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## **Central Eurasia**

***Military Affairs***

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# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

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4 March 1992

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## CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

### **Lt-Gen Korobeynikov on Problems Facing Border Troops**

*92UM0588A Moscow TRUD in Russian 11 Feb 92 p 2*

[Interview with Lt-Gen Ivan Mikhaylovich Korobeynikov, first deputy chairman of the Committee for Protection of the State Border, by Yu. Dmitriyev; place and date not given: "The Border Is the Same for Everyone"]

[Text] Our interview is with Lieutenant-General I.M. Korobeynikov, first deputy chairman of the Committee for Protection of the State Border.

[Dmitriyev] Ivan Mikhaylovich, what is the mood in the Border Troops, whom the country has always considered the "elite?"

[Korobeynikov] Frankly, it is not important. The events in our society, naturally, could not pass by the troops. The uncertainty concerns everyone. Our people do not know precisely what borders they are protecting and what their future fate is.

[Dmitriyev] What is the position of the committee on which you now serve?

[Korobeynikov] We advocate a single foreign border for the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] and unified Border Troops on a fundamentally new basis. At a meeting of the heads of state of the CIS participants at the end of last year, Colonel-General Ilya Yakovlevich Kalinichenko was appointed commander in chief of the Border Troops. He was instructed to develop within 2 months, jointly with the leadership of the sovereign republics of the Commonwealth, a mechanism of the activities of the troops taking into account the requirements of national laws. We have prepared draft agreements based on this.

[Dmitriyev] Was it limited to this?

[Korobeynikov] Of course not. The chairman of the committee, Colonel-General I. Kalinichenko, left for personal meetings with the leaders of the CIS member-countries. We also prepared a package of documents on protection of the border and economic zone of the Commonwealth, on the status and fundamentals of the activities of the Border Troops, and on unified command of the troops, which we hope will be examined by the presidents of the sovereign republics on 14 February. Given a favorable decision, the Border Troops will still remain unified, true, now in a new capacity.

[Dmitriyev] Are they needed as such? After all, we have abandoned the "iron curtain."

[Korobeynikov] Be that as it may, there is something to think about here. Beginning this year, for example, the continuous signaling system and the notorious "barbed wire" will be removed from the border. But the border itself remains, and the situation here is not simple.

Last year, for example, not counting the sadly well-known massive border violations in the south of the country, we arrested a record number of violators—more than 5,000

people. And believe me, no matter what side of the cordon they were trying to cross, their intentions were not at all harmless. The vast majority break the law for mercenary reasons: smuggling or for some economic purpose. Or let us take the border with Afghanistan—people who are desperate come across our border, steal everything they can get their hands on, and fire weapons without a second thought. Already this year in the Pyandzh Border Detachment, Senior Lieutenant Yuriy Moyashev died in a clash with bandits, a border helicopter was fired on from neighboring territory, and mining of our roads in the area along the border continues.

Let us turn our attention to the traffic control post service. There is a unique "record" here, too—border guards have arrested more than 5,500 people with someone else's or counterfeit documents. Compared just to 1990, such violations have increased almost 2.5-fold. The amount of contraband confiscated at traffic control posts exceeded 8 million rubles.

Damage from poaching in our economic zone is increasing, whether this has to do with the Black Sea or the Pacific Ocean basin. Just in the convention area, border guard patrol ships prevented, according to the most modest estimates, the plundering of approximately 50,000 tons of our fish stocks. The state "earned" 7 million foreign currency rubles in fines. Unfortunately, this is a drop in that same ocean. Vessels under the flags of the PRC, Poland, Bulgaria were added to the "traditional" poachers making a living in our economic zone and in the convention area in the Pacific Ocean—the Japanese, Taiwanese, and Koreans.

[Dmitriyev] But really, won't each of the republics be able to ensure reliable protection of their own borders?

[Korobeynikov] In principle, yes. Another question is what will it cost? The leadership of each of the member-republics of the CIS has been offered share participation in maintaining the Border Troops, which, according to experts' estimates, will cost them several times less than creating and fully supporting their own structures. Here is an example. Armament, equipment, uniforms, and food-stuffs are supplied to the Border Troops from practically the entire territory of the former Union. It is understandable what breaking the existing ties will lead to here. Incidentally, in the republics that have decided to have "sovereign" border troops, the management staff has already reached impressive size and there remains a trend for it to expand!

Then there is personnel training. We have a total of three schools training real border guard professionals, and they graduate enough officers to organize service in all the sovereign republics. They have a base equipped with everything necessary for improving the skills of command personnel and specialists. If all these educational institutions were to belong only to those republics on whose territory they are located, what is left for the rest of them? Build their own educational institutions or pay "rent" for the training officers at their "neighbors?"

We cannot say that the Baltic countries are successfully solving the problem of training personnel for their border guards, although they are exerting considerable effort in this area. But recently at the "Klaypeda" traffic control post, the Lithuanian border guards calmly let through four people with counterfeit documents, and the violators were arrested by an officer of our border guard district—a real professional.

[Dmitriyev] But the possible "division" of the Border Troops means not only separating armament and equipment according to "national quarters"...

[Korobeynikov] Of course not! Figuratively speaking, we will have to slice the living. The possible fireworks of oaths will inflict a crushing blow to the very basis of the Border Troops—the officers, after which the troops themselves will in essence no longer remain. Today I am already afraid to release compulsory service soldiers, noncommissioned officers, seamen, and petty officers drafted from a number of sovereign republics on leave they have earned—some of them are not given the opportunity to return to their unit or subunit if they are located on the territory of a given state. Recently, two lads of the Moldavian and two of the Uzbek nationalities had difficulty returning to the Far East Border District. They understand what will never reach some politicians: it is not so important where you are serving—you are still protecting your own land and your own home. It is much more important how you serve.

[Dmitriyev] Does preserving unified Border Troops apparently also assumes preserving a unified border policy?

[Korobeynikov] You are absolutely right. A coordinated, unified policy in the interests of each of the sovereign republics and all of them together. It is no secret that attempts by individual states of the Commonwealth to make a "transparent" border are turning out badly not only for them. The decision of the leadership of Moldova to admit Romanian citizens on its territory without visas and only by passports by no means did not oblige some of them to enrich themselves culturally and acquire property and goods namely and exclusively in this republic. Today you meet "visa-less" Romanians everywhere. Of course, not all of them are traveling merely to become familiar with new areas. Romanian citizens try to get into Poland, Finland, and other countries from the territory of other sovereign member-states of the CIS. One group even managed to cross the border of Russia and China and from there defect to North Korea. No, I do not advocate building an "iron curtain." It is a matter of a reasonable, weighted approach to admitting foreign citizens onto the territory of states of the Commonwealth.

[Dmitriyev] Won't unified Border Troops do some harm to the sovereignty of the republics?

[Korobeynikov] Under no circumstances! Border protection in each of the states of the Commonwealth will be accomplished on the basis of its laws, and the Border Troops will be subordinate to the president and the commander in chief of the Border Troops. A commander of Border Troops units stationed on the territory of a republic will also be appointed only with consent of the president.

The people love and support the defenders of their borders. A curious example comes from Uzbekistan. Recently, some of the recruits of the Termez Border Detachment, drafted in the republic, tried to leave their training post. Shortly thereafter, nearly all of them were returned to the unit by their parents or older brothers. I admit that the relatives gave some of the deserters a slap in the face so as not to shirk protecting the borders of their own state. After deputies, clergy, and other respectable people of Uzbekistan spoke before these young soldiers, no one tried to run again. Of course, manning units from the indigenous residents does not mean that lads from other regions will not serve on the territory of this republic. They will, but only on a voluntary or contract basis.

We hope very much to preserve the unity of the Border Troops and finally determine their status. In my opinion, the situation that has developed does not suit any sober-minded person. There is a paradox: the situation on the border is heated up, and in some places the border guards are being shot in the back, both figuratively and literally (as happened, for example, in Nakhichevan, when Private Yuriy Panasenko, a wonderful lad, died). They are shot by those who are being protected by the border guards, sparing neither effort nor life. It cannot continue like this for long. We now have a real opportunity to see light at the end of the tunnel...

[Dmitriyev] All this is true, but Ukraine has already created its own Border Troops.

[Korobeynikov] This is the business of the government of the republic and its people. However, I think that the ties between the Border Troops of Ukraine and of the states of the Commonwealth will be preserved. It is difficult to say in what form, but we are hoping.

### **Tatarstan Supports Unified Military**

92UM0567C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 11 Feb 92 p 2

[Interview with Major A. Perov, member, Tatarstan Supreme Council Presidium, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col O. Bedula: "No Present Need for Tatarstan Army"; date and place not given, first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Tatarstan has been increasingly at the center of attention of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Developments occurring here tend to render some kind of influence on the future of Russia and of the entire Commonwealth.

The republic's military policy is the subject of our correspondent's interview below with Major A. Perov, member of the Tatarstan Supreme Council Presidium, who in the Parliament is responsible for maintaining communication with local councils and for dealing with the Armed Forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States].

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Anatoliy Ivanovich, Tatarstan continues to pursue its political, legal, economic, and administrative independence. It appears that the military question is the only one that has not been addressed, by the

Parliament, president, or the government. Is that the republic's official government line, or is it a matter of time before something develops there?

[Perov] That sort of question is being asked of the republic's Parliament, the president, and the government with increasing frequency, and not only by journalists. The answer has been and continues to be the same: Tatarstan does not have an army of its own, and there are no plans to create one.

Nevertheless, some persons of the native population with whom I had an opportunity to speak recently on the streets of Kazan told me that they are in favor of creating a small but well-equipped mobile army that would have the National Guard as its backbone. Specifically, the idea is expressed by some of the Tatar Public Center and the youth organization Azatlyk.

In addition, they are attempting to create detachments of the National Guard. However, the Republic Procuracy Office has cautioned the leaders of the public organizations relative to legal liability for anticonstitutional acts.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Speaking of the Constitution, Article 61 of the republic's new draft Constitution states that citizens of the Tatarstan Republic are obligated to perform military service and protect their Fatherland. The basic law apparently makes references to the future statehood of Tatarstan. But how do you define the term "Fatherland"? Does it pertain only to the area of the republic or the entire Russian Federation?

[Perov] The article you mentioned is the only one in the draft Constitution that makes reference to military service and military construction. That in my opinion is indicative. As far as the term "Fatherland" is concerned, its interpretation relative to questions of defense will be clarified by a general referendum specifying the republic's status with respect to Russia. The Supreme Council has not taken up the issue of making any changes in the republic's military construction. The structure of the highest legislative body does not include any subunit, such as a commission, subcommittee, group, or committee, that would have military problems in its purview.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How does the Supreme Council feel about the polemics regarding the issue of unified or combined Armed Forces?

[Perov] This is an area in which we stand in complete agreement with the recently held Officers' Assembly: It is absolutely necessary to save the Army; to not permit it to be split up into separate, competing factions; to not permit disintegration of the defense potential into nationalistic pieces. This is the only way in which it will be possible to develop a single doctrine, define the status of servicemen within the area encompassing the CIS countries, carry out reform of the Armed Forces, and provide uniform social and legal guarantees for servicemen. Any other resolution of these problems will invariably lead to conflicts, finally to complete division. The republic's leadership is exhibiting a position that is more in harmony, compared with

the last few years, with that of the authorities of the Volga-Ural Military District.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Anatoliy Ivanovich, it is no secret that the latest draft call for the Armed Forces experienced considerable difficulty. Certain sovereign states permitted only a minimum of draftees to be called up or refused to provide any youths at all for the army of the Commonwealth countries. What position does Tatarstan take on this issue?

[Perov] The republic's commissariats filled the General Staff's "order" this fall in the amount of 100 percent. Our boys do not serve in only the Baltic countries, the Urals, and certain areas of the Caucasus. Soldiers drafted from Tatarstan have not drawn any complaints, judging by comments made by military authorities of districts, fleets, and groups of forces.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But there have been heated debates in Parliament over sending draftees to construction troops. Just what is the cause of the trouble here?

[Perov] What happened was that the General Staff failed to coordinate with the Supreme Council when it raised the draft quota for construction units: from the previous 1,100 to 3,000 men. That definitely caused misunderstanding. The Supreme Council requested the then USSR Ministry of Defense for an explanation. Soon afterward, we were visited by representatives of the General Staff. We decided to meet the General Staff half-way, agreeing to induct 1,900 men into construction units.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It is a fact that the social area is the most worrisome and pressing for the Army. What does the republic intend to do in this respect for the benefit of servicemen?

[Perov] Our response here is reflected not only in future plans, but also in current actions. Judge for yourself: The government has already distributed lots for building cottages to be occupied by families of servicemen. There are no problems in providing officers and warrant officers with lots for dachas and plots for gardens. In this connection, both money and construction materials have been distributed for residential construction. A Cabinet of Ministers decree releases servicemen with children who attend state kindergartens from paying rent, in the established amounts of 120 to 130 rubles a month.

In addition, the Republic Ministry of Trade has provided the Kazan voyentorg with several hundred thousand rubles' worth of highly scarce products and has subsidized equipping the induction station of the Republic Military Commissariat in the amount of one-half million rubles. The government has set a 50-percent discount on fees for admitting conscript servicemen to cultural institutions.

Reserve officers also have not been forgotten. A Tatarstan government decree has established a reserve officer retraining center at the Commercial Academy and created a state commerce school. Retired Lieutenant General V. Fomin was appointed to the position of head.

The housing problem is not as easy to resolve. The trade unions still do not accept the government's offer of allotting 6 percent of housing under construction to the military; this remains an area in which we must satisfy all interests. The Ministry of Defense did not take timely action to extend the housing agreement with local authorities; hence the current problems. Nevertheless, we hope that the republic will resolve the present apartment obligation sometime in 1992.

### Reports of New Servicemen's Organizations

#### Independent Union of Servicemen

92UM0618A Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian 17 Jan 92 p 2

[INTERFAX report: "Military Establishes an Independent Trade Union"]

[Text] The founding conference of the Independent Trade Union of Servicemen (NPSB) of the CIS Armed Forces is to be held in Moscow on 17 January. Taking part in it will be representatives of military districts of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and also army units stationed on the territories of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The conference is being conducted independently of the all-Army assembly that is being held on the same day.

Mikhail Kolchev, a member of the organizing committee of the NPSB, announced that the future trade union "does not intend to set political objectives for itself, but will engage only in the social protection of its members, first of all, officers of army subunits that are returning to the territory of Russia." M. Kolchev emphasized that the NPSB is categorically opposed to strikes as a means for the trade union to achieve its objectives. The NPSB organizational committee announced its readiness to accept into the trade union representatives of the National Guards of CIS member republics.

#### Veterans' Organization Charter Registered

92UM0618B Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*  
in Russian 21 Jan 92 p 3

[Report by unnamed TASS correspondent: "CIS Veterans Now with Charter"]

[Text] The charter of a new public association—the Community (Union) of Veterans' Organizations of the CIS has been registered with the Russian Ministry of Justice. Nikolay Shapalin, chairman of the coordinating council of this public association, reported this to a TASS correspondent. It became the successor to the All-Union Organization of Veterans of War and Labor and the Armed Forces.

#### Officers for Russia's Rebirth

92UM0618C Moscow *SYN OTECHESTVA* in Russian  
No 4, 24 Jan 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "New Movement Established"]

[Text] An all-Russian conference of the young social-patriotic organization "Officers for the Rebirth of Russia" Movement was held in Moscow the other day. It united

regular officers and those who were discharged into the reserve or who are retired. The main purpose of the movement is the social protection of servicemen, affirmation of the traditions of officer honor and dignity, and the restoration of the Russian officer corps and Cossacks capable of organizing the Russian Army in such a way as to guarantee the national and territorial security of the state and the rebirth of Russia.

In the appeal of an initiative group, which was disseminated on the eve of the conference, literally the following was said in this regard: "...The time has come for all honorable officers of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and security organs, including those in the reserve or in retirement, to stop the destruction of the state, the economy, culture, and morality through their common efforts. The voice of officers in the defense of the people should be heard, and the opinion of officers should be taken into account in the resolution of state problems."

#### Loss of Property in Withdrawal From Mongolia

92UM0459A Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*  
in Russian 21 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by special correspondent A. Khokhlov: "Why Do We Need Other People's Land, Colonel?"]

[Text] Our troops are pulling out of Mongolia, leaving behind property worth 2.5 billion rubles.

We shall never be rich, because we are too generous. And the poorer our lives, the more we give away. The fate of property of the armed forces of the former USSR is a most graphic example of this.

You cannot make omelets without breaking eggs. While parceling out the power and dividing up the previously unified nation, the politicians have apparently not yet grasped the fact that each "egg" is worth billions. We cannot recover what we left in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and what we will soon leave in Germany will perhaps be compensated for in the form of humanitarian aid. One cannot understand why we are leaving so much in Mongolia, however.

We are leaving Mongolia on our own.

Ambassador to the Mongolian Republic V. Sitnikov recalls: "I was instructed immediately to inform former leader of Mongolia Batmunkh that Soviet troops would soon be withdrawn from Mongolia. Batmunkh was absolutely opposed. Our army entered Mongolia at the request of its government during a period of tense relations with China. The military lived fairly amicably with the local population. They helped whenever they could.... I reported the attitude of the Mongolians to Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. I was told: Inform them that the decision has already been made."

It was the correct decision, one should note, but....

A purely Soviet phenomenon: The sun does not come up over our hearth and home after every rooster's crow. The military resolved their problems, compiled a schedule for

the withdrawal of units and subunits and began transferring personnel. The matter of the property of the armed forces in Mongolia, however, from which our last soldier is to depart by 1 September, has still not been decided.

One cannot say that no attempts were made to see to the fate of our common property in Mongolia. Former Chairman of the Council of Ministers N.I. Ryzhkov signed two documents, each of which is amazing for the incompetence of those who compiled it (and not just them). A telegram sent to the Soviet embassy in Ulan Bator specified that all military property not being removed was to be sold for the price of its remaining value. Just how we were to "conjure" an additional 2.5 billion rubles from the government of a nation which already owed us more than 10 billion remained a mystery. Soon thereafter, Nikolay Ivanovich put his signature to another order with the same sort of ease. This order actually gave away barracks and other housing worth 800 million rubles (at the old prices), as well as vehicles, machinery, equipment and other property from depots of the Ministry of Defense. A "gift" worth a total of 2.5 billion rubles.

Strange as it seems to us today, there are countries in which people's lives are far worse than ours. Mongolia is one of them. After 1917 the Russians "took revenge" on the Mongolians for the 300-year yoke. We imposed our path of development upon them for 70 years. And half of the residents of Ulan Bator still live in prehistoric yurts. Today the Mongolians look at extremely rich neighboring China and prosperous South Korea, and are increasingly beginning to reproach us.... Should we repent of our sins and leave as a gratis offering that which we have not yet been able to sell?

Alas, we shall be the poorer for such a gift, and the Mongolians will gain nothing.

Col V. Lipshits tells the following: "We withdrew the division from Choir. We left 39 barracks, five mess halls, four boiler facilities, a hospital, a dormitory for 170 people and 17 apartment buildings with 1,250 well-outfitted apartments. We asked the Mongolians to send us their specialists to learn how to maintain this large facility. They were unable to do so. They had too few specialists. They invited Mongolians without apartments to live in the post, offered them 2,000 tugriks and free rent for three years. There were few takers. There was housing but no jobs. Empty concrete boxes stand in Choir today, surrounded by several dozen yurts....

The same fate befell the military posts at Sain Shanda, Nalaikha... and where else? It is not valid to accuse the Mongolians of squandering our former property. They have no need of it in their mountains and deserts. Nor is there anyone for us to "bring to account." Ryzhkov is retired, Pavlov is in prison, Gaidar appears to have had nothing to do with anything....

In Moscow's halls of power there has only been talk about the need to conclude first a Soviet-Mongolian agreement and now, a Mongolian-Russian intergovernmental agreement on the fate of property of the former USSR's army in

Mongolia. For now the sovereign interests are being protected only by the last sovereign people of the Russian state, the military.

After many years of traipsing around remote locations, 62-year-old Maj Gen V. Mizun was serving in a quiet and peaceful position in the Chita Oblast Military Commissariat. When the troop withdrawal from Mongolia was begun, the choice of leadership fell on him. Mizun agreed, even though the offer certainly did not involve a promotion.

Today he is in Mongolia: Yeltsin, Gaidar, Kozryev and the military commander all in one. Representing the interests of our nation—"not the one which was, but the one which is yet to be"—Vyacheslav Grigoryevich is cunning, resourceful and uncompromising. Not a single Mongolian "initiative" to appropriate the best as rapidly as possible has won in the battles which have broken over the bastion of Mizun's character.

With risk and fear Vyacheslav Grigoryevich is hauling to the homeland everything he can—from a soldier's stool to concrete slabs—from the airfield on Genghis Khan Hill. Most importantly, however, he is dragging out the gratis transfer of military facilities in the hope that the trouble in the homeland will end and someone among our new politicians will understand that it is more profitable to sell than to give things away, particularly since the Mongolian side will be none the worse off for it.

Not a week passes during which Soviet or Mongolian entrepreneurs do not push through a meeting with Gen Mizun. They all have the same request: Help us set up a joint Mongolian-Soviet enterprise. Our military property in Mongolia is also attracting the attention of foreign businessmen. Businessmen from South Korea are eager, together with the Mongolians and us, to exploit the military post at Baganur, from which our unit will withdraw in June of 1992.

The People's Great Hural of the Mongolian Republic recently adopted a decision making it possible to sell land to private parties. The Mongolian path to capitalism has a green light. Will we get the green light for ours?

We gave away to Mongolia 22 military posts in 1991 alone. We have yet to benefit from this transfer. If we succeed in retaining a share of the joint enterprises, in a year or two money will begin to flow into Mongolia's budget and also into the budget of our nation, whichever of the endlessly changing names it ends up with. Let us reach agreement, and we can get by without "wooden" rubles and tugriks. The poor do not need money for their accounting. The in-kind exchange brought up from the depths of the centuries and referred to with the fashionable foreign term "barter" in the post-socialist era will be mutually advantageous. Trade between the USSR and Mongolia has always been advantageous to both sides, after all. We sold oil and machine-tools and purchased things which would have cost us an arm and a leg in dollars: rare metals, meat, furs and hides. Or do we not need these things today?



We are leaving Mongolia. The military are taking everything they can. The soldiers load 6-7 tons of property onto trucks a day. Hard as they might work, however, they cannot take that which is not transportable: our real estate on Mongolian land.

And businessmen occupy our rooms. Businessmen from joint enterprises occupy those not neglected or damaged. Unfortunately, however, we are not involved in the joint ventures.

A young and enterprising Mongolian, Otgonbayar Davasambu set up a joint enterprise with a Japanese firm. For a million tugriks he bought four barracks in the center of the capital. He believes he bought them cheap, because the city executive committee of Ulan Bator is for now selling for next to nothing former Soviet property it got for free. Business is excellent for Otgonbayar. He produces cosmetic and artist's brushes from horse hairs, squirrel and Siberian polecat fur. He is optimistic about the future and is prepared to trade with us. He wants to buy several more abandoned buildings first, though.

And Col Valeriy Ivanovich Novik, who has served the homeland honorably, anticipates returning home with alarm and pain. Col Novik has put in more than the required years as an officer, but he has no apartment. Nor is there housing for 85% of his colleagues returning from Mongolia in the near future.

"If I had my way," a warrant officer in Ulan Bator admitted, "I would physically drag my apartment to the border. Who is going to give me a place in the homeland?"

This is probably on the minds of our military right now in Germany and Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.

It is too bad the politicians did not think of this. While producing nuclear warheads and fleets, they forgot about the people who handle the weapons. A small portion of the proceeds from the sale of real estate and other property of the former USSR in the former "fraternal" nations would suffice to provide them with a tolerable existence at home. The politicians turn to the army, however, only when they need it.

### **Official Discusses Fate of Those Not Taking Ukrainian Oath**

92UM0572A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
28 Feb 92 p 1

[Interview with Colonel Ivan Pavlovich Khaletskiy, acting chief of the Personnel Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, by *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* correspondent under the rubric "Topical!": "If He Has Not Taken the Oath"]

[Text] The Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine and the command element of the military units have given military personnel complete independence with respect to such an important matter as taking the oath of loyalty to the people of the Ukraine. According to data received by the Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine, most of the personnel have taken

this oath. Many, however, have made a different choice for one reason or another. This has immediately raised a large number of questions for us.

Our correspondent met with Col Ivan Pavlovich Khaletskiy, acting chief of the Personnel Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, and asked him to answer the most urgent questions.

[Correspondent] May officers who have not taken the oath of loyalty to the Ukraine continue to serve?

[Khaletskiy] Those servicemen who for whatever reason have not taken the oath may continue and are required to continue serving and fulfill their duty under the previous oath. No one has a right to force them to take the oath of loyalty to the people of the Ukraine or apply any kind of pressure.

The forces have received the temporary agreement worked out by us. The serviceman who signs it but does not take the oath commits himself conscientiously to perform his service duties, to respect and observe the laws of the Ukraine. I feel that this is a very democratic step making it possible to find compromises in the existing, complicated situation and avoid alienating those servicemen who want to serve in the armed forces of the Ukraine but have still not arrived at a final decision for a number of thoroughly personal reasons.

We understand these hesitations. Particularly since thousands of Ukrainian citizens serving outside the Ukraine are in a similar situation. I presume that this problem will be settled in the near future at the level of interstate agreements.

[Correspondent] What are the time periods for transferring military personnel who want to continue their service in another nation of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]?

[Khaletskiy] If a serviceman decides he wants to serve in a different country of the CIS, we will not prevent this. The specific system for transferring officers from one sovereign state to another has not been worked out. This is despite the fact that we have already received requests for officer exchanges from Moldova and Belarus. As interstate agreements are concluded, however, we shall transfer servicemen who have submitted requests to those states of the CIS where they have indicated a desire to serve.

[Correspondent] Will the departing officers be given an opportunity to exchange housing?

[Khaletskiy] Yes, that will be possible. We shall engage in the direct exchange of officers in order somehow to meet the people's needs for housing. The officers will be able to trade apartments.

[Correspondent] Our readers are concerned that there might be a repeat of the Stalinist repression against the families of those officers who have not taken the oath and have departed to serve in other states of the CIS.

[Khaletskiy] No, that will not be repeated. Setting up our sovereign state and its armed forces in a civilized and legal

way, we have not yet provided any grounds for accusing us of a barbaric, dictatorial approach to the resolution of these or any other issues. And we do not intend to violate the democratic principles in the future. Regardless of nationality or religion, and all the more, where one's relatives serve, the laws of the Ukraine apply fully to all its citizens.

[Correspondent] Will cadets who do not take the oath be permitted to complete the military school and receive an unencumbered diploma?

[Khaletskiy] Those cadets who do not take the oath will have the right peacefully to complete the semester and take the test. Only then will they be transferred to those schools in the CIS where they want to continue their training.

If a cadet expresses a desire to transfer to a civilian VUZ, we will not only not prevent this but will, as the Military Training Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has stated, facilitate it to the extent of our capabilities.

#### **North Ossetia Forms National Guard**

92UM0556B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 7 Feb 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Northern Ossetia Forming National Guard"]

[Text] Three battalions of three companies each, and three separate companies (two of them special-purpose and one cavalry) are what seem to comprise the future National Guard of Northern Ossetia. Total manpower of the units will amount to 2,000 men. Elements of the National Guard number 270 men so far; their armaments consist of 14 armored personnel carriers and small arms. The Guard is commanded by Kim Tsegolov, a retired general who previously held an instructor's position in a military academy, an "Afghaner."

#### **Editorial: Servicemen Complain on Prices, Wages**

92UM0547A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
7 Feb 92 First edition pp 1, 3

[Editorial: "The AFB and MVD Are Ours, But the Army Is Someone Else's: It Seems That Is Precisely How Some Functionaries at the Ministry of Economics and Finance of Russia Reason"]

[Text] These days the editorial office is receiving more letters than ever before about the social problems of servicemen. And this is understandable. The liberalization of prices is closing up everything more and more drastically. Money is decreasing in value before our very eyes. Unlike most others, a serviceman does not have the opportunity to earn additional money—he, a state person, has to count only on how the appropriate state bodies assess his difficult military labor.

Judging from the mail, many of our readers feel reassured by the position of Russian President B.N. Yeltsin, who stated more than once, including at the recent All-Army Officer Assembly, the intention to ensure reliable social protection of servicemen and their families during the transition to market relations. At the same time, many

express concern over whether the president's plans will be drowned in red tape and opposition by some administrative structures. They ask KRASNAYA ZVEZDA to probe into this more actively and fight to see that servicemen do not end up being hurt during today's difficult times.

Alas, it seems that such concerns are not unfounded. In any event, information at the editorial office's disposal makes us think about this. A fairly great deal has been written about compensation in connection with liberalization of prices for servicemen of the armed forces, bodies of state security, and the rank-and-file and supervisory personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD]. Certainly, no one here has any assumptions that the labor of all these categories of individuals is not equally important to the state and that compensation will be accomplished unequally.

However, by Resolution No 38 of 20 January 1992 of the government of the Russian Federation, salaries for rank-and-file and supervisory personnel of the Russian Federation MVD and servicemen of the Russian Federation Federal Security Agency [AFB] were set at 1.5-2 times higher than for corresponding categories of servicemen of the armed forces. Salaries for special ranks are also stipulated in amounts greater than salaries for military ranks.

How could this have happened? For an explanation, we turned to the Central Finance Directorate of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]. Here is what Colonel Yu. Ilin, a department chief of this directorate, told us:

"Back in late November and early December 1991, the wage problems of these individuals were discussed at a working group meeting in the government of the Russian Federation with participation by representatives of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labor, the Armed Forces, the MVD, and the KGB. The Central Finance Directorate of the Armed Forces raised this issue again when in the first half of January 1992 the staff of the Ministry of Economics and Ministry of Labor of the Russian Federation were already considering a draft resolution on wage conditions of rank-and-file and supervisory personnel of the Russian Federation MVD and servicemen of the Russian Federation Federal Security Agency. The request by the Central Finance Directorate of the Armed Forces on inviting its representatives to the discussion was disregarded. This draft became a reality, despite the fact that a similar document on applying these wage conditions to servicemen, submitted by the Main Command of the Armed Forces, was already in the staff of the Russian Federation Government.

Today it is unclear what final decision will be adopted with respect to servicemen. However, we know for sure about the official conclusion by the functionaries of the Ministry of Economics submitted to the Russian Federation government on 3 February 1992: the salaries of servicemen of the armed forces should be lower than rank-and-file and supervisory personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and servicemen of the Federal Security Agency. It goes

without saying—a “profoundly” well-founded conclusion in connection with liberation of prices!

Having worked in finance positions for 32 years, I cannot understand why the pay of a tank platoon commander, a combat missile system engineer, or a nuclear-powered submarine engineer should be nearly half the salary of a lieutenant in the MVD. The pay of these servicemen is 50 percent lower than that of a rank-and-file fireman in the MVD and 20 percent lower than that of a manager of archives, an officer worker....

It would be interesting to find out why, say, a platoon commander, a warrant officer, transferred from the MVD to the armed forces to an equivalent position would suddenly begin receiving 50 percent less pay for his rank, and the salary is twice that. What, are prices for servicemen of the armed forces lower, or did this warrant officer, who was serving in Tver and sent, for example, to the Transcaucasus, arrive at a resort? Or why will an officer in the AFB serving a military unit or large unit of the armed force receive more than the commanders of these units and large units?

No one can call into question the fact that a number of subunits and structures of the MVD and AFB today are performing their missions in complicated conditions, just like servicemen in a number of regions of the country. But this is another issue altogether. Performing duty in such conditions should be governed by payment of bonuses and compensation and by granting benefits.

Ridiculous miscalculations? I would like to think it is just that. Although there is information that the method of mending the worn moneybag at the expense of servicemen in the staff of the Ministry of Finance, possibly, is not all that accidental. We have learned from official sources that here they are even talking about the possibility of revising some of the decisions made at one time by the government and the President of the former USSR with respect to servicemen and casting doubt on the validity and even the legitimacy of making them.

We would be happy if officials would officially deny this sort of information or if it turned out that this is merely the position of individual persons in the ministry. In any case, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is willing to provide space on its pages for leaders of the government of Russia, the Ministry of Economics, and the Ministry of Finance to explain their policy with respect to material and financial support of servicemen and to solving their social problems.

We are well aware of the squall of phone calls and letters that will result from this article and what outrage it will evoke in military collectives. But we must promulgate the information we have. It is too painful a topic to keep quiet about today. No matter how difficult, we must not, as was done in past years, profit at the expense of the material situation of those in the military. Any sensible politician and economist should understand this.

I would like to hope that the staff's position is not yet the position of the government, that the government has not yet had its say, that the Russian parliament, in which we

have heard quite a few assurances about understanding the problems of the Army and Navy, will also state its attitude towards this conflict, and that Russian President B.N. Yeltsin will be steadfast in defending his line and be true to himself.

### **Morale Problems of 14th Army**

92UM0550B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 8 Feb 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Rudenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: “The 14th Army, Stationed in Ukraine and Moldova, Including in the Dniester Region, Has Found Itself Between Three Fires”]

[Text] In most regions of the country, the Army has unwillingly ended up at the epicenter of political struggle. Furthermore, it is a harsh struggle, in which political motives and sometimes ambitions are often placed above the interests of people and the security of the fatherland. The officers and soldiers of the 14th Guards Combined-Arms Army have experienced for themselves how adversely this reflects on combat readiness, the mood of servicemen, and stabilization of the situation in the region.

“Our large unit is in a unique situation,” explained Major-General V. Sitnikov, chief of staff. “Judge for yourself. The army is stationed in nine garrisons, four of which are located in Ukraine, three in Moldova, and two in the Dniester region. All three republics have stated their intention to have their own national armed forces and have begun forming them. We have found ourselves between three fires.”

The general said with pain in his heart how difficult it is to carry out military duty when they try constantly to provoke you, draw you into a conflict, and accuse you of sins you did not commit. Let us recall if only the statements of some especially zealous politicians and journalists that the 14th Army allegedly observes neutrality in words only, but in actuality is supplying the guards of the Dniester region with weapons and combat equipment. All this is an unceasing lies and slander. At the headquarters, I was shown documents from which it followed that in the entire 14th Army, beginning in 1946, a total of 11 weapons have been under investigation: 7 pistols, 3 assault rifles, and 1 machinegun. Not a single soldier and not a single assault rifle or pistol have been involved in shootings. This fact cannot be refuted. Incidentally, those who wanted to do so were convinced of this long ago.

It should be said that the army's desire to be outside of politics and to maintain neutrality evokes an ambiguous reaction both in Moldova and in the Dniester region. Some condemn servicemen for the position of noninterference and urge them to determine whose side they are on. Fortunately, there are not too many of these people for now. The majority of residents in the region react with understanding to the armed defenders' problems and strive to maintain traditionally good relations with them. This is a sure sign that with any development of events, the army and the people will not end up on different sides of the barricades.

Those who stir up passions concerning the army should be reminded that this is a very dangerous game. Everything has its limit, including the patience of servicemen. They have grown tired of uncertainty, unfair accusations, and threats, first from one side, then another, and then yet another.

"Who are we, to whom are we subordinate, what state are we protecting?" Lieutenant Grigoriy Sokolov, for example, asks reasonably.

The young officer's question is not as rhetorical as it may seem at first glance. The situation is so complex and involved that, I am afraid, there is simply no clear answer to it for the time being. A difficult search is under way for the least painful way out of the situation that has taken shape. It should be said that thanks to the weighed approach to the 14th Army's problems, the leadership of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] has already managed to achieve much on this path.

Without a doubt, the most important thing was the decision of Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov on resubordinating the army directly to the commander of the Ground Forces. It was welcomed with enthusiasm in the units.

However, the presidents and governments of Ukraine, Moldova, and the Dniester region have virtually ignored this decision. They have declared their right to troops stationed on their territories, issued decrees on transferring units and subunits to their jurisdiction, and suggested that servicemen take a pledge of allegiance to the republics. As a result, the servicemen again have found themselves in the role of pawns in the hands of politicians.

Today it is already obvious that it is not likely that the decision of the commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces will be able to be implemented fully. For the time being, only the troops stationed in the Dniester region have become directly subordinate to the commander of the Ground Forces. The fate of units and subunits located in Ukraine and Moldova has not been decided completely.

I have talked with many members of both the Moscow commission and the commission of the Odessa Military District Headquarters involved with receiving and transferring troops, and their opinion is clear—dividing the army among the republics cannot be avoided. It actually has already taken place. For the Commonwealth of Independent States, the loss of the 14th Army as a unified combat unit means that an important strategic axis in the southwest of the CIS remains uncovered for all practical purposes. This already affects the security interests not only of Ukraine, the Dniester region, or Moldova, but also of the entire Commonwealth. But who is paying attention to such "trivial matters" today? Everyone is concerned about something else—how to grab for themselves a bigger piece of the former Soviet Army. This is not about people and their social protection, but about combat equipment, arms, military facilities, and defense installations, which later on could be, if not used, at least sold. This reminds me of the subject of a well-known anecdote, where one of

the heroes says: If I do not eat up the bag of apples, I will at least take a bite out of them.

Servicemen do not in any way dispute the right of any of the republics to have its own army. What is more, they are ready to help them in any way they can. But the haste with which the republics are forming their armed forces is hardly helping to stabilize the situation. A thoughtful, step-by-step approach is needed here; above all, civilized political decisions are needed.

The talks held last week between the deputy commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces, Colonel-General V. Pyankov, and leaders of the government and State Department on Military Issues of the Republic of Moldova on the conditions, directions, and phases of reforming units and subunits stationed in Moldova convincingly indicates that these problems can be resolved. The talks were held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and a search for a reasonable compromise. The parties called for a preparatory period preceding the transfer of units and subunits to the jurisdiction of Moldova, during which the troops will be completely subordinate to the Main Command of the CIS Armed Forces. They also specified questions of manning, financing, material-technical and food support. Special emphasis was placed on problems of social and legal protection of servicemen and their family members. They retain the right to decide for themselves where they will serve in the future, apartment or waiting list for one, pension, and so forth. Incidentally, it is assumed that by no means all units stationed on the right bank of the Dniester will come under the jurisdiction of Moldova, that is to say, wild privatization here, it seems, will be able to be avoided.

Things are more complex with Ukraine on this matter. Troops of the 14th Army stationed there have actually already been "privatized" by the republic, and the Ukrainian oath has already been instituted.

The Dniester Moldovan Republic is in a totally special situation. As we know, it is not officially recognized. But it exists in reality, and this cannot be ignored.

The former commander of the 14th Army, Lieutenant-General G. Yakovlev, appointed chief of the Administration for Defense and Security of the Dniester Moldovan Republic [DMR], informed me that to date the President of the DMR and the government have drawn up and passed all normative acts on the future armed forces of the Dniester region.

General Yakovlev called the resubordination of the 14th Army to the commander of the Ground Forces the most correct decision in the given situation. But at the same time, he is convinced that although units stationed in the DMR have not been transferred to the jurisdiction of the DMR, as the decree of President I. Smirnov requires, the government and residents of the Left Bank will not permit them to be withdrawn from there or disbanded. The armed guardsmen near military installations, combat equipment depots, and airfields strictly monitoring every piece of

combat equipment that goes beyond the borders of the garrison convince us that the general's words are not unfounded.

Under no circumstances do I want to cast aspersions on the patriotic feelings of the guardsmen, the soldiers of the "Dniester" Battalion, and Cossacks, ready with weapons in hand to protect their young republic, but I will say frankly that the appearance of new military formations in the region is causing me personally more alarm than joy. It is a great misfortune that when entering Tiraspol or Dubossary today, you encounter submachinegunners instead of the smiling faces of the townspeople. It is not the Cossacks and guardsmen but the politicians who are obligated to find a way out of the situation that has been created.

"The dynamics of development of events in the Dniester region and Moldova remind us of what we saw in Yerevan and Baku, where I had occasion to be at the height of the events," said Lieutenant Colonel A. Pakhomov and Lieutenant Colonel S. Protasov, motorized rifle regiment commanders. And I thought, heaven forbid that here, too, families of servicemen would have to leave their dwellings with two suitcases and children as was the case there. After all, they already have had a lot to bear and continue to have.

"We hold up basically by toughness," a company commander, Senior Lieutenant T. Karabayev, told me. "How can you devote yourself to the service, when your thoughts are taken up by where to get coal or firewood, how to eat at least twice a day, or how to live until payday."

Many, if not the majority of officers have such a frame of mind today. And how can it be otherwise, if about 70 percent of the officers in the regiment in which Karabayev serves do not have housing, when their pay is hardly enough to feed their family?

"In matters of providing officers and warrant officers with housing, we are on the brink of a social explosion today," noted Colonel V. Kutuzov, chief of the army's rear services. "There are about 2,000 people on the waiting list for apartments in the region, including 1,500 in Tiraspol. The city has cooperated with us—it set aside a future 'spot' for development. Realistically, we can build 400-500 apartments annually. But this is on the condition that we are allocated money, funds, and resources."

Problems of financial, food, and medical support and supplying the army with fuel have also become much worse.

The new commander of the 14th Army, Major-General Yu. Netkachev, also talked about these problems with alarm and concern. As a result of interruptions in fuel supply and also the fact that the majority of the training ranges and training sites are located in Ukraine, combat training has actually been curtailed. Now in order to execute a march with young drivers, one must reach agreement with three parties. It is not surprising that they have each set aside only 50-60 km instead of the prescribed 800 km.

What are the servicemen of the 14th Army, who have found themselves in such a difficult and uncertain situation, counting on? On just one thing—common sense. In determining the future fate of both the entire army and the individual servicemen, common sense must prevail over the now-dominant temporary demands of the republics and the ambitions of certain political leaders.

### **Moscow Oblast: 180 Refuse Oath**

*92UM0550A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Feb 92 First edition p 2*

[Article by Col A. Oliynik: "From the Moscow Military District: 180 Inductees Refuse To Take the Military Oath. Some of Them Do Not Wish To Read the Text in Russian"]

[Text] In large units and units of the Moscow Military District, the ritual of taking the military oath has concluded for general-purpose forces among replacement troops. Of more than 5,000 young soldiers, 180 have refused to take the oath on nationality grounds. Among them are 68 Ukrainians, 64 Belarussians, 42 Tajiks, and 6 Turkmen... Incidentally, there were about 40 among the Turkmen refusing to take the oath; however, after explanatory work by commanders and their educational assistants, more than 30 of the young soldiers took the military oath.

The main justification for soldiers of non-Russian nationalities refusing to take the oath was their desire to be sworn in only on the territory of their independent states—members of the Commonwealth of Independent States—and, naturally to serve there. The young Ukrainian and Tajik soldiers expressed the desire to take the oath only in their native language.

The district headquarters is now gathering lists of those refusing to take the oath, racking their brains over what to do with them, and how to get replacements for the companies and battalions whose strength levels have already thinned out.

### **Troops Were Ready To Intervene in Grozny**

*92UM0596A Moscow TRUD in Russian 13 Feb 92 p 1*

[Unattributed article: "An Assault Force Did Not Land"]

[Text] A division of the Airborne Troops was ready to land in Chechnia.

Colonel-General Aleksandr Grachev, First Deputy Commander of the CIS troops, confirmed that on the night of 8-9 February, it was planned to land an assault force of the Vitebsk Division of the Airborne Troops in the Chechen territory with a view to defending local military units against raiders. A. Grachev said this during a meeting with the leader of Chechnia, Dzhokhar Dudayev, on 11 February in Grozny. Movladi Udugov, chairman of the Committee for Information and the Press of the Chechen Republic, reported this to INTERFAX. According to him, A. Grachev and D. Dudayev discussed the future of the CIS Armed Forces in the territory of the Chechen Republic

and "came to a mutual understanding on virtually all issues discussed." M. Udugov did not mention any specific agreements.

#### **Chechen Chief of Staff on Armed Forces**

92UM0663A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
26 Feb 92 p 1

[Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) Musa Merzhuyev, chief of staff, Chechen Republic Defense Forces, by Captain 1st Rank A. Pilipchuk and Captain 3rd Rank V. Yermolin, occasion, date and place not specified: "Musa Merzhuyev: We Do Not Conceive of Ourselves Outside a Collective Defense"]

[Text] *The process of national military organizational development on the expanses of the former Union is gathering force. Ministries of defense and general staffs are growing on the cultivated soil of sovereignties like mushrooms after a rain. And a Defense Forces staff also has been established in the Chechen Republic (in the recent past the Chechen-Ingush ASSR). A Law on Defense (Protection) of the Chechen Republic already is in force in the Republic.*

*We met in Grozny with Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) Musa Merzhuyev, chief of staff of Defense Forces (his last position in the Soviet Army was as a unit commander of the Air Defense Forces) and asked him a few questions.*

[Pilipchuk, Yermolin] **What were the state and political motives for establishing regular military structures in the Republic?**

[Merzhuyev] As emphasized in the law, the Chechen Republic Defense Forces are protective in nature. The familiar Russian President's Ukase instituting a state of emergency on Republic territory served as the direct cause of their organizational development on a permanent basis. Formation began in those days, for example, of the Chechen 1st Separate Air Squadron commanded by test pilot Khayrutdin Visengeriyev, and of certain other military force elements. Changes in the specific political situation also were reflected in our plans for establishing a national army. We are ready to build a collective defense both with the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] as well as with Russia. President Dzhokhar Dudayev, in particular, recently proposed to Marshal Shaposhnikov to deploy a full-fledged division on the basis of the motorized rifle training division stationed in Grozny and to assume the burden of expenses for its upkeep and responsibility for protecting the southern boundaries of the CIS. Recently I had occasion to meet with Colonel General Gromov and with commanders of the CIS Armed Forces Air Defense and Air Force. We do not conceive of ourselves outside a collective defense.

[Pilipchuk, Yermolin] **We would like to remind you that the division and other military units stationed on the territory of Chechen are under Russia's jurisdiction. This circumstance hardly can be ignored in a possible negotiating process.**

[Merzhuyev] In the final account we are not against a withdrawal of forces from Republic territory, but certain

forces would like to present matters as if the military will be forced to fight their way into Russia...

[Pilipchuk, Yermolin] **But an attack on military posts already is a fait accompli.**

[Merzhuyev] This specifically is the doing of the hands of the reaction, of obsolete structures which do not wish to surrender their positions. They constitute a brain center and place reliance on the dregs of society, supplying them with drugs and vodka and inciting them to attack military units and seize weapons. Republic Defense Forces sub-units have placed the military posts under guard.

[Pilipchuk, Yermolin] **Establishing an army always places the question of cadres training on the agenda.**

[Merzhuyev] If agreements are reached with the CIS and Russia, then we will train cadres in CIS military educational institutions and Chechen officers also will be able to serve outside the Republic.

#### **CIS: POLICY**

##### **Background of Army General Lobov's Dismissal**

PM2312101591 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI  
in Russian No 50, 15 Dec 91 (signed to press 10 Dec 91)  
p 2

[Yuriy Teplyakov article: "Generals Are Leaving. Why? On Cadre Changes in the General Staff"]

[Text] Information, like water, has to leak out somewhere sometime, even if the events are taking place in the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, and especially as the event was expected. Right up to the very last moment it was not known who would appear in the role of retiree—Shaposhnikov or Lobov. But everything had been decided by the evening of 6 December. The car had just left to get General of the Army Vladimir Lobov from the airfield (the Chief of the General Staff was returning from an official trip to Britain), but the news was already being surreptitiously discussed in the corridors of military power. Gorbachev is summoning Lobov—that means?... Correct. The next day the secret ceased to be a secret. Lobov left his post, which he had occupied for three months and a few days.

The idea was that Lobov would occupy the Chief of General Staff's office immediately after Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev had vacated it. That was in 1988. It was snatched from under his nose by the virtually unheard-of General Mikhail Moiseyev, who came to Moscow via the Far East. In a conversation with me at the time Lobov did not hide his irritation over this. The appointment was unexpected and strange from the military career viewpoint. Everyone expected Lobov to replace Akhromeyev—both by virtue of his being his first deputy and by virtue of his standing in the Army: He is a doctor of military sciences and a man who has climbed practically all the rungs of the career ladder. This is valued in the Army, where upstarts who get to the top as a result of some sort of political games are resented. But Lobov's time had still not yet come—he was assigned to the practically meaningless

post of Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact. After the August putsch they remembered Lobov, who to all intents and purposes assumed responsibility for all Army affairs, whereas the new minister, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, assumed more of a politician's role. Probably, when appointing them both, it just did not occur to the USSR President that such different figures as Shaposhnikov and Lobov would come into conflict. The point is that both the Minister and the Chief of the General Staff have their own concepts of the reform of the Army. It is known that Lobov is the author of a draft whereby a civil servant would head the Ministry of Defense. The General Staff will be the only purely military structure in this department. Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov has his own views on this point.

Neither general entered into open conflict, but every colonel in the white marble building in the Arbat is now firmly convinced: evidently Shaposhnikov presented Gorbachev with the condition for his continued work. The President had to make a choice, and he did so. It is a curious fact that several more major figures in the Army leadership were sent into retirement along with Lobov: Chief of Rear Services Arkhipov, General Yashin, who came to the General Staff from the Missile Troops... The list of those dismissed is quite long.

#### **Agreement on General Purpose Forces**

92UM0656D Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 21 Feb 92 p 3

[Agreement on general purpose forces: "Agreement Between the Republic of Armenia, Republic of Belarus, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan on General Purpose Forces During the Transition Period"]

[Text] The states participating in this agreement, herein-after referred to as the "member-states,"

- proceeding from the need for mutually acceptable and organized resolution of issues in the sphere of command and control of General Purpose Forces,
- considering the role of General Purpose Forces in insuring member-state security,
- guided by the Agreement of the Council of the Heads of the Commonwealth of Independent States Member-States on Armed Forces and Border Troops dated December 30 1991,
- have agreed to the following:

#### **Article 1**

The member-states are forming Combined General Purpose Forces.

The term "General Purpose Forces" means: armies, division-sized and smaller units, institutions, military educational institutions, and other military formations and military facilities that are not part of the Commonwealth

of Independent States Strategic Forces, and also the member-states own armed forces that are operationally subordinate with their concurrence to the Unified Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief.

The list of military formations that are subject to inclusion in the General Purpose Forces for each member-state and their deployment is determined by separate protocols.

#### **Article 2**

The Commonwealth Member-States carry out command and control of their own armed forces through the ministries of defense (committees on defense) of these states.

#### **Article 3**

The status of the General Purpose Forces is determined by a separate agreement between the member-states, while considering their national laws.

#### **Article 4**

Separate agreements regulate logistics and financial support of General Purpose Forces.

#### **Article 5**

Each member-state has the right to withdraw from this agreement, having sent notification of this to the other member-states not less than six months prior to withdrawal.

#### **Article 6**

The agreement enters into force the moment it is signed but, for Belarus, from the moment of ratification by the Belarus Republic Supreme Soviet.

Done at Minsk, February 14, 1992 in one authentic copy in the Russian language. The authentic copy is maintained in the Republic of Belarus Government Archives which sends a certified copy to the states that have signed this agreement.

Representatives of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan signed the agreement.

The President of Armenia made the following explanatory note: to Article 1—after the word "protocols," add: "and is approved by the Council of the Heads of State."

#### **Agreement on Social Guarantees to Troops**

92UM0656C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 21 Feb 92 p 3

[Agreement on social guarantees to troops: "Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Independent States Member States on Social and Legal Guarantees of Servicemen, Individuals Released from Military Service, and Their Family Members"]

[Text] The Azerbaijan Republic, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova, the



Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan and Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as "Commonwealth Member- States,"

- proceeding from the need to adopt coordinated measures for the support of social and legal protection of servicemen, individuals who have been released from military service, and for their family members,
- considering the rights of servicemen to be transferred for continuation of military service or to be released into the reserve (retirement) from one Commonwealth state into another,
- for the purpose of creating the appropriate standard of living and the conditions for fulfillment of the obligations of military service for servicemen, and also the legal basis for implementation of these measures, have agreed to the following:

#### Article 1

The level of rights and privileges previously prescribed by laws and other normative acts of the former USSR are preserved for servicemen and individuals released from military service who are living on the territory of Commonwealth member-states, and also for their family members.

Unilateral restrictions of the indicated rights and privileges of servicemen, individuals who have been released from military service, and their family members are prohibited.

The Commonwealth Member-States have the right to take steps to increase the social protection of servicemen, individuals released from military service, and their family members.

#### Article 2

Through their legislation, the Commonwealth States prescribe and guarantee the entirety of political, socio-economic, and personal rights and freedoms of servicemen, individuals released from military service, and their family members in accordance with the standards of international law and the provisions of this agreement, including the following rights:

- to maintain citizenship of the Commonwealth Member-State which they had prior to conscription (entry) into military service;
- to have property that belongs to them and to use this property as they deem appropriate;
- to reside in the living quarters they occupy; and,
- to receive the pension prescribed by law.

The procedures for providing pension support of servicemen are prescribed by interstate agreements;

- to transport personal property without the levy of customs duties, taxes, or payments when crossing the border of Commonwealth states, with the exception of items whose export (import) is banned by the law of the appropriate state;

- to receive an education at Commonwealth states higher, middle, and middle-special educational institutions and to use children's pre-school institutions;

- to take advantage of medical and other types of social support; and,

- to job placement in state organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations after release from military service.

Furthermore, servicemen, after release from military service, and also their family members have the right to take the citizenship of their state of residence and to remain for permanent residence on its territory or to select another place of residence.

#### Article 3

The Commonwealth states provide housing to servicemen and their family members who do not have having housing or need improved housing conditions, in accordance with the laws of the state of residence.

#### Article 4

Commonwealth Member-States assume the obligation in 1992 to develop and adopt mutually agreed upon legislative acts on the social protection of servicemen, individuals who have been released from military service, and their family members.

#### Article 5

The agreement enters into force the moment it is signed.

Done at Minsk, February 14, 1992 in one authentic copy in the Russian language. The authentic copy is preserved in the Republic of Belarus Government Archives which sends a certified copy to the states that have signed this agreement.

Representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine signed the agreement.

During the signing, the President of Moldova noted that in Moldova guarantees to servicemen are determined by republic law.

#### Agreement on Support Services

92UM0656B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 21 Feb 92 p 2

[Agreement on support services: "Agreement on the Principles for Supporting the Commonwealth Member-States Armed Forces with Weaponry, Equipment, Materiel, and Organization of Production Activities of Repair Enterprises and Scientific Research and Experimental Design Work"]

[Text] The Commonwealth of Independent States Member-States (hereinafter, the Commonwealth), guided by the desire to maintain the combat readiness of the Commonwealth Strategic Forces and Commonwealth states armed forces at the proper level, to improve the support of troops with required materiel, to create the conditions for work



for the existing production capacity, and to maintain scientific potential, have agreed to the following:

#### Article 1

Assist each other in the resolution of issues of logistics and rear services support of Commonwealth Member-States troops, deliveries of weapons, equipment, and materiel, and also cooperative ties of production of military products, unconditional preservation of long-term production-economic ties and direct contracts.

#### Article 2

Implement, on the level of the Commonwealth State governments, state regulation of deliveries and development of the most important types of military products. Carry out monitoring of the conclusion and execution of contracts for reciprocal deliveries through the appropriate Commonwealth states administrative organs.

#### Article 3

Carry out repair and manufacture of weapons, vehicles, and military-technical equipment at Commonwealth states armed forces enterprises in the common interests, according to approved plans and prices and on the principles of reciprocal accounting and preservation of production ties that have developed.

#### Article 4

Carry out the supply of weapons, vehicles, and also the supply of military-technical equipment, manufactured-technical products and other materiel based on approved orders that have been submitted to the appropriate Commonwealth states administrative organs on the principles of reciprocal accounting at approved prices.

#### Article 5

Weapons and vehicles that belong to the Commonwealth Strategic Forces and Commonwealth states armed forces cannot be unilaterally resubordinated, redesignated, or privatized while they are located outside the borders of the state at repair enterprises. Acts, unilaterally adopted on this issue, are annulled.

#### Article 6

Support the continuation of previously begun scientific research and experimental design work based on shared participation and the vested interests of the parties.

#### Article 7

Carry out constant reciprocal exchange of technical information on models of weapons and equipment that are in operation.

#### Article 8

Military missions at industrial enterprises located on the territory of Commonwealth states, that carry out development, manufacture, assembly, and delivery of weapons,

military vehicles and equipment, are part of the armed forces of the state on whose territory the enterprises and organizations are located.

#### Article 9

Carry out interstate transportation of troops and military transport movements in accordance with special agreements of Commonwealth states motor transportation organs, planning and procedures for supporting military transport movements and their management are resolved between Commonwealth states armed forces military transport organs.

#### Article 10

Commonwealth states armed forces servicemen with orders are sent for examination and treatment to Commonwealth states military treatment institutions at no cost.

The provision of sanatorium-resort treatment and relaxation for Commonwealth states servicemen, their family members, and workers and employees is carried out according to contract terms.

#### Article 11

Specific procedures for carrying out the provisions of this agreement on types of support is formulated through separate agreements of the Commonwealth states heads of government or authorized administrative organs.

#### Article 12

This agreement enters into force from the moment it is signed.

Done at Minsk on February 14, 1992 in one authentic copy in the Russian language. The authentic copy is preserved at the Republic of Belarus Government Archives which will send certified copies to the states that have signed this agreement.

Representatives of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine have signed the document.

#### Protocol of the Heads of State Session

Task the ministers of defense (chairman of the commissions on defense) of the Commonwealth Member-States to prepare, with the participation of Marshal Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, a bloc of agreements on military issues, having in mind to review them on March 20, 1992.

Done at Minsk on February 14, 1992 in one authentic copy in the Russian language. The authentic copy will be surrendered for safekeeping to the Republic of Belarus Government which will send a certified copy of it to the states that have signed this protocol.

Representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine signed the protocol.

### Agreement on Single Defense Budget

92UM0656A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 21 Feb 92 p 2

[Agreement on single defense budget: "Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Independent States Member-States on the Formation of a Single Defense Budget and Procedures for Financing the Commonwealth States Armed Forces"]

[Text] The Azerbaijan Republic, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan and Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as "Commonwealth Member- States," —proceeding from the need for financial support of the Commonwealth states armed forces, —have agreed on the following:

#### Article 1

The following forms of expenditures in calculations per year are included in the single defense budget that has been formed to finance the Commonwealth states armed forces:

- maintenance of the army and navy (monetary allowances of servicemen; salaries of staff workers and employees; food support; payments for clothing and related gear; payment and storage of special fuel and gas; repair and manufacture of weapons, military vehicles and equipment; transportation expenses; lease costs of electric communications systems; maintenance of cosmodromes, special ranges, bases and depots; ruble payments for expenditures in foreign hard currency for the maintenance of troops abroad; and, operational, economic, and other expenses associated with the life support of troops);
- payment for weapons, military vehicles, and equipment, including the purchase of nuclear munitions;
- payment of scientific-technical production;
- capital construction and major repairs, including special and housing construction; and,
- pension support of servicemen and their family members.

#### Article 2

Appropriations for maintenance of the army and navy are determined based on the actual strength of servicemen, workers and employees of the Commonwealth states armed forces, support standards and standard maintenance of weapons, military vehicles and equipment, prices and tariffs in force, combat training plans, production and economic activities and other factors.

Appropriations for payment for weapons, military vehicles and equipment are determined while proceeding from planned numbers of weapons, military vehicle and equipment deliveries to support the Commonwealth states armed forces within the limits of the resources appropriated.

Appropriations for payment of scientific-technical production are determined while proceeding from the planned

amount of scientific research and development on military topics, while considering their realization and urgency within the limits of the resources appropriated.

Capital investment and appropriations for construction of new and the reconstruction and expansion of existing primary available housing are defined as the combination of expenditures for the creation of normal conditions for combat and special training, life and everyday life, storage, maintenance, and repair of weapons, military vehicles, and equipment, the operation of administrative organs, medical servicing and relaxation of personnel, and also providing housing and socio-cultural and everyday life facilities for servicemen and their family members.

Appropriations for pension support of Commonwealth states armed forces servicemen and their family members are determined while proceeding from the number of pensioners and the amounts of the pensions designated for them.

#### Article 3

The Commonwealth Member-States acknowledge the advisability of the fact that a single defense budget will be defined in base year prices while considering the predicted price index and measures for the social protection of servicemen and their family members.

#### Article 4

The draft single defense budget is being developed by the Commonwealth States Armed Forces Main Command Authority and is being reviewed by the Ministers of Defense Council (Committees on Defense chairmen) of the Commonwealth Member-States and is submitted to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Council.

The single defense budget is approved by the Commonwealth Heads of State Council upon submission of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Council.

#### Article 5

The Commonwealth Member-States assume the obligation to participate in the formation of the single defense budget by contributing the prescribed contributions into it. The amount and procedures for each Commonwealth Member-State to transfer the prescribed contribution is determined by the Commonwealth Heads of Government Council.

#### Article 6

When the need for additional appropriations that have not been taken into account in the approved single defense budget arise during the course of a year, the issues of determining their amount and the procedures for contributing to the single defense budget to finance the Commonwealth Member-States armed forces are resolved in accordance with this agreement.

### Article 7

The annual report on the execution of the single defense budget is submitted by the Commonwealth States Armed Forces Main Command Authority to the Commonwealth Heads of State Council.

The agreement enters into force the moment it is signed.

Done at Minsk, February 14, 1992 in one authentic copy in the Russian language. The authentic copy is preserved in the Republic of Belarus Government Archives which sends a certified copy to the states that have signed this agreement.

Representatives of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan signed the document and some of them have made private reservations.

The document contains the following special opinion, signed by the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Ukraine:

The Azerbaijan Republic and Ukraine do not participate in the formation of the single defense budget for maintenance of Strategic Conventional Forces but carry out share financing of only the maintenance of the strategic forces on their territory during the period defined for the Azerbaijan Republic and Ukraine in accordance with the Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces Between the Commonwealth of Independent States Member-States dated December 30, 1991.

### Col-Gen Pyankov Comments on Minsk Summit

92UM0651A Moscow TRUD in Russian 22 Feb 92  
pp 1,3

[Interview with Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth Combined Armed Forces Colonel-General Boris Yevgenyevich Pyankov by V. Badurkin, under the rubric: "View on the Situation": "Will the Army Survive until Its 75th Anniversary"]

[Text] Everything is changing in our world. And yesterday's solemn reception at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses on the occasion of the 74th anniversary of the Armed Forces was not like previous ones. And not only because American generals arrived to congratulate their colleagues on the celebration. The customary "ceremonial unit" was not there, and in the short speeches and even at the "furshet" [not found] they no longer talked about "successes in reliable defense," but about Armed Forces problems.

During the tough times the army is going through, they expected that the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Heads of State meeting that took place in Minsk a week ago would dismiss many of them. However, that did not happen. Several "hot" questions have thus remained unresolved and the content of the documents signed there are "Greek" to many of us.

Why did it turn out that the kind of army that we will have in the near future is hidden behind the agreement's official sentences—our correspondent discusses this with Deputy

Commander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth Unified Armed Forces Lieutenant-General B. Pyankov.

[Badurkin] Boris Yevgenyevich, do you agree with the high assessment of what was attained at Minsk?

[Pyankov] I think the presidents had grounds to give it a "4." [on a scale of 5], like Kravchuk, and even higher. Because they rapidly managed to come to an agreement on economic issues. As for the package of military documents (and this part of the meeting's program was primary), then, while following the methodology they adopted, I would not give it more than a "3".

We who prepared the documents are to blame for the indecisive result of the meeting. We should not have submitted so many problems to the heads of state for their review at one time. As a result, many very important issues were thus left unresolved.

[Badurkin] And the main issue among them is on the status of the general purpose forces... What kind of armed forces will there be now?

[Pyankov] It is this question that elicited a great discussion. But since the CIS is not a state, the concept of "unified" [yedinye] armed forces was removed from consideration. Then a new term appeared—"allied" [obyedinennyye]. But it also did not find general support.

Besides the clear and precise position of Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan and to a certain extent Turkmenistan, having declared that they will create their own armies, yet another proposal has arisen: for the republic forces to only be operationally subordinate to the unified command.

[Badurkin] How do we understand this? Like the Warsaw Pact, when the troops that comprised the allied forces lived according to the laws of their own countries, these countries financed them, and they were operationally part of a single structure?

[Pyankov] If it were so... The essence of this proposal, if I can put it bluntly, is the following: we will sort of slightly subordinate ourselves to you, you will supply and finance us, but the troops will be ours, republic troops.

The army, like no other state institution, will not accept uncertainty. Here it is either/or. Either you are part of the common forces or you live on your own.

[Badurkin] So just what kind army and navy will there be?

[Pyankov] The armed forces of those states which do not create independent formations will be allied...

[Badurkin] That is, eight countries?

[Pyankov] Practically, yes, although Belarus and Azerbaijan have a special position.

[Badurkin] The signed Agreement on the Status of the Strategic Forces causes many questions. If their composition was precisely defined in the Alma-Ata document, now that list is being determined by each state independently...

[Pyankov] The Ukrainian delegation insisted on that. This was not an unexpected development for us: as soon as they

signed the agreement in Alma-Ata, the Ukrainian leadership began to move away from it. This position is absolutely understandable: keep everything that is advantageous for yourself and do not include it in the strategic forces.

Let us speak plainly, there were sharp discussions on this point. This is the decision that was made: each republic determines its own list, it is coordinated with the OVS [Unified Armed Forces] commander-in-chief and, it is approved by the Heads of State Council. The procedure is sufficiently complex. And the main reason is the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. If previously it was unambiguously part of the strategic forces, naturally Ukraine will not include it on its list now. The OVS commander-in-chief directorate will insist on the previous variation. And ultimately, this issue will be submitted for review of the heads of state. In my opinion, this is why we should not have complicated the task but we should have already resolved the problem of the fleet in Minsk. All of the remaining contradictions are totally inconsequential and we can come to an agreement on them at any level.

[Badurkin] Of the 14 draft agreements, half have been signed. What principle documents still remain "off screen"?

[Pyankov] First of all, the agreement on the principles of armed forces logistics support. At the ministers of defense session, two primary variations were examined: the "commander-in-chief directorate's" and the Ukrainian variations. We proposed that the republics allocate the resources they have in agreed-upon amounts with the payment from the military budget. States having their own armies must supply them independently, by concluding delivery contracts with other countries. But the Ukrainian delegation wanted their armed forces to be supplied just like the unified armed forces. You will agree that this approach appears to be strange. As soon as you have formed your army, you also provide for it yourself.

[Badurkin] But if Ukraine had agreed to pay for everything...

[Pyankov] This is not a matter of payment. Our common fate—is a general shortage. By way of illustration, Ukraine has created its own air force. Fine. But why must Russia or the other republics supply it with spare parts, engines and even elementary—wheels, if there is a very acute shortage of all of this today? It is the same thing with food and fuel.

Besides, such important documents as agreements on the legal bases of the OVS's activities, on a single defense budget, on the organization of military intelligence and counterintelligence, on the army's manning principles, on law enforcement organs, and on movement of nuclear weapons have also remained unsigned...

[Badurkin] How will the Unified Armed Forces live if the issue of their financing is not resolved?

[Pyankov] For now agreement has only been achieved on the principles of forming the military budget. Today it has been determined for what purposes money will be spent but who and how much they must allocate for this... For now, all armed forces (with the exception of the Ukrainian

armed forces) are maintained using Russia's resources. During the first quarter, no other republic has yet given a single kopek. And the second quarter will begin next month. Will Russia once again carry this load?

[Badurkin] One more very serious issue which concerns not only us but also the entire European Community is about quotas of primary weaponry that have been prescribed by the Vienna Accords.

[Pyankov] Honestly speaking, I as a military expert do not know how it will be resolved. This is a very serious issue. As soon as we begin to discuss it, a tense atmosphere immediately emerges. What is the essence of it? When they signed this agreement, there was a single state—the USSR. By way of illustration, they determined that there must be no more than 13,150 tanks in the European portion. At that time, this quantity was divided by military districts in accordance with strategic precepts. As a result, the primary mass of combat vehicles remained in the three Ukrainian military districts and there were practically none on the territory of Moldova or Russia. Today, we have to divide them among independent states. And each of them is claiming a significantly large portion. If we agree with them, the CIS will generally exceed its quota by a factor of 2.5 which, naturally, no one will permit us to do. If Russia's interests are not considered, then it will remain without a single tank in Europe.

What is more, the number of tanks subject to mandatory destruction is written into the Agreement. We must do this. But in the situation that has developed, the most modern combat vehicles could go to the "press."

I do not know how to resolve this issue. We will hope that the ministers of defense and foreign affairs of the sovereign states will somehow come to an agreement.

[Badurkin] I would like to end our conversation on an optimistic note. Many military personnel have learned with joy that an agreement on their social and legal guarantees has finally been signed...

[Pyankov] And yet. I am also glad that political, socioeconomic and personal rights and freedoms have been returned to me and to my comrades-in-arms. But what will it be like for those officers and warrant officers who are ending their service (and with the reductions that have begun there will be several hundred thousand) and who have to make a choice: in the army of which state will you finish your service? Who will pay them their pension? This is only one issue and there are hundreds. The presidents are obliged to resolve them by adopting mutually coordinated legislative acts during the course of this year. But you cannot stop life and you cannot force it to wait.

Perhaps the main thing is for all of these problems to be resolved gradually. The positions of states are changing and new, non-traditional views and approaches will appear. We will hope that the next meeting—on March 20 in Kiev—will remove another entire series of issues. We have already begun preparing for it.

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At a meeting with journalists, OVS Commander-in-Chief Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov gave his personal prediction on the future of the Armed Forces: "...ultimately they can divide the army by ethnic or state signs... But they must do this in a civilized manner, calmly, and without infringing upon human dignity and without ruining peoples' fates..."

### CIS: GROUND TROOPS

#### 366th MR Regiment to be Withdrawn From Nagorno-Karabakh

92UM0654B Moscow KRASNAYA GAZETA in Russian  
22 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces Intends to Withdraw Motorized-rifle Regiment From Nagorno-Karabakh"]

[Text] The address of Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov to the CIS Council of Presidents with regard to events in Nagorno-Karabakh (published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 20 February) was read at a joint session of the chambers of the Russian parliament. Addressing the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, the Commander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth's Combined Armed Forces said that only one military unit of the CIS Combined Armed Forces is currently located in Nagorno-Karabakh—the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment, stationed in Stepanakert (Khankeidi).

Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov refuted the allegation, made by a group of soldiers and televised yesterday, that this regiment is supposedly participating in combat actions on the Armenian side. The Commander-in-Chief also stated that he intends to withdraw the 366th Regiment from Nagorno-Karabakh. He said that "several dozen" soldiers were transferred there from a unit in Nakhichevan due to personnel shortages in the regiment, particularly among drivers needed for its withdrawal. Some of them, continued the Marshal of Aviation, "decided that they were brought there to participate in a war and deserted." It was precisely these people who upon reaching Baku then provided a television interview. Shaposhnikov refuted Azerbaijani President Aiaz Mutalibov's allegation that units of the 366th Regiment participated in attacks against Azerbaijani villages. He also reported that there were no casualties among the regiment's servicemen. At the same time, a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia was held in Moscow. A communique on the results of the meeting says that the ministers "reached a number of conclusions which they will report to their governments and parliaments," among them being:

1. The necessity for an immediate cease-fire in the region of the Karabakh conflict and a lifting of blockades on roads and lines of communication, initially for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
2. The recognition of the necessity of the comprehensive fulfillment of the obligations under CSCE undertaken by

the sides involved, in the first place the refusal to use force or the threat of force. The acceptance and approval of the ideas of the furthest acceptance of the creative possibilities and efforts of the CSCE and the UN in support of the regulation of conflict.

3. Assurance of a continuing negotiating process with the purpose of the development of guarantees and mechanisms for observation of a cease fire and searches for multilateral regulation of the conflict.

4) Support for the initiatives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the creation of a trilateral working group for providing cooperation in the peace-making efforts, the preparation of a negotiation process, including the question of the determination of the composition of the participants and the forms of their participation.

#### Transcaucasus MD Protests Attack on 366th MR Regiment

92UM0654A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 24 Feb 92 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "Mourning On a Holiday"]

[Text] The Command of the Transcaucasus Military District protested to the leadership of the Republic of Azerbaijan in connection with the firing upon a military unit and death of a soldier. The declaration states that at 0850 on 23 February a position of the 366th Motorized-rifle Regiment, which is stationed in Khankeidi (Stepanakert), was shelled by artillery from a *grad* system. As a result of this, ten servicemen were wounded and one died of wounds.

The District's Military Council and personnel regard this as a sacrilegious act since it was committed on Armed Forces Day which, in the former USSR, was traditionally considered a holiday for all men regardless of nationality. The declaration underscores that: "Our disposition towards the problems which disturb the Republic of Azerbaijan has always been one of understanding and we are deeply upset by the tragedy of Nagorno-Karabakh, but the army has nothing to do with this."

### CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

#### Attacks on PVO Units Continue

92UM0575A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
12 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Major A. Ivanov: "From the Main Staff of PVO Troops: Attacks on Military Subunits Continue, Servicemen Endeavor To Recapture Loot"]

[Text] The surface-to-air missile unit deployed not far from the city of Mingechaur in Azerbaijan was subjected to repeated attacks during the past week. And not long ago a group of armed militants broke into the surface-to-air missile battery position and stole three special vehicles and a bus from the motor pool.

About 20 armed persons penetrated the territory of the detached radar company that was deployed not far from

Poti (Georgia). Threatening with assault rifles, the militants ransacked the food depot, stole the only motor vehicle, and put the radar station out of commission.

But this time, the bandits did not succeed in hiding. Their way to the mountains was obstructed by a group of soldiers, and the militants hid, after abandoning the loot.

### Development, Use of Anti-Radar Missiles

92UM0558A Moscow VESTNIK  
PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian  
No 12, Dec 91 pp 34-37

[Article by Doctor of Military Sciences Colonel Yu. Omelchenko: "Antiradar Missiles: Development and Methods of Use"]

[Text] *From materials in the foreign press.*

One of the most important directions for a further rise in the combat capabilities of aviation when breaking through air defenses, according to the views of foreign specialists, is considered to be fitting aircraft with highly effective anti-radar missiles (ARMs). They are able to defeat radar stations under conditions of tactical and technical countermeasures. This was demonstrated especially clearly during the war in the Persian Gulf.

Foreign specialists note that the appearance of antiradar missiles in air forces was brought about by the increasing complexity of the conditions of confrontation of attacking aviation with the assets and resources of the air defenses of the defending side. The antiradar tactics of American aviation during the U.S. aggression in Vietnam were limited to fighter-bombers carrying out strikes against radar positions whose locations were determined in advance by reconnaissance aircraft. Considerable forces were moreover brought in to carry out those strikes. After the destruction of an RF-4C by SAM fire in July of 1965, for example, the American command decided to take action to destroy that SAM system by way of retribution. They allotted 46 F-105 Thunderchief aircraft, which carried out the assigned mission. Another seven SAM positions were destroyed in similar fashion over the subsequent five months. American aviation, however, suffered large losses of pilots and combat aircraft therein.

The first step toward raising the effectiveness of combat operations when striking SAM systems was the appearance of specially equipped F-100F aircraft fitted with the Wild Weasel system. The equipment included AGM-45 Shrike antiradar missiles. The results from the use of the Wild Weasel system were highly regarded by American military specialists, and the system was intensively developed. F-105F and F-4C aircraft came to be used to carry the antiradar weapons. The Wild Weasel system, now on F-4G aircraft with different ARMs, is currently considered to be highly effective and promising. The suitability of the F-15 and F-16 aircraft to perform the functions of special EW aircraft is being researched in accordance with the Wild Weasel-7 program that was begun at the end of the 1980s.

Work is also underway, in conjunction with the development of the Wild Weasel system, on modernizing and

creating new antiradar missiles that are both included in the Wild Weasel system and are employed by other aircraft apart from that system.

It should be noted that the Shrike missiles, part of the first generation of ARMs, have been present in a number of Air Force units up to the present even though, in the estimation of foreign specialists, their use entails substantial tactical limitations. If the air-defense radar projected for the strike ceases emitting, the Shrike missile is deprived of homing signals and flies on a ballistic trajectory with great inaccuracy. The comparatively small operating range of the missile (27 km [kilometers] with low-altitude launch, 52 km with launches above 7,000 meters) does not allow it to home in on a target outside of visual range. In order for a Shrike missile launch to be successful, the launch-platform aircraft should be flying directly at the target, since the launch of the missile while the aircraft is turning is not permitted.

At the same time, foreign specialists note as one substantial merit of the Shrike ARM its minimal requirements for a launch aircraft, thanks to which it can be adapted for mounting on various types of aircraft, as was done during the Vietnam War and in other armed conflicts. The A-6B and A-4F aircraft have been used along with the F-100F, F-105F, F-4C and F-4G as launch aircraft for the Shrike ARM. Phantom and Kfir aircraft of the Israeli Air Force, as well as British Vulcan bombers that took part in the combat operations for the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in 1982, have also been fitted with this missile.

The AGM-78 Standard ARM missile, adopted in 1968, marked a definite stage in the development of this class of missile and introduced marked changes in the design of ARMs, which also affected their methods of employment. The missile has greater range than the Shrike (80-100 km). The possibility of launching it against a target outside the area of direct visibility also appeared. The most important distinguishing feature of the Standard ARM was the installation of a "memory" device for the coordinates of targets, thanks to which the missile continues to fly toward the target radar even if it ceases emitting high-frequency energy.

The increased dimensions of the Standard ARM led accordingly to an increase in its radar signature, thanks to which the moment of separation of the ARM from its launch aircraft can be detected on the screens of the air-defense radar and the crews can take the necessary protective measures against it in good time. The Standard ARM, despite the use of the "memory" devices, has not provided the increase in the effectiveness of strikes against radars that was expected of it.

One of the latest ARM developments is the AGM-88 HARM, the series production of which began in 1982. The foreign press reports that 150 HARM missiles were produced every month in 1987, and the procurement of 7,023 missiles for the U.S. Air Force and 7,046 for the U.S. Navy is envisaged overall under the program.

The most substantial advantage of the HARM missile is the possibility of using it in three operating modes.

The aircraft system warning of radar illumination is used as the principal signal detector to detect radars in the "self-defense" mode. The on-board launch-control computer, with receipt of the signal, automatically compares and evaluates the incoming data, categorizing the incoming signals by the degree of threat that they pose, and over a time interval measured in milliseconds transmits the appropriate data to the HARM ARM. Information on the readiness of the missile for launch comes onto the display in the pilot's cockpit, and he executes the launch.

One distinguishing feature of the "unexpected target detection" mode is the fact that the homing head of the HARM missile itself is used as the signal detector for detection and warning of radar illumination. The pilot selects and enters into the computer memory ahead of time data on a certain category of targets in accordance with a catalogue of them, and the homing head of the missile detects and transmits data only on targets that are recorded in the computer memory. If several targets appear at the same time, the pilot himself makes the choice of target and launches the missile.

The "programmed flight" mode is employed when the launch aircraft is at large distances from the target radar. In that case the ARM, after the launch, flies according to a pre-programmed trajectory in the general direction of the target radars. If any of the radars begins emitting during the stage of free flight of the HARM, it immediately locks on with the missile homing head. The latter then heads toward the target. The missile self-destructs if it does not lock onto radar emissions during the flight and seeking stages of the homing head.

The further development and improvement of antiradar missiles and methods of using them has been undertaken in other countries as well. France in particular has developed the improved ARMAT missile on the basis of the existing AS.37 Martel ARM. It may be mounted on many types of tactical fighters. The French command feels that it is sufficiently effective even though that missile has quite large dimensions and heavy weight (540 kg [kilograms]). The foreign press reports that Jaguar fighter-bombers of the French Air Force employed ARMAT missiles to disable the radar at a Libyan military base at Qadi-Dum in the northern part of the Republic of Chad in January of 1987. It is also known that Iraq used ARMAT antiradar missile against Iranian air-defense radar, employing F-160 Mirage fighters as the launch aircraft.

The ALARM antiradar missile has appeared in Great Britain, and it also possesses the ability to seek and select target radars for destruction.

The most likely method of employing the ALARM antiradar missile is its launch in a combined (dual-purpose) mode, the essence of which is as follows. After the launch the missile flies into the area where the radar is located, executing a search for those types of target radars whose characteristics are stored in its memory device. The targets are distributed by their importance. The missile begins homing onto the appropriate target upon detecting it. If a

target is not detected over a programmed flight distance, the missile gains altitude to about 12,000 meters, upon reaching which it cuts its engine and deploys a braking parachute while its homing head continues to seek signals from sources of emissions during the subsequent slow descent. When a target is detected, the parachute is jettisoned and the missile dives vertically onto the radar. One ALARM missile can force several radars to stay turned off for 10-15 minutes, which is considered sufficient for the passage of strike aircraft.

The launch of ALARM missiles in the direct-attack mode is possible to counter those radars that pose the greatest threat to the ARM launch aircraft. The missile flies at a low trajectory without deploying the parachute, which ensures the large flight range that is essential when performing the mission of sweeping a corridor in an air-defense system. It is most likely in practice that several ALARM antiradar missiles would be launched at once. Some of them would operate in the direct-attack mode, and others in the combined mode.

We would note that the majority of the existing ARMs are missiles large in size and heavy in weight. The quantity and weight of other arms must therefore be reduced when mounting them on aircraft, thereby reducing the overall combat capabilities of the aircraft. Foreign specialists assume in this regard that the new generation of ARMs will by and large include "light" missiles that can be accommodated on any aircraft in addition to the regular armaments.

One of the simplest "light" ARMs is the American AGM-122 Sidearm missile, based on the AIM-9C Sidewinder air-to-air missile with a semi-active homing head. The launch aircraft for the Sidearm missiles will be small strike aircraft of the U.S. Navy and Marines, such as the A-8, A-4 and the AH-1 helicopter. The development of a new Sidearm-2 missile with an improved homing head is possible in the future. The short range of this ARM (15-17 km), light fragmentation warhead (11 kg) and small overall weight of the missile (91 kg) testify to the fact that the sphere of application of the ARM is also beginning to encompass the area of air defense for ground troops in areas adjacent to the front. The direct launch against sources of emissions is considered to be the principal method of employing "light" ARMs. The launch aircraft, with not only the ARM set-up but their own armaments on board, will be able to perform a broad range of missions.

The light ARMs also include the French STAR, which is carried on the Mirage-2000, Super Etandard and Rafale aircraft. The principal focus in its design was placed on achieving high speeds and operating ranges. It is expected that the missile will develop a cruising speed that is greater than Mach 2, and will have a maximum operating range of about 100 km.

The desire to create ARMs that could be in the air waiting for emissions from a radar for a long period of time has led to the development of a missile that could be counted among cruise missiles in its design—the AGM-136A Tacit Rainbow with an air-breathing jet engine and an operating range of up to 600 km. The U.S. Department of Defense



has concluded a contract for the production of the Tacit Rainbow in an aircraft-launched version. The Pentagon has at the same time displayed an interest in concluding a contract for the production of a version of the Tacit Rainbow ARM for launching from an aircraft. This missile, in the opinion of foreign specialists, should become a standard weapon of the NATO bloc. It has already been offered to the FRG, which is expanding the opportunities for the Western European countries to take part in a large-scale program for its production.

The most typical method of employing the Tacit Rainbow ARM is the following. Having reached the target area, the missile will loiter (about 30 minutes) until its homing head detects the emissions of an enemy radar, and then will convert to strike mode against it. If the emissions of the radar are halted at that moment, the missile automatically goes into the climbing mode and once again loiters over the target area waiting for a radar. Data on the radar targeted for destruction is entered into the missile-control system on the ground in the launch of a Tacit Rainbow ARM from the aircraft, and there is no need for an electronic interface between the missile and the launch aircraft.

The development of the Seek Spinner ARM for the Air Force is also underway in the United States. It is being developed on the basis of the Brave-2000 RPV [remotely piloted vehicle], and should be an inexpensive antiradar missile with a propeller able to fly in patrol mode and attack radars from a dive when they come up. The missile can fly for up to an hour and twenty minutes.

One important problem connected with the development of ARMs and methods of using them consists of the fact that these missiles home onto the source of the radar emissions—that is, the radar antenna. American aircraft employed the HARM antiradar missile against radars located in the area of the city of Syrte, on the Libyan coast of the Mediterranean Sea, during the course of the aggression against Libya by the forces of U.S. Naval Aviation in March of 1986. Only the antennas were heavily damaged, and they were soon repaired.

Strikes by ARMs, in the opinion of foreign specialists, must be made against the radar equipment, the huts with the operators or the vans with the electronic gear. The introduction of corrections into the memory devices of such missiles as the HARM, ARMAT and others, thanks to which the trajectory of the missile could be corrected in the last moments of flight to aim at the vitally important parts of the radar, is being proposed for that purpose.

The ALARM antiradar missile uses a somewhat different method. The missile dives vertically, or almost vertically, onto the radar in the last stage of the flight.

The use of new and advanced ARMs thus presupposes more complicated tactics. The "sweeping of a corridor," the suppression or destruction of air-defense radars along the flight paths of groups of strike aircraft, is becoming the chief mission therein. Launches of ARMs by aircraft when they are located outside the zones of engagement of air defenses are becoming typical.

Taking into account the contemporary acuity of economic issues, it should be noted that the evaluation of ARMs according to the criteria of "cost-effectiveness" is showing a substantial rise in their cost. Data is cited in the foreign press in this regard that the cost of one Shrike missile was initially 19,000 dollars, and then dropped to 4,000 dollars. The cost of a HARM missile is more than a hundred times higher! The cost of the other ARMs is also high.

Foreign specialists cite the following data pertaining to the quantity requirements for these missiles. Some 33 American A-6 and F-111 aircraft required about 50 ARMs to destroy a small quantity of targets in the air strikes against targets in Libya in April of 1986. One aircraft sortie will require 1.5 ARMs accordingly. Applying that standard to a mass air raid by hundreds of strike aircraft, it is assumed that from 500 to 1,000 ARMs would be required daily in the first stages of offensive operations by NATO forces to suppress air-defense systems.

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#### **Commission Investigates Fatal Jet Crash** *92UM0589B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* *in Russian 11 Feb 92 First Edition p 4*

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Rudenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Thirty Minutes Into the Flight"]

[Text] On February 7, during a planned training flight to intercept an air target, an Air Force MIG-29 piloted by Major-General of Aviation S. Oskanov, chief of the Lipetsk Pilot Combat Training and Retraining Center and meritorious military specialist, crashed.

The aircraft was flying in difficult weather conditions at an altitude of 900 m. At 18:21 hours, the pilot reported to the flight chief that he had completed his mission, and after getting the OK to return to the base, began ascending to an altitude of 3,400 m. At that time communications with the aircraft were suddenly broken off, and the blip from the aircraft disappeared from the radar screens. It was 30th minutes into the flight.

A standby aviation search-and-rescue force that was sent up immediately soon discovered that at a distance of 61 km from the airfield, the aircraft had fallen to the ground and disintegrated on impact. The pilot was killed. None of the people living nearby were injured. The causes of the air crash are under investigation. The commission is headed by Colonel-General of Aviation Ye. Rusanov, chief of the CIS Armed Forces Aviation Flight Safety Service.

Russian Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi, who had served with General Sulambek Oskanov, visited Lipetsk in connection with the tragedy.



**Designer Dondukov on Yak-141**

92UM0653A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
25 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Aleksandr Nikolayevich Dondukov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Major S. Prokopenko: "We Will yet Make Our Presence Felt..." Asserts OKB imeni A.S. Yakovlev Chief Designer Aleksandr Dondukov"]

[Text] He was born in Samara to the family of an aircraft engine designer. He graduated from MAI [Moscow Aviation Institute imeni Sergo Ordzhonikidze]. He worked at the OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni A.I. Mikoyan. He became the head of the Yakovlev "firm" two years ago.

[Prokopenko] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has written about the Yak-141, the world's first supersonic, vertical take-off and landing aircraft [VTOL] that was developed by your OKB. The aircraft has already set several world records for aircraft of this class in its first tested models. The Yak-141 demonstration model became a real sensation at the 39th International Aerospace Show at Le Bourget. And the fate of the aircraft, they say, has not yet been determined?

[Dondukov] No, right now we can say that the fate of the Yak-141 in Russia, which is the legitimate successor of the Soviet Union, has been clarified. Until now, no one in the highest echelons of the Armed Forces manifested proper interest in this aircraft. Having been left without financing last year, we closed the topic through a military-industrial complex decision. However, I think that this aircraft has not been lost either for Russia or for the navy, in particular. We are conducting negotiations with foreign investors and I have requested authorization to continue work on the development of this aircraft from Russian President B. Yeltsin. We have proposals from a number of countries of the East. And I think this is a solution to the situation that has developed.

It is important to preserve not only the new aircraft but also the unique direction in aircraft design—the development of vertical take-off and landing aircraft. While working on them, we have penetrated into the sphere of technologies of the year 2000. The closure of this theme would set back native aviation dozens of years. Air Force and Navy representatives, who are interested in the development of this type of aircraft, also understand this. It is the assistance and support of Admiral of the Fleet Chernavin and Lieutenant-Generals of Aviation Potapov and Ayupov that have helped our experts to conduct marketing research which have already provided a positive result. I can say: we have very great chances of preserving this direction.

[Prokopenko] According to your assessments, by how much does the KB's [design bureau] work in the development of VTOL aircraft exceed similar foreign projects?

[Dondukov] If you consider that we already have a finished Yak-141 aircraft, but in the plans of the United States and Great Britain—who are conducting work in this

sphere—production of an aircraft with these specifications is not planned until the year 2000, this difference also determines how far we have outdistanced them. We are already developing the third generation of this class of aircraft for the future. But these are plans that will not be implemented before the year 2005.

[Prokopenko] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, a series of Yak-141 ship tests were recently completed. How do you assess the results?

[Dondukov] I think that on the whole the tests were conducted successfully. We have fulfilled 85-90 percent of the program. However, to my great regret, we did not get by without an accident which by the way frequently occurs during the testing of any aircraft, especially military.

In this case, the aircraft fell vertically onto the deck from an altitude of 30 meters due to certain design shortcomings. The gear struts penetrated the fuel tanks, fuel leaked onto the deck, and the operating power plant burst into flames. However, the fire was extinguished in a matter of minutes. I think that the aircraft confirmed all of its specifications, having completed all of its take-offs and landings. Furthermore, as a result of the accident, we obtained an impartial, high assessment of the aircraft emergency egress systems: the pilot ejected from the aircraft while it was on the deck in a very difficult situation, safely landed in the water and was rescued and back aboard the ship in three minutes. After restoration work, the aircraft will be used for test purposes.

[Prokopenko] Right now many people are arguing about the ways and means of conducting conversion. I would like to know your point of view on this problem and on the OKB's place in this process?

[Dondukov] I want to say: The process of conversion, in its current understanding, has affected our KB to a lesser degree than other similar collectives. This is explained by the fact that we have been involved with the most varied types of aircraft. But, unfortunately for the umpteenth time, a system of slogans has once again been set into motion in the approaches to the conduct of conversion. Really, they have undertaken conversion without preparation, without a specific deeply and well thought-out program, and without the required limiting and initial conditions. And what is worst of all—without the required assets.

I will say that aircraft programs in the entire world are the most expensive. Whether it is in the United States, Great Britain, or France. Even space programs are in second place. But aviation was, is, and will still be in first place for a long time because the enormous expenditures associated with these programs result in enormous dividends.

With our voluntaristic approach to the conduct of conversion, enterprises have been given orders without considering their specific features. Say, our KB, which is a head enterprise and is involved with complex coordination, has been tasked with work on can-stacking machinery and with dry milk product packaging equipment. At that, it is not a question of an entire line but only about an individual

section. This has resulted in extreme cost increases for this machinery because, during their development, we were forced to involve those experts whose skills and labor are highly valued. And this is not only at our collective.

Therefore, we can frankly say that in our country conversion is being conducted hastily and without considering world experience. There decision-making on such a large-scale program is preceded by a minimum of a 2-3 year-long period "of zeroing in on the target" which involves the best experts from various spheres and which examines and analyzes all variations.

[Prokopenko] And how has the situation with conversion impacted the state of affairs in the firm?

[Dondukov] We had a year of complicated and difficult searches. We ultimately found a solution. We will manage to preserve the collective, cadres, and that potential which we have. And I think that we will yet very seriously make our presence felt. This year, our collective is flying a number of aircraft. They are the four-seater Yak-112 and the Yak-3 replica aircraft that are being manufactured on order from American firms. I think that the six-seater Yak-58 and two-seater Yak-54 will take off into the air by the end of this year or the beginning of next year with favorable conditions. The firm has studied market conditions for these aircraft for several years beforehand. We have selected partners and we have received orders. So, as of today, we do not have a shortage of orders. There is a requirement for a work force because we have had a certain outflow of cadres, but we are counting on stabilizing this situation by March.

[Prokopenko] If it is not a secret, how are you stabilizing the situation?

[Dondukov] Primarily due to the fact that we have found investors—firms which are attempting to invest their resources in our developments. And if at the beginning of this search domestic enterprises perceived our proposals on cooperation without enthusiasm which forced us to seek foreign partners, today the situation has changed. Serious partners have appeared in our country, who are interested in our programs that are famous throughout the world. Cooperation will bring us and them high dividends.

Second, in this context, a quite important fact is that already at the end of 1990, we had practically shifted from budget financing to contract relations. Therefore, in the current situation when a drastic reduction of budget appropriations for NIOKR [scientific research and experimental design work] has placed a number of serious problems before other OKB's, our collective has found itself in a more favorable position. And today we only need one thing—for the political situation in the country to normalize, government decisions to be implemented, and that they do not interfere with our work.

## CIS: NAVAL FORCES

### Chernavin Comments on Division of Fleet

92UM0544A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by V. Litovkin: "Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin: Division of the Black Sea Fleet is Out of the Question"]

[Text] On 5 February the Naval press service held a briefing for Russian and foreign journalists. Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Chernavin, Commander of the CIS Navy answered questions.

The Admiral stated that the question of moving the main bases of the Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk or anywhere else has not yet been considered by us. He confirmed his position about the impossibility of a division of the Black Sea Fleet. Chernavin said that the Fleet fulfills strategic missions in the interest of all Commonwealth countries and must have the ability to carry out these functions.

He said that if Ukraine wants its own naval forces, then we are prepared to render assistance through the allocation of some forces and assets for protection of the maritime border, oversight of the maritime economic zone ... The admiral stated that it is first necessary to formulate missions for which a navy is needed and thereupon create one. Yet they are asking that we give landing-assault units to Ukraine though it is unclear whose shores they intend to assault.

The Commander of the Navy also stated that 90 percent of conscripts in the Black Sea Fleet took the oath to the CIS. The remainder wanted to take the Ukrainian oath or did not want to take any oath.

### On Claims of Commander of Submarine Grounded off Sweden in 1981

92UM0479A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 6

[Article by Marat Zubko: "The Order Was to Blow Up the Submarine: With Not Only the Crew but Also Nuclear Torpedoes", and comments of Captain 1st Rank Vazhov on statement by submarine Captain Gushchin, by V. Litovkin]

[Text] Once again the need arises for us to continue discussion of the subject raised in the article "The Order Was to Blow Up the Submarine Together With the Crew" (IZVESTIYA, No 293, 1991). Moreover this occasion is so serious that in our opinion the Russian leadership must intervene, and give the public the complete picture as to what happened to the Soviet submarine U-137, which ran aground in a fjord in southern Sweden in 1981.

Let me recall that the article above was written largely on the basis of the recollections of Vasilii Besedin, the submarine's deputy commander for political affairs, who stated that the crew had been ordered to defend the vessel to the last, and that in the worst case it was to batten down the hatch and blow up the submarine together with the

crew. To the question troubling the Swedes, "Were there nuclear weapons aboard?", he replied in the negative, although Swedish experts who analyzed water samples asserted the opposite.

In a subsequent article, "Why the Political Deputy Commander Didn't Blow Up Himself and the Submarine", our newspaper (IZVESTIYA, No 302, 1991) turned the floor over to Captain 2d Rank A. Bulakhtin, former deputy chief of the USSR KGB's special department for the Baltic Fleet's submarine unit, who presented a somewhat different version of those events on the basis of his investigation.

In his words, there had been no direct order to blow up the submarine, although according to military regulations the crew "should have done everything possible to deny access of unauthorized persons to the unit's territory, and the submarine was a separate unit." Bulakhtin also made a statement that I personally didn't fully understand: "...given the statements of foreign mass media that nuclear weapons were aboard the submarine, only a madman could have given the order to blow it up."

It is strange that having conducted an investigation of the incident, when it comes to nuclear weapons he cites the foreign press, as if he himself had seen nothing! But that's not what's important. Here is what remains unclear: The press carried the statements of two witnesses who for some reason offered a different interpretation of the events. And then a third spoke up, painting a picture that would make your hair stand on end.

This third person was the former commander of the submarine U-137, Anatoliy Gushchin, a captain 3d rank in the past, and now retired at 45 years. Swedish journalists found him in Estonia and asked him to appear on the popular Robert Ashberg show. And so, here is what Gushchin said:

First, the submarine that ran aground under his command in a fjord not far from the Swedish naval base at Karlskrona on 27 October 1981 was carrying nuclear weapons.

Second, the command had in fact been ordered to blow up the submarine if need be.

Can you imagine? Blow up a submarine with nuclear torpedoes! This means that in those days Europe was on the brink of catastrophe. Who was it that gave such an order? In A. Bulakhtin's words only a madman could have done so. But this means that he did exist, if what the former commander of the submarine said was true.

During the program the host of the show tried to find out from A. Gushchin how high the yield of the nuclear weapons was. The captain didn't give exact figures, but he did say that it was high enough to destroy an entire enemy squadron under the right circumstances. And he added that while these nuclear weapons could destroy a harbor, they could hardly destroy entire cities.

The Swedes estimated that in such a case the U-137 was carrying 5-10 kiloton tactical nuclear warheads, which is what torpedoes were outfitted with then. They recalled for the purposes of comparison that a 13 kiloton bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. And how many total warheads

were there aboard the submarine, armed with four torpedoes? There is no answer to this question for the moment.

A. Gushchin said that the things he had to endure after that incident you wouldn't even wish upon an enemy. The possibility cannot be excluded that his words are ruled by bad feelings toward the fleet command. Nonetheless, in my opinion his confession should be considered in all seriousness. The Russian leadership, which has inherited the affairs of the Union administration, should conduct a special investigation of the "Odyssey" of the submarine U-137, and tell the truth about whether its commander really did have orders then to blow up the submarine together with not only the crew but the nuclear warheads as well.

And what is most important, if such an order existed then, does it still stand today? What would happen if another submarine armed with nuclear torpedoes of a higher yield finds itself in a similar situation?

It should also be considered that the Swedish side is also searching increasingly more actively for the truth in this matter. According to assertions in the local press the subject of violations of Sweden's territorial waters by foreign submarines was discussed in a meeting between Prime Minister Karl Bildt [transliteration] and Russian First Vice Premier Gennadiy Burbulis, who was in Stockholm last week.

And in the near future a group of Swedish experts will depart for Moscow for talks with Russian authorities; they will also ask questions about the involvement of the navy of the former USSR in invasions of Swedish skerries in the 1980's. According to Stockholm newspapers the group will include Karl Bildt's personal advisors. Time itself will shed light on this affair for the Russian leadership.

Another voice also deserving of attention made itself heard simultaneously with Anatoliy Gushchin. A statement was made to the press by Commander Karl Andersson—the same person who negotiated with the crew of the U-137 in behalf of the Swedish Coast Guard, and who was mentioned in the article "The Order Was to Blow Up the Submarine Together With the Crew."

After that incident with the U-137, he was virtually turned into a Swedish national hero. He became a unique symbol of the nation's struggle for the inviolability of the country's territorial waters. His appointments to the posts of chief of the naval school and commander of the naval base at Karlskrona were reflections of his popularity.

But then "national hero" Karl Andersson literally flabbergasted the public. He declared that all of the racket raised over the last 10 years about invasions of Swedish skerries by foreign submarines was simply fantasy, like with flying saucers. The case of the U-137 is of course an exception.

"We have not a single shred of evidence of such violations," he noted, "not a single photograph of a foreign submarine. Over 1,200 submarines were sunk during World War II, but in an entire decade of searching we were

unable to find even a tiny rivet from a violating vessel. All that the experts have is a photograph of impressions made on the bottom of Khorsh [transliteration] Fjord, but they could have been left by the anchor of some ship."

After this statement Swedish television organized a debate between Karl Andersson and Swedish Defense Minister Anders Bjork. The latter asserted that because he had departed from active service, the commander was unacquainted with the latest Coast Guard reports. And the other stated an opinion that should be especially interesting to our readers:

"When they changed the buttons on the uniform of Soviet soldiers in Kazakhstan, for example, we knew about it in a couple of months. But although minisubmarines have been operating for so many years, we still don't know where they are made, who makes them or where they come from."

The minister parried: We know where they come from, but I can't divulge this fact at the moment. So who's right? We will probably find out only after the archives of the former union ministry of defense are made public. The appropriate documents are stored there, if they exist.

If our submariners had in fact been involved in violations, sooner or later this will have to be admitted to us. And if they hadn't been, all the better: We don't need the bad publicity. What is especially important is to know everything about how matters stood then, and stand now, with regard to orders to blow up submarines together with their crews and nuclear torpedoes.

#### Vazhov on Gushchin's Statement, by V. Litovkin

*The editor's office asked Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Vazhov, chief of the Northwestern Sector of the Main Naval Staff Operations Directorate, to comment on the statement by Anatoliy Gushchin, former commander of the submarine U-137.*

I will leave the captain 3d rank's assertion that an order was received to blow up the submarine to his own conscience. It would be impossible to document the existence of such an order today because no such documents exist in the archives. I can only say as a specialist that the Gushchin had no possibilities for doing so. There could have been only 20 high-explosive grenades aboard the submarine; naturally they could have wrecked considerable havoc, but they couldn't of course have caused the explosion of a 1,350-ton submarine made of especially strong ship steel capable of withstanding a pressure of 25 kilograms per square centimeter.

Nor could a torpedo have been exploded, because special safety mechanisms make detonation of a torpedo inside a torpedo tube impossible. And a torpedo tube can't be blown up by an external charge because it is stronger than the ship's hull. Therefore an order to blow up the submarine seems quite unfulfillable to me.

I might suppose that Gushchin received instructions to knock out secret equipment—radios, torpedo firing instruments, cryptographic equipment. A grenade would have been enough for that job. But nothing else could have been blown up.

Was the submarine carrying a torpedo fitted with a nuclear warhead? Apparently it was. Submarines carried such torpedoes on the Baltic in those days. But even so, the warheads of these torpedoes have their own safeguards against unsanctioned detonation. These safeguards won't fail even if the torpedo itself blows up.

In October 1986, during the accident aboard the Soviet submarine in the Atlantic, a missile tipped with a nuclear warhead exploded. The explosion blew off the lid of the missile shaft and ejected part of the missile into the sea, but the warhead didn't operate—its activation was protected by a special code.

Then there is one last thing that casts doubt upon the truthfulness of the words of the captain 3d rank. When a submarine is resting on the bottom in shallow water, it makes no sense to blow it up in order to conceal or hide something. All of it would still be there at the surface, and it wouldn't be hard for specialists to reach conclusions about its design and what was in it.

Now about the minisubmarines. A great deal of what the newspapers say about them is far-fetched. There were only two of them, built by Leningrad's Admiralteyskoye Association. The decision to build them was made in the early 1980's, and the plan was to make them multipurpose, but the concept failed. Lack of coordination between the numerous departments had its effect, the boats wound up too heavy and hard to control, and so construction of more of them had to be abandoned.

Their specifications are no secret today. The displacement of such a boat is 219 tons, it is 28 meters long, its speed is six and a half knots, and its range is 240 miles. It has a diesel-electric propulsion unit and an electric motor, and a full battery charge can support 60 miles of subsurface running.

There is a crew of three—a commander, a mechanic and a navigator, each of whom can control the boat alone. Its endurance, which is determined by the water and food stores, is 10 days. During trials it did not remain below the surface for more than 24 hours—it had to surface to ventilate the compartments.

Diving depth is up to 200 meters. Its armament consists of a device for launching containers. The latter could accommodate a television unit to explore the bottom, apparatus for search and rescue measures, or a mechanical manipulator with which to raise various objects from the bottom and to transfer articles to a submarine in distress. The submarine could also be adapted to lay mines and even accommodate a torpedo tube.

Together with the expenses of design and development the boats cost 180 million rubles in old prices. The boats themselves cost around 20 million. This is approximately the cost of two Tu-22 aircraft.

During trials they went to sea 170 times, though of course no farther than the Liepaja roadstead and 10 miles from the Paldiski coast. They never went beyond the USSR's territorial waters, such that the suggestion that they may have been in Swedish skerries is devoid of all grounds.

The fate of the boats will be this: We will take them up on shore, mothball them, and if we are able to correct their design shortcomings, we will put them back in service. If not, they will remain as museum pieces, as experimental models that could serve as the basis for designing other modifications. In peacetime their use is totally meaningless.

These are the things we want to say at the meeting with the delegation of experts from the Swedish Navy, to be held 28 January. We will be visited by Captain 1st Rank Emil Svenson, a naval advisor to the Swedish prime minister, and Captain 2d Rank Nils Uve Yanson [transliterations] from the Swedish Defense Ministry.

I have been appointed leader of the expert group from the Russian Navy. We are prepared to provide our Swedish associates with all information on our activities in Baltic waters. I think that they will have no reason to suspect us of insincerity.

#### **India, China Interested in Varyag**

92UM0583A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Feb 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Have Buyers Come Along?"]

[Text] The information agency PRESS TRUST OF INDIA reports, quoting the latest issue of JANES DEFENSE WEEKLY, that India as well as China is interested in acquiring the heavy aircraft carrier cruiser Varyag from Ukraine. The vessel, with a displacement of 67,500 tons, is analogous to the Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov, which was part of the Northern Fleet. It is now being built at a shipyard in Nikolayev.

After an announcement concerning the nationalization of Nikolayev shipyards by Ukraine, the future of large combat vessels being built there, including the aircraft-carrying cruiser Ulyanovsk, and the missile cruiser Admiral Lobov, appears uncertain, the report points out.

#### **Sailors Comment on Black Sea Fleet Controversy**

92UM0668B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
13 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by the newspaper's special correspondent: "Holding Their Own Ground"]

[Text] The lord of the manor will come and settle things. This may not exactly be the case, but still this saying reflects the ambiguity of the situation which has come about with the taking of the military oath by the young recruits in the Black Sea Fleet. Since 26 January, when a majority of the sailors in the Training Detachment imeni Admiral F.S. Oktyabrskiy took the oath to the CIS and a portion of them refused, what a hubbub has been raised over this on the Ukrainian and Russian TV and radio. But nowhere have they given the opinion of the "refuseniks." The editors have decided to make up for this.

Seaman Sergey Ivkov: I was called up from Kerch. When the time approached to take the oath, our commander Capt 3d Rank V. Kolesnik told us: "Before you are three texts of the military oath proclaiming loyalty to Russia, Ukraine and the CIS. The choice is yours."

Then the day came to take the oath. According to the rolls, I was among the first in the platoon. I stepped forward, read the text for loyalty to the Ukrainian people and signed it. A total of eight sailors from the ranks took this oath. But then a captain first rank (I did not know his name) came up to the table on which the text lay and took it away. It was explained to us that the given oath was not valid and we had to take a different one...

Seaman Aleksandr Ryazanov: Even at the induction center in Pereyaslav-Khmel'nitskiy, which is in the Kiev Area, we were firmly promised that we would be serving in Ukraine. For this reason I had not the slightest doubt as to which oath I would take—of course one for loyalty to my people.

Actually that was the case at the start of the ceremony. The first to take the oath was Seaman Oleg Andryushchenko and after him came another ten, including myself. But when the next fellow serviceman left the formation, it was suddenly discovered that there were different words in the text...

A military formation is not the place for a demonstration. However, without discussing the situation, we knew what had happened. As a total, of the 21 men who were in formation on that day, nine took the Ukrainian oath (at present it for some reason is considered invalid).

Seaman Andrey Gerasimidi: I, it turned out, was only "semisworn." I was the third from the ranks. Before me the oath of loyalty to Ukraine had been read out twice. Then I, having begun to read the text, immediately stopped. I realized that the words given me were from a different text! I read as far as the middle and said to the officer: "I shall not take this oath."

So this is the situation. In the subunit, having surrounded our correspondent tightly, the sailors said that all of them—some 90 men—would not take the oath of loyalty to the CIS but wanted to serve only their own people. They have no service reprimands against them. For now the fellows cannot be employed in certain tasks, for example, standing guard. They are not permitted to go on leave in the city. In all other regards they are just like the rest. They are very hopeful that the politicians from the CIS states will be wise. For now they are holding their own ground. They are awaiting the decisions.

#### **CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES**

##### **Major General Artemov Details Food Problem**

92UM0621A Moscow SYN OTECHESTVA in Russian  
No 4, Jan 92 p 4

[Interview with Major-General Aleksandr Leonidovich Artemov, deputy chief of the Central Food Directorate, by

O. Sedykh, occasion, date and place not specified, under rubric "In One Column": "On a Starvation Ration?"; uncaptioned photograph of Artemov included]

[Text] *The atmosphere in the office of Major-General A. Artemov, deputy chief of the Central Food Directorate, has been heated since early morning. Reports have been coming in from outlying areas, one more disturbing than the next: supplies of meat are coming to an end and there are not enough groats or fish products. Prompt decisions are made on each report on the spot, although it is not very simple at all to give help. I seemingly can see the aircraft with food products soaring into the air and rolling stock being loaded at food depots...*

[Artemov] The situation is really very complicated, says Aleksandr Leonidovich, tearing himself from the telephone briefly. I do not intend to frighten anyone, but the situation is such that, like it or not, one has to declare that a state solution to the Army and Navy food problem simply does not exist now. The troops are engaged in self-procurement of food products, if that can be said.

Here are just a few of what are in my view very eloquent figures. In 11 months of the past year the Armed Forces were short the delivery of 17,000 tons of meat products, 75,900 tons of flour, 17,000 tons of groats and 12,000 tons of fish products. Of course, the existing situation largely is the result of economic difficulties being experienced by the Commonwealth, but political realities of the day also aggravate it appreciably. Georgia, for example, has completely stopped sending products to the Transcaucasus Military District. Azerbaijan and Armenia are selling or bartering products by only half. It is also a similar picture in a number of other regions, as a result of which we were forced to take an extreme step: arranging to supply troops with food products from reserves of the center and military districts.

[Sedykh] And the import of food? Can the situation really not be alleviated in some way with its help?

[Artemov] Not everything is as simple as it seems here. Foreign firms are not hastening for now to conclude contracts for the 1992 delivery of food for the Western and Northern groups of forces, because of the absence of currency on the part of our foreign trade associations. In addition, the procedure of paying for food deliveries to units and formations stationed in the Baltic states has not been spelled out up to now.

[Sedykh] Just what is the solution?

[Artemov] We prepared a number of specific proposals, about which I hope leaders of states included in the Commonwealth will be informed in the near future. It is proposed above all to supply food to the Armed Forces centrally, by state order, on an immediate basis. It would appear that special agencies which would take care of planning support to the Army and Navy and coordinating the volumes, procedures and time periods of interstate food deliveries with sovereign states should be established for this under the Council of heads of governments and directly in the independent republics themselves. And one

other point of no small importance. Lately we have run across instances where attempts are being made simply to take military sovkhozes located in certain republics away from us. It is a fully understandable desire, for in contrast to many other agricultural enterprises, our sovkhozes are built up well, are profitable, and maintain high labor discipline. In this connection we propose to legislatively secure for military sovkhozes the lands they have and not transfer these farms to other departments until the country's food support stabilizes.

[Sedykh] But Aleksandr Leonidovich, the fact is, one has to understand that not only is it not simple for us, it is not simple for anyone with food products. The measures you propose can cause confrontation in one way or another. Is it not better simply to go tighten the belts tighter?

[Artemov] Even so, we have no room to tighten them further. Judge for yourself. This year it was planned to appreciably increase the combined-arms ration. In particular, it was proposed to issue juices and increase the daily issue of meat and fish to soldiers and sailors. Unfortunately, the decision was made not to implement this supplement temporarily due to a food shortage.

A complicated situation also has taken shape with officer rations. A positive decision was made on this matter, as you know, but rations will be issued based on availability of resources in view of the difficult economic situation in the country. In their absence, officers will begin to receive monthly compensation, the size of which will increase depending on the increase in cost of food products. In January of this year, for example, it will tentatively be R650.

As you see, we are reckoning with the economic difficulties which have arisen in the country, but we too have to go half-way. It is high time, for example, to dispel the myth concocted by someone that the Army allegedly is eating the country out of house and home. I do not know how it is for other indicators, but with respect to food, the Armed Forces' requirement for it is only two (!) percent of the volume of population consumption.

[Sedykh] Well, can we ourselves somehow alleviate the food problem?

[Artemov] To some extent, yes. Moreover, we are doing much in this direction. For example, under the present complicated conditions our military sovkhozes not only are relieving tension by supplying the Army with food, but in a number of places also are helping the troops simply to survive. This year, for example, they will be able to meet Armed Forces' needs for meat for 3.5 months, milk for 6.5 months, eggs for 4 months and potatoes for 4.5 months. You will agree, that is not a bad indicator, but we also plan to increase it. In 1992 another ten will be added to presently existing military sovkhozes and their number thereby will go to 100, which will permit organizing production of our own farm products in essentially all regions.

[Sedykh] The transition to a territorial supply principle also evidently promises rather good prospects?

[Artemov] We really are linking great hopes to it. Centralized supply no longer will be able to function with its previous effectiveness under the new economic conditions. Direct contracts concluded locally which very keenly consider the capabilities and features of particular regions will become the basis of supply.

[Sedykh] To sum up our conversation, there generally still is cause for optimism?

[Artemov] Yes, one should not panic. No matter what happens, this year as well the Army will receive food in an amount sufficient for its life support.

#### List of Spare Parts for Sale on Open Economy

92UM0236A Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE* in Russian No 8, Aug 91 (signed to press 09 Sep 91) p 40

[Unattributed item under rubric "TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE Information and Advertising": "Spare Parts Offered for Sale in the National Economy"]

[Text]

| Catalog Number, Make                  | Part Name      |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|
| <b>Spare Parts:</b>                   |                |
| 69-1002042                            | Plate          |
| 20-10000100                           | 83.0 mm ring   |
| 20-10000104                           | Starter bushes |
| 20-10000102                           | 0.05 bushes    |
| 20-1002010/11                         | Block          |
| 20-1002032                            | Pipe           |
| 20-1002058, 20-1002110, 20/60-1002111 | Covers         |
| 20-1003010                            | Head           |
| 20-1003020                            | Gasket         |
| 40-1003060                            | Manifold       |
| 12-1004045                            | Connecting rod |
| 20-1005115                            | Flywheel       |
| 20-1005125                            | Rim            |
| 20-1006025                            | Camshaft       |
| 20/21-1008010                         | Gas line       |
| 20-1008080                            | Gasket         |
| 20-1005015                            | Crankshaft     |
| 46-1009010                            | Crankcase      |
| 20-1009050/65                         | Indicator      |
| 20-1011070                            | Pinion         |
| 69-1108010                            | Filter         |
| 69-1293917                            | Flange         |
| 21/20-1308025                         | Pulley         |
| 69-13101110                           | Louvers        |
| 69-1601015                            | Crankcase      |
| 12-1601093                            | Disk           |
| 69-1602300                            | Yoke           |
| 69-1602028                            | Roller         |
| M-7626                                | Bushing        |
| 69-1702040, 69-1702041                | Rods           |
| 69-1802025                            | Shaft          |
| 69-1802036                            | Pinion         |
| 69-1802085                            | Shaft          |
| 69-1802090                            | Pinion         |
| 69-1802098                            | Cover          |

| Catalog Number, Make          | Part Name |
|-------------------------------|-----------|
| 69-1802101                    | Gasket    |
| 69-1802110                    | Shaft     |
| 69-1802113                    | Washer    |
| 69-1802116                    | Coupling  |
| 69-1802125                    | Gasket    |
| 69-1803020, 69-1803028        | Yokes     |
| 69-2304020                    | Housing   |
| 69-2304100                    | Lever     |
| 69-2902444                    | Bracket   |
| 69-2902458                    | Web       |
| 69-2902480                    | Axle      |
| 69-2905430                    | Strut     |
| 69-2915418                    | Crank pin |
| 69-2915430                    | Strut     |
| 69-3401090                    | Arm       |
| 20-3501080                    | Coupling  |
| 150Yu-2506006, 69Yu-3506015BR | Pipes     |
| 69-3802033                    | Pinion    |
| 76-8402309                    | Panel     |
| 408-110912                    | Filter    |
| 402/403-4301091               | Arm       |
| 402-1009010                   | Crankcase |
| 109-1109010                   | Filter    |
| 451D-2902015                  | Leaf      |
| 451D-2902051                  | Leaf      |
| 450-2902103                   | Leaf      |
| 451D-2912051                  | Leaf      |
| 451D-2915430                  | Strut     |
| 451D-3001010                  | Beam      |
| 451D-3508068                  | Cable     |
| 451D-3803034                  | Pinion    |
| K495-222A, K125N-321          | Nozzles   |
| 451-522                       | Gasket    |
| 130-3401085                   | Bushing   |
| 130-3401087                   | Arm       |
| 130-3401179                   | Gutter    |
| 130-3401378                   | Cover     |
| 130-3401505                   | Bushing   |
| 130-3407240                   | Pulley    |
| 130-3407247                   | Bushing   |
| 130-3407435                   | Header    |
| 130-3407439                   | Gasket    |
| 130-3501090                   | Shoe      |
| 130-1107451                   | Housing   |
| 130-1010040A2                 | Grid      |



| Catalog Number, Make                                | Part Name                  |
|---|----------------------------|
| 303031, 251513, 421139                              | Nuts                       |
| 130-1014012   | Manifold                   |
| 130-1007106, 130-1007107                            | Struts                     |
| 130-1011025, 130-1011027                            | Axles                      |
| 130-1011037   | Pinion                     |
| 130-1011042   | Shaft                      |
| 130-1011045, 130-1011049                            | Pinions                    |
| 130-1012035   | Filter                     |
| 130-1015086   | Pipe connection            |
| 130-1015089   | Elbow                      |
| 130-1015300   | Flange                     |
| 130-1015499   | T-joint                    |
| 130-1015434   | Pipe                       |
| 130-1702058   | Spring                     |
| 306342  | Ring                       |
| 307183  | Stud                       |
| 307611  | Spring                     |
| 355077  | Washer                     |
| 130-6804010, 130-6804011                            | Mechanisms                 |
| 130-1104682   | Pipe                       |
| 130-1106027   | Yoke                       |
| 130-2402230   | Gasket                     |
| 130-1303014   | Manifold                   |
| 307156, 200367, 307175, 414103, 307172, 131-8500077 | Bolts                      |
| 131-2900102   | Suspension                 |
| 131-2918180   | Ring                       |
| MB-1802305, MB-1802306                              | Crankcases                 |
| MB-18003210   | Chamber                    |
| MB-1830014  | Shaft                      |
| MB-1830054  | Pinion                     |
| MB-1830060  | Shaft                      |
| MB-1830062  | Pinion                     |
| MB-2403210, MB-2403213                              | Crankcases                 |
| MB-3401090  | Arm                        |
| MB-3508048  | Quadrant                   |
| MB-4202010  | KAI [not further expanded] |
| MB-2203010  | Pipe                       |
| MB-2206010  | Shaft                      |
| MB-1702214  | Lever                      |
| MB-4202024  | Pinion                     |
| MB-4502030  | Spider                     |
| 2102016   | Housing                    |
| 131-4224171   | Hose                       |
| 131-2402180   | Cover                      |
| 131-1307026   | Overflow                   |

| Catalog Number, Make   | Part Name |
|--|-----------|
| 3508, 3616, 3618, 6204, 30215, 46111, 60089, 226906, 326705, 804705, 2318, 7605, 60212, 402313, 40231, 502310, 50-32315, 2007913 | Bearings  |
| 161-1015050  | Funnel    |
| 302119p  | Bolt      |
| 8102026  | Gasket    |
| 8102020  | Cover     |
| 8102032  | Rotor     |

**Motor Pool and Garage Equipment:**

|   |  |
|---|--|
| PPV-16-12-10  | Cleaning device                        |
| URV   | Consumption indicator                  |
|   | Mobile transporter                     |
| FO-1511 V-20303   | Distributor                            |
| EMK-12  | Valve                                  |
| EDO-51111-1/380; EDO-10101/220; EDO-10102/3805  | Electric heaters                       |
| SV1-40-1N-2/2-18; SV1-40-1N-1.5-18; SVM1-A40-1N-2.2-18; 2S160AV1-6.3/33-7.5; 2S16B2V6-18/18-5.5           | Hydroelectric stations [Gidrostantsii] |
| KU-2-500-45/42, VK-550-125-13, VK-550-125-13, RK-650-50/25-22, 480-25-53-2-1, Ts2-250-20-13, RK-500-50-11 | Reduction gears                        |
| TSpE-10x25x200  | Pipe                                   |
|   | Hardness gauge                         |
| RAR-15  | Frame                                  |
| S-171; 28-0346  | Pullers                                |
| PARM-98   | Grip for cabs                          |
| 5330; 5937-390 10366  | Fittings                               |
| 120-3916016A; 72V-5563; 51-390401B; 307310  | Wrenches                               |
| ar-20-3901B40   | Gauge                                  |
| 535-3913025   | Hose                                   |
| 535-3918082   | Handle                                 |
| 712-27sb183   | Clamp                                  |
| 17-100-31106  | Governor                               |
| PZhD 30-500-07  | Valve                                  |
| PZhD 30-500-04  | Small valve                            |
| 105-44-243  | Nut                                    |
| 7x17; 8x8; 8x12   | Rollers                                |
| 34.928; 13/8  | Balls                                  |
| 35.719 mm; 36.513 mm  | Small balls                            |

**Materials:**

|       |                                |
|-------|--------------------------------|
|       | Tubular fiber                  |
|       | Linen squares                  |
| PA-4  | Aluminum powder                |
|       | Cardboard bits                 |
| RTD-1 | Set of industrial rubber parts |

Note. All parts are of 1st category *Address for inquiries*: 103160, Moscow, K-160, TEKHNKA I VOORUZHENIYE editorial offices. *Telephone numbers for inquiries*: 293-33-54; 293-88-75.

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### Housing Shortfalls Detailed

92UM0467A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
29 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major I. Ivanyuk: "It is Difficult To Repay Housing Debts, But Things Are Even More Difficult for Homeless Officers"]

[Text] In conversing with Western correspondents, who now show much interest in the Armed Forces' social problems, their genuine amazement very quickly breaks through. It is not even over the fact that servicemen, who are not ignored in any country, have ended up here below the poverty line. These people are surprised by something else: the army tries with all its might to fend for itself and feed itself and it still helps the people.

Speaking of housing, 90 percent of the apartments which the Armed Forces receive for their money annually are the product of military construction. Each year it becomes more and more difficult to create them: there are more and more homeless military people with their households, ever fewer conscripts who can be handed a trowel instead of an assault rifle, less money, and fewer construction materials.

Well, how about local authorities, the Soviets? For it was always proclaimed that they too should be concerned for servicemen, including the allocation of housing. Alas, it is possible to count on your fingers the ispolkoms which, like that of Sakhalin Oblast, now assign apartments to the military regardless of the sources of their receipt for oblast needs.

The 1984 government decree under which servicemen must be provided housing became invalid long ago. Under this document, Russia owed the army over 13,000 apartments. Things also are no better with proportional participation: money for these purposes has been punctually allocated from the military budget lately, but apartments coming out the other end are only half of what is owed. As of 1 January the Army lacked a total of more than 7,500 such apartments. The following figure also is indicative: only one out of every 130 families who have lost ties with the Armed Forces has resettled from restricted and isolated military posts. At those rates the process of freeing up garrison apartments threatens to drag on for centuries.

Servicemen themselves—both those discharged to the reserve and those continuing to serve—are attempting to somehow defend their rights. Thus, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA wrote about homeless officers committees established, for example, in Ulyanovsk and Moscow. The voice of homeless people also was heard in full force at the All-Service Conference of Representatives of Officers Meetings.

Russian President B. Yeltsin, who spoke there, assured those present that in the next half year the Armed Forces will receive 120,000 apartments from the state (the entire deficit is approximately 200,000 apartments). An impressive figure, and it is not surprising that it was greeted with a certain skepsis by many of those present: even before, there were many various promises and everyone, including the uninitiated, are familiar with construction rates at our construction sites; the usual time periods for placing housing in operation are for the most part at the very end of the year; and debts have piled up for years, but here everything is to be paid back in a matter of months...

But even if the promise is not fulfilled in such rigid time periods, if the promised apartments are received by the Army, for example, by year's end, this already would be such forward progress for which the Russian leadership would earn the enormous gratitude of people in shoulderboards. The important thing is for matters to move off dead center in principle and for local people to understand that it is impossible to be eternally in debt to the Army or to exploit servicemen. The time has come to show concern for armed defenders not in words, but in deed.

The editors are publishing data today on how many apartments are owed the Armed Forces in Russia by each republic and each oblast. We are publishing them so that the public in all regions knows precisely what the military can lay claim to and so that local people also seriously ponder how work should be arranged so the President's words do not remain an empty sound and the hopes of people in shoulderboards are not replaced by disappointment.

It is difficult but possible to fulfill the promise made by the RSFSR President and repay the housing debts to the Army. It is gratifying that already after the All-Service Officers Meeting B. N. Yeltsin himself reaffirmed his resolve to achieve this. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA intends to help him in this matter in every way. We will attempt to track the general situation by regions and publicize instances of non-performance and red tape. We also invite you, dear readers, to take part in this.

Well, let us begin with a kind of "stock-taking"—here is how things stand with the housing debts today and here is what we are beginning with.

|                      | USSR MOD Proportional Participation |            |                 |             | Receipt of Space by Government Decree |            |                  | Resettlement from Restricted Posts (families) |                   | Discharged to Reserve and Not Provided Housing (families) |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------|------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|------------|------------------|---|-------------------|---|
|                      | Debt as of 1 Jan 1992               |            | Under 1991 Plan |             | Debt as of 1 Jan 1992                 |            | Received in 1991 | To Be Resettled                               | Resettled in 1991 |   |
|                      | sq m, 000's                         | Apartments | sq m, 000's     | sq m, 000's | sq m, 000's                           | Apartments | sq m, 000's      |   |                   |   |
| Russian Federation   | 437.0                               | 7634       | 212.3           | 71.0        | 717.7                                 | 13192      | 112.9            | 48 164  | 366               | 34059   |
| Including:           |                                     |            |                 |             |                                       |            |                  |   |                   |   |
| Moscow               | 11.1                                | 1(9)0      | 10.1            | 7.4         | 231.4                                 | 4350       |                  | 300   |                   | 152   |
| Moscow Oblast        | 9.7                                 | 1(6)7      | 8.0             | 6.2         | 31.1                                  | 565        | 6.1              | 4547  | 11(9)             | 2284  |
| St. Petersburg       | 51.2                                | 883        | 18.8            | 3.0         |                                       |            | 13.5             | 232   |                   | 472   |
| Leningrad Oblast     | 74.5                                | 1285       |                 | 1.3         | 7.9                                   | 143        | 11.1             | 4998  | 9                 | 884   |
| Bashkiriya           | 2.9                                 | 50         | 1.3             | 0.7         | 1.9                                   | 34         | 0.1              | 191   |                   | 31 3  |
| Dagestan             | 2.4                                 | 42         | 1.5             | 0.4         | 1.9                                   | 36         | 0.(6)            |   |                   | 56  |
| Kabardino-Balkariya  | 6.2                                 | 107        | 2.3             | 0.2         | 1.7                                   | 31         | 0.2              |   |                   | 208   |
| Buryatiya            |                                     |            |                 |             | 4.0                                   | 73         | 0.(6)            | 201   |                   | 96  |
| Karelia              | 0.1                                 | 2          | 0.1             |             |                                       |            | 1.2              | 249   | 2                 | 181   |
| Komi                 | 0.7                                 | 12         |                 |             | 2.2                                   | 40         | 0.1              | 3   |                   | 45  |
| North Osetiya        | 10.8                                | 186        | 6.9             | 0.7         | 1.0                                   | 17         | 4.7              | 143   |                   | 81  |
| Mari El              | 1.9                                 | 33         | 1.8             | 0.1         |                                       |            | 0.3              |   |                   | 248   |
| Mordoviya            |                                     |            |                 |             |                                       |            |                  | 38  |                   | 69  |
| Tatarstan            | 0.4                                 | 7          | 0.2             | 0.1         | 2.1                                   | 38         | 3.5              | 313   |                   | 403   |
| Udmurtiya            | 0.5                                 | 9          | 0.4             | 0.1         | 0.3                                   | 6          | 0.(6)            | 292   |                   | 218   |
| Checheno-Ingushetiya | 5.9                                 | 101        | 1.4             | 0.2         | 4.1                                   | 75         | 0.5              | 26  |                   | 39  |
| Chuvashiya           | 0.8                                 | 14         | 1.3             | 1.1         |                                       |            |                  |   |                   | 183   |
| Yakutskaya-Sakha     | 0.3                                 | 4          |                 |             | 3.1                                   | 56         | 0.8              | 101   |                   | 55  |
| Altay Kray           | 9.6                                 | 186        | 8.6             | 3.9         |                                       |            | 3.3              | 134   |                   | 272   |
| Krasnodar Kray       | 10.1                                | 175        | 5.2             | 1.7         | 10.0                                  | 181        | 4.0              | 354   | 2                 | 3009  |
| Krasnoyarsk Kray     | 10.8                                | 185        | 4.8             | 1.5         | 0.3                                   | 5          | 1.0              | 359   | 2                 | 330   |
| Maritime Kray        | 2.4                                 | 42         | 2.4             |             | 13.7                                  | 249        | 5.2              | 1413  | 27                | 1406  |
| Khabarovsk Kray      | 0.7                                 | 12         | 1.0             | 0.3         | 11.0                                  | 199        | 1.4              | 868   | 1                 | 758   |
| Stavropol Kray       | 10.8                                | 187        | 8.0             | 2.5         | 2.1                                   | 39         | 1.2              | 2   |                   | 1341  |
| Amur Oblast          | 2.4                                 | 41         | 0.8             |             | 1.2                                   | 22         | 1.(5)            | 375   |                   | 474   |
| Arkhangelsk Oblast   | 0.8                                 | 14         |                 | 0.4         | (9).2                                 | 167        | 0.7              | 567   | 58                | 203   |
| Astrakhan Oblast     | 0.7                                 | 12         | 0.3             |             | 1.1                                   | 19         | 1.3              | 859   | 40                | 144   |
| Belgorod Oblast      | 2.6                                 | 45         | 2.6             | 0.3         | 0.5                                   | 8          | 0.9              |   |                   | 995   |
| Bryansk Oblast       | 4.5                                 | 78         | 3.0             | 0.7         | 0.9                                   | 15         | 1.4              | 267   | 5                 | 402   |
| Vladimir Oblast      | 3.7                                 | 64         | 3.2             | 1.1         | 5.3                                   | 96         | 0.8              | 498   | 4                 | 493   |
| Volograd Oblast      | 13.9                                | 239        | 5.8             | 0.2         | 11.1                                  | 202        | 1.4              | 278   | 2                 | 690   |
| Vologda Oblast       | 0.4                                 | 6          | 0.9             | 0.6         | 8.7                                   | 158        | 1.4              | 118   |                   | 340   |

|                         | USSR MOD Proportional Participation |            |                 |                   |                                       |            |                  |   |                   |   |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------|------------|------------------|---|-------------------|---|
|                         |                                     |            | Under 1991 Plan |                   | Receipt of Space by Government Decree |            |                  |   |                   |   |
|                         | Debt as of 1 Jan 1992               |            | To Be Received  | Actually Received | Debt as of 1 Jan 1992                 |            | Received in 1991 | Resettlement from Restricted Posts (families) |                   |   |
|                         | sq m, 000's                         | Apartments | sq m, 000's     | sq m, 000's       | sq m, 000's                           | Apartments | sq m, 000's      | To Be Resettled                               | Resettled in 1991 | Discharged to Reserve and Not Provided Housing (families) |
| Voronezh Oblast         | 7.2                                 | 124        | 7.5             | 0.9               | 12.8                                  | 233        | 0.1              | 22  | 3                 | 1141  |
| Ivanovo Oblast          | 4.5                                 | 77         | 2.3             |                   | 2.(9)                                 | 52         | 0.(5)            | 439   | 2                 | 265   |
| Irkutsk Oblast          | 11.8                                | 203        | 7.1             | 0.7               | 14.7                                  | 268        | 1.7              | 342   | 2                 | 146   |
| Kaliningrad Oblast      | 4.2                                 | 72         | 4.2             |                   | 19.2                                  | 350        | 0.7              | 575   | 2                 | 870   |
| Kamchatka Oblast        | 14.7                                | 254        | 1.3             | 0.2               | 0.8                                   | 14         | 1.9              | 326   |                   | 110   |
| Kaluga Oblast           | 0.7                                 | 12         | 0.2             | 0.1               | 5.9                                   | 107        | 0.5              | 152   |                   | 494   |
| Kemerovo Oblast         | 0.6                                 | 10         | 0.6             |                   | 0.6                                   | 11         |                  |   |                   | 67  |
| Kirov Oblast            | 2.0                                 | 35         | 2.6             | 2.1               | 3.9                                   | 70         | 1.2              | 571   | 4                 | 336   |
| Kostroma Oblast         | 0.4                                 | 7          | 0.2             |                   | 8.6                                   | 157        |                  | 150   |                   | 196   |
| Kurgan Oblast           | 0.4                                 | 7          | 0.4             |                   | 3.6                                   | 66         |                  | 47  | 3                 | 178   |
| Kursk Oblast            | 3.0                                 | 51         | 2.6             | 0.5               |                                       |            | 0.3              | 46  |                   | 310   |
| Lipetsk Oblast          | 1.9                                 | 33         | 1.2             | 0.1               | 1.5                                   | 26         | 1.4              | 637   |                   | 505   |
| Magadan Oblast          | 3.2                                 | 55         | 1.0             | 0.2               | 0.1                                   | 1          | 0.7              | 18  |                   | 41  |
| Murmansk Oblast         | 10.5                                | 181        | 6.3             | 0.6               | 13.0                                  | 237        | 1.9              | 586   | 5                 | 244   |
| Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast | 3.4                                 | 58         | 3.4             | 2.7               | 6.9                                   | 125        | 1.9              | 213   | 1                 | 1112  |
| Novgorod Oblast         | 2.3                                 | 40         | 1.2             | 0.1               | (9).1                                 | 166        | 0.(9)            | 1115  | 5                 | 492   |
| Novosibirsk Oblast      | 22.2                                | 383        | 5.3             | 0.1               | 22.8                                  | 415        | 0.4              | 364   |                   | 334   |
| Omsk Oblast             | 10.8                                | 186        | 6.1             | 2.0               | 5.0                                   | 90         | 1.0              | 2(6)  | 2                 | 2(5)1   |
| Orenburg Oblast         | 2.5                                 | 43         | 3.2             | 2.5               | 0.2                                   | 4          | 0.2              | 479   | 6                 | 243   |
| Orel Oblast             | 0.9                                 | (9)        | 1.4             | 1.4               | 0.8                                   | 14         | 0.4              |   |                   | 363   |
| Penza Oblast            | 6.3                                 | 109        | 8.0             | 2.3               | 4.9                                   | 88         | 1.4              | 495   | 2                 | 617   |
| Pskov Oblast            | 1.7                                 | 29         |                 | 0.2               | 4.2                                   | 76         |                  | 586   | 6                 | 431   |
| Perm Oblast             | 1.7                                 | 30         | 1.6             | 0.2               | 8.0                                   | 146        | 3.3              | 588   | 5                 | 297   |
| Rostov Oblast           | 4.7                                 | 81         | 1.3             | 0.3               | 28.3                                  | 515        | 0.8              | 102   | 4                 | 998   |
| Ryazan Oblast           | 2.8                                 | 48         | 0.8             | 0.1               | 23.7                                  | 430        | 1.6              | 90(6)   |                   | 710   |
| Samara Oblast           | 5.3                                 | 92         | 4.(6)           | 2.0               | 15.4                                  | 299        | 2.3              | 542   | 5                 | 730   |
| Saratov Oblast          | 21.8                                | 376        | 15.2            | 7.7               | 13.8                                  | 252        | 1.0              | 1658  | 3                 | 1156  |
| Sakhalin Oblast         |                                     |            |                 |                   | 1.9                                   | 35         | 0.7              | 426   |                   | 161   |
| Sverdlovsk Oblast       | 11.5                                | 198        | 0.4             | 0.(6)             | 16.8                                  | 306        | 3.(6)            | 1300  | 5                 | 467   |
| Smolensk Oblast         | 1.4                                 | 25         | 1.4             | 0.1               | 14.1                                  | 256        | 0.4              | 213   |                   | 366   |
| Tambov Oblast           | 2.4                                 | 41         | 1.7             | 0.1               | 7.2                                   | 130        | 2.9              | 545   |                   | 787   |
| Tver Oblast             | 4.2                                 | 73         | 1.3             | 0.(6)             | 14.5                                  | 264        | 7.9              | 659   | 1                 | 753   |
| Tomsk Oblast            | 0.2                                 | 3          | 2.1             | 2.1               |                                       |            |                  | 8   | 2                 | 84  |
| Tula Oblast             | 0.3                                 | 5          | 3.0             | 3.3               | 8.9                                   | 162        | 0.9              | 174   |                   | 43(6)   |

|                    | USSR MOD Proportional Participation |             |                 |                   |                                       |             |                  |  |                   |  |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------|------------------|--|-------------------|--|
|                    |                                     |             | Under 1991 Plan |                   | Receipt of Space by Government Decree |             |                  |  |                   |  |
|                    | Debt as of 1 Jan 1992               |             | To Be Received  | Actually Received | Debt as of 1 Jan 1992                 |             | Received in 1991 | Resettlement from Restricted Posts (fam-ilies) |                   |  |
|                    | sq m, 000's                         | Apart-ments | sq m, 000's     | sq m, 000's       | sq m, 000's                           | Apart-ments | sq m, 000's      | To Be Resettled                                | Resettled in 1991 | Discharged to Reserve and Not Provided Housing (fam-ilies) |
| Tyumen Oblast      | 1.3                                 | 22          | 1.3             |                   | 0.4                                   | 7           |                  | (8)3   |                   | 10(9)  |
| Ulyanovsk Oblast   | 3.5                                 | (6)1        | 4.1             | 1.2               |                                       |             |                  | 197  | 2                 | 464  |
| Chita Oblast       | 1.6                                 | 28          | 0.7             | 0.8               | 33.6                                  | (5)11       | 0.5              | 287  |                   | 97   |
| Chelyabinsk Oblast | (6).2                               | 107         | 6.0             | 0.(8)             | 8.8                                   | 161         | 0.3              | 906  | *                 | *  |
| Yaroslavl Oblast   | 0.5                                 | 9           | 0.5             | 0.3               | 12.3                                  | *           | *                | *  | *                 | *  |

[Translator's note: Asterisk (\*) indicates figure missing as last lines of data are incomplete; parentheses () around a digit indicates digit is not legible]

### Unprofitable Contract for Ship Scrapping

92UM0627A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
19 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain 2nd Rank V. Gromak, under the rubric: "Two Views on the Problem": "They Calculated—and Shed a few Tears, or About What Sort of Businessmen We Are"]

[Text] The navy's ships are not immortal. Having served their term of service, they find refuge at ship finishing plants, but the majority are in ship cemeteries. I have seen these cemeteries in the Black Sea and Northern Fleets. The Baltic Fleet is no exception. Here, under the influence of the sun, wind, water and atmospheric precipitation for years, the combat might that is no longer, having sailed the seas and oceans, is being transformed into rust and is polluting area waters and the environment.

At the end of 1988, the then USSR Council of Ministries assigned the Navy the mission of immediately clearing submerged ships from fleet basing facilities. The Naval commander-in-chief used his directive to define the specific directions of the work. And even earlier, Admiral I. Kapitanets had sent a telegram to the Baltic Fleet in which, considering the complexity of the indicated work, he expressed the desirability of enlisting the services of outside organizations, including for the creation of joint ventures with foreign firms. As a result, in 1987-1991, the Baltic Fleet sold 31 ships abroad through joint ventures for U.S. \$2,134,000 and 84,900 foreign exchange rubles.

Thus, by way of illustration, in January 1990, the fleet concluded a contract with the Soviet-Italian Siklin Joint Venture to dismantle ships raised from the sea bottom for scrap metal and sell it abroad. Siklin SP [joint venture] General Director G. Kostarev, Baltic Fleet Real Property

Department [otdeleniye fondovogo imushchestva] [OFI] Head V. Panich, and Acting Unit Commander A. Sentsov signed the contract.

It seemed to be a profitable deal because, Siklin, according to the contract, was supposed to raise 10 submerged objects from the bottom of the sea and break them up for scrap metal or sell them. In so doing, the fleet was to receive 50 percent of the net profit. But a year later, the Naval Rear Services Chief demanded that the contract with the firm be canceled and that all operations cease as of 1 February 1991. During the year, Siklin managed to sell a submarine to Italy at a contract price of U.S. \$95,220. Of that sum, the fleet received \$2,200. You must agree that the paltriness of the sum elicits surprise.

It turns out that it was written in black and white in the contract that the Joint Venture assumes the expense for raising and breaking up objects using its own men and equipment and for their transportation and processing for the period until to 1 July 1991. But at the same time, Baltic Fleet OFI Head V. Panich reports to the fleet commander that "total expenses for towing, getting the objects into port and the reduced price due to the short quantity of nonferrous metal were \$73,100 and R897,119, of which the Baltic Fleet pays 34 percent, that is, \$21,483 and R263,653." Why? There is really no legal basis and it turns out the fleet simply gave the firm these funds. Truly strange generosity, is it not?

"Now, in view of the unilateral breaking of the contract with the joint venture, it is useless to take the matter to arbitration court," thinks Vitaliy Izrailevich Panich. "Siklin wins the case, having borne the expenses due to non-observance of the terms of delivery and also having invested funds in search operations and the composition of projects for salvaging other objects stipulated in the contract. The fleet will have to pay in arbitration. In a word, they were crying dollars..."

And how did the fleet use the sums of money it received? As we also ascertained, not in the best way. In February 1991, the joint venture transferred \$20,478 from the Bank of Estonia to Litsom k litsu [Face-to-Face] Joint Venture's account in Moscow. It planned to acquire electronic computer equipment for fleet headquarters with this sum. Unfortunately, until now, no one at fleet headquarters has seen any of this equipment. Fleet Radio Technical Service Head Captain 1st Rank V. Lobachev, who concluded the barter contract with Litsom k litsu Venture for the delivery of a five-computer local area network for the sum of \$20,294, explains that they have not been delivered and that the hard currency assets cited have been frozen.

We also recall that in February 1991 the Baltic Fleet signed a contract with the Soviet-American Purbalt Joint Venture for cutting up raised objects into scrap metal or selling them abroad as metal.

Of the five planned objects, Purbalt Joint Venture only raised a patrol vessel from the bottom of the sea. It was sold to Spain as scrap metal for U.S. \$68,257. With the deduction of the sum of the reduced contract value (the broker's commission, presidential tax and towing expenses), the fleet was due \$11,858. Besides, towing expenditures totaled R120,000 and, according to the contract, the fleet pays half. Indeed, the joint venture violated the terms of the contract on ship salvaging and is paying a penalty for this. But ultimately, the fleet owes it R55,000. Oh, what arithmetic...

How does the fleet financial service assess these contracts?

"An analysis of the contracts between the fleet and Siklin and Purbalt joint ventures," says Financial Services Deputy Director Colonel V. Voronin, "and also the accounting documentation on them, attests to the fact that no control whatsoever exists over the prices set by the joint ventures on the sale of the objects. None of the concluded contracts contains the weight of the object or the quantity of ferrous or nonferrous metal in it. While performing reciprocal calculations, the fleet is, in the majority of cases, in an unprofitable economic position. By way of illustration, Siklin sold the submarine for \$16,439. According to the ferrous and nonferrous metals yield table drawn up by the naval planning organization, the boat's weight is 670-ton and it contains 28 tons of nonferrous metals. According to average effective foreign market price, the contract price was lowered by \$57,321 as compared to the calculated price. And from that deal, the fleet received a total of \$3,019...

In an explanatory letter addressed to the fleet prosecutor, Fleet OFI Head V. Panich wrote that the contracts were coordinated with the fleet legal group, but only went into force after a Naval Rear Services Financial and Legal Panel of Experts was conducted...

"But who, specifically, conducted it?" asks Baltic Fleet Financial Service Head Col. S. Leonov. "In accordance with the existing order, all contracts should have been reviewed and approved at the fleet financial service, alas, not one of them made it to us..."

Amateurism and incompetence have been our misfortunes since time immemorial. The deals for the sale of scrap metal abroad through joint ventures have once again confirmed that. Yes, and what else can you expect when the shoemaker bakes the pies and baker stitches the shoes? Or, perhaps, these deals were advantageous for someone? But this is already a question for the investigating organs...

### Deputy Billeting Chief on State of Military Housing

92UM0621B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 20 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Major-General Dmitriy Danilovich Yarmak, deputy chief of the Main Billeting-maintenance Directorate, Commonwealth of Independent States Joint Armed Forces Glavkomat, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent P. Altunin, occasion, date and place not specified, under rubric "Housing Problem Monitored": "Will There Be Fewer Homeless in the Army?"]

[Text] *It can be said without exaggeration that the Army and Navy housing problem is number one in acuteness. To this day the situation has been called an impasse and even catastrophic, but hopes have appeared lately connected above all with statements by Russian President B. Yeltsin about the need to repay housing debts to servicemen in short time periods. More specifically, the Russian Federation pledges to allocate 120,000 apartments to servicemen in the first half-year.*

*On 29 January KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published a composite table of housing debts which have accumulated at present in various regions of Russia. As you recall, we promised to track how the Russian President's decision is being fulfilled locally. In so doing, we in no way are removing other aspects of the housing problem as well from our monitoring. Today our correspondent, P. Altunin, chats about these matters with Major-General D. Yarmak, deputy chief of the Main Billeting-maintenance Directorate of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] Joint Armed Forces Glavkomat:*

[Altunin] **Dmitriy Danilovich, how do you regard the President's reassuring statement and what has been done here in the past month?**

[Yarmak] It is really a very important and radical statement. We reacted to it immediately. Here, read the directive.

From the directive of the CinC, CIS Armed Forces, Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov to commanders of branches of the Armed Forces, districts and fleets: at an expanded session of the Russian government with the involvement of prime ministers of republics and heads of kray and oblast administrations on 23 January, the President of the Russian Federation obligated local executive authorities to liquidate the living space debt to the Ministry of Defense. To this end, on 27 January of this year Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov sent letters to all administration heads, including those of the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, with a request to implement

this decision in the current year. For their part, commanders of branches, districts and fleets are obligated to establish business contact with local authorities and together with them see to the liquidation of the housing debt. They must report to the Commander-in-Chief quarterly on the progress of this process.

**[Altunin] And how was this directive received locally?**

**[Yarmak]** First of all, we dragged the corresponding documents out of the camphor balls, one could say, and checked the figures in oblasts and krays through the district [KEU] billeting-maintenance directorates. Now no one disputes them. The overall assessment is that it will be very difficult to "pull out" the assignment, but we must. In places work is being organized with the proportionate involvement of our military builders. There also are specific decisions: a planned 280-apartment house in Novosibirsk will be transferred to the military. In Chelyabinsk an 80-apartment house will be built for officers through efforts of the Granat Cooperative. We plan to do everything possible in the Transbaykal and Far East districts.

**[Altunin] How about in Moscow?**

**[Yarmak]** It is common knowledge that the Moscow Gorispolkom has issued almost no living space for servicemen in recent years. If that did happen, it was a teaspoonful an hour, as they say... Thus the debt was 231,400 m<sup>2</sup> as of 1 January of this year. Had we received this debt plus our own construction, you can figure that this year there would be almost no homeless in Moscow. Marshal Shaposhnikov recently sent a letter to Moscow Mayor G. Popov with all data on the debts. Now we are awaiting an answer and, more important, action. We have seen the first swallow—several days ago the municipal administration allocated 14,700 m<sup>2</sup> for Moscow Military District.

Thus, work has begun, but I believe that it will not produce the proper result if there is no special government decree with respect to the President's decision which would activate mechanisms for execution locally.

**[Altunin] The Army itself also is intensifying housing construction now?**

**[Yarmak]** Yes, the situation has changed in recent years. While previously the proportion of housing and cultural-everyday services establishments in capital construction was around 30 percent, now it has been legalized in another ratio of up to 70 percent. Appropriations for housing construction are increasing this year compared with 1990 by 3.3 times (in comparable prices).

I can quote a few more specific figures: as of 1 January 1991 there were 79,400 homeless families of servicemen in the Ground Forces and 35,800 families were provided for during the year; in the Missile Troops it was 8,500 and 4,300, in the Air Force 41,500 and 11,900, and in the Navy 21,500 and 8,300 respectively. All this basically was achieved by our builders' labor.

True, I will add right away that the number of homeless in the above branches hardly has diminished. Why? The basic influx consists of troops being withdrawn from the

groups. Moreover, officers and warrant officers being discharged to the reserve are being provided for first of all, while school graduates, lieutenants, unfortunately are swelling the homeless ranks.

**[Altunin] And how are things in the districts?**

**[Yarmak]** I also can refer to figures (true, they have not been completely checked). The following were placed in operation in 1991: 2,337 apartments with a plan of 2,500 in the Belorussian Military District; 2,134 with a plan of 2,100 in the Volga-Ural MD; 1,491 with a plan of 1,700 in the Carpathian MD; 1,056 with a plan of 1,000 in the Turkestan MD; 747 with a plan of 750 in the Siberian MD and so on. Eight thousand apartments were received from military builders for troops being withdrawn from countries of Eastern Europe and Mongolia.

I must say that there was movement in Moscow after the "dead season"—last year 1,000 service families moved into new apartments in the area of Kuntsevo, Chertanovo-Annino, Lefortovo and others. We have not had so many housewarmings in recent years.

Meanwhile, it is of course early to rest content. The fact is, there were 195,850 homeless officers and warrant officers in the Armed Forces as of 1 January 1992.

**[Altunin] Do you have data on where they live?**

**[Yarmak]** There are 62,500 families in dormitories and hotels, 14,800 in official spaces, 29,500 in reserved space and 89,100 in private apartments. These are bitter data, especially the last figures—private apartments. The fact is, payment for them now is expressed in four figures... The recently established compensation already means nothing now. This question must be resolved without delay.

**[Altunin] Can you speak about the role of district KEUs in supplying apartments?**

**[Yarmak]** Billeting-maintenance entities are in a difficult spot. They seemingly are clients. They ordered, paid the money, and now must wait for them to be built. But this was an illusion even before, and now especially so. It is exceptionally difficult to come to an agreement about allotting lands. They offer inconvenient plots far from utility and heating lines. There is a multitude of bureaucratic coordinations that go on before they are allocated (up to 50 in Moscow, for example). There are endless delays of planning documentation... One constantly has to live with the problems of military builders. The fact is, construction units are understrength, qualified civilian specialists leave for where the pay is greater, and the shortage of construction materials... We are patching all these enormous holes together.

Our eternal misfortune is the construction of boiler rooms and purification works. The installations are complex, crammed with equipment which is delivered both by the contractor and the client, because of which there are quite often mismatches. The work is difficult, without prestige, and pay is low. Previously everything was held together by commands from above, but now this is not the case and specialists are leaving. I believe that those working in



municipal works must be given material incentives, for which special norms should be drawn up at the government level.

Well, as you see, last year's figures say that there still is success even with that supreme tension involved in building housing. The success has to be developed.

**[Altunin] And what can be said about housing quality?**

**[Yarmak]** Briefly stated, it has not improved compared with past years. I already said why: builders' low level of qualification (these are young soldiers) and incomplete deliveries of basic materials, especially finishing materials, or even their total absence.

It is true that we permitted future new residents themselves to perform finishing work—wallpapering, laying linoleum and so on—in the apartments earmarked for them, if they wish, of course. They can use their own better-quality materials, and their labor and the estimated cost of materials are paid for. Entire brigades were even formed from among tenants in the Navy for these purposes. Are there really many instances where everything inside is stripped and redecorated before moving into apartments?

**[Altunin] But you have an inspectorate which accepts apartments from builders?**

**[Yarmak]** Yes, and it is constantly coming into conflicts with contractors. Sometimes a house is not accepted for months. But an "understanding of the situation" and the moral influence of tenants force concessions. Today the situation is that because of a shortage of funds and in pursuit of housing construction rates, in places it is necessary to postpone "until later" cultural-everyday services establishments: kindergartens, shops and even schools... This of course is disorder.

**[Altunin] How are things today with the so-called dilapidated housing?**

**[Yarmak]** Many houses require capital repair and tenants have to be evicted, but there is nowhere for them to go. It is necessary to be patient.

**[Altunin] You spoke about hotels? What other reserves are being used for putting up officers?**

**[Yarmak]** I must say that the Glavkomat leadership takes a decisive attitude toward cleaning up all reserves. Houses "for higher-ups" in training centers as well as so-called military council hotels, "commanders' huts" and so on all have been placed at the use of people in essentially all districts and fleets.

**[Altunin] Now about the promised 20,000 hectares of land in Moscow Oblast for officers wishing to build cottages...**

**[Yarmak]** Yes, that is said in the Russian President's decree, but what do we have in fact? The municipal administration intends to take away our range lands for this, but in the process there is no longer any talk about officers... So there is to be a "grinding down." And building cottages inside the Moscow limits is unrealistic in today's situation. There is already nowhere to place multistory buildings.

**[Altunin] Dmitriy Danilovich, how is the construction of apartments going for troops being withdrawn, particularly with German money?**

**[Yarmak]** It is common knowledge that initially there were problems about where to build and for whom. Now everything is going according to plan. A military post became operational recently in Belarus. What can one say? The quality is excellent and the people are satisfied. In principle, Ukraine refused to accept troops being withdrawn. There will be only two of the 17 planned posts. We will "plant" the others in the Moscow, Leningrad, Volga-Ural and other districts.

Of course, we will not be in time for the troops being withdrawn according to the rigid timetable. And now our servicemen are departing the Baltic... Tension at times is created in the places where they are arriving: they built houses for their own post, but now a portion of them must be given up for the arriving officers and warrant officers. But there is nothing to be done.

Three groups, each for a republic, have been established for withdrawal of troops from the Baltic. Appropriate documents are being drawn up and a schedule of troop withdrawal is being compiled. I am sure that no one will end up on a bare spot, although we will have a great deal of work to do.

## INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

### Officer Turns Over Units' Hardware to Azerbaijan

92UM0530A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Feb 92  
Morning edition p 8

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Nikolay Klavdin: "Did the 'Voice of Blood' Play on the Major?"]

[Text] This unprecedented event occurred on January 29.

At 7 a.m., a motorized-rifle division separate reconnaissance battalion completed a march to the area of the village of Baladzhar where planned drills were supposed to be conducted. Battalion Commander Major Mudrak halted the column near the village. He ordered the soldiers to leave their vehicles and to go to the firing range which was located nearby. Staying behind with the drivers, he handed over the vehicles and some of the weapons to an Azeri National Army induction center.

As reported to the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief's office, the following was handed over: BRDMs [Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles]—3, BMPs [Armored Personnel Vehicles]—6, ZIL-131 with trailer—1, Kalashnikov assault rifles—11, Makarov pistols—24, AGS-17—1 and, light machineguns—3.

Having turned over all of this, Major Mudrak ordered the remaining soldiers to go to the firing range and he himself made off with the guerrillas.

Why did he do this? As the military personnel reported, the reasons have still not been ascertained but there is the assumption that the "voice of blood played" on the major—the officer's mother is allegedly Azeri, although the most ordinary variation—money—is also possible.

We called the headquarters of the Baku Army. They responded to us that, according to the latest data, the Major is already no longer on Azeri territory. He has allegedly flown to another republic, to his homeland.

What awaits him?

"There can be various underlying causes," Main Military Procuracy Investigations Directorate Deputy Chief, Colonel of Justice Anatoliy Korotkov responded to this question. "Maybe, he was motivated by profit or some sort of ethnic motives but, be that as it may, all of this runs counter to the law and Armed Forces regulations. It contains the elements of a crime. And we intend to demand that he be extradited for trial.

### Officer Orders Unit to Hand Over Weapons

92UM0530B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Feb 92  
in Russian First Edition p 1

[Article by Major K. Litvinov, under the rubric: "From Tbilisi": "This Has Always Been Called Treason"]

[Text] It occurred several days ago, not far from Baku. In broad daylight and in plain view of the reconnaissance battalion which its commander, Major V. Mudrak, had led out on a tactical drill. Upon arrival at the site, the officer ordered the scouts to move 50 paces away from their

vehicles and then to put down their weapons and move away another 50 paces. At a prearranged signal, a large group of guerrillas ran out from their cover and, not meeting any resistance whatsoever, seized six BMP's, three BRDM's [Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles], two mounted grenade launchers, thirteen assault rifles, and six pistols. Major Mudrak also left with the raiders.

The unit command authorities filed a protest to the leader of the bandit gang and demanded the return of the weapons and vehicles. To which they received a categorical refusal because "Mudrak acted on his own will, national self-consciousness had awakened in him" (the traitor's mother is Azerbaijani).

We still need to ascertain the true reasons for the treason. But there is the assumption that Mudrak was in collusion with the bandits and received a large sum of money for the vehicles and weapons. But then again, from the words of his fellow servicemen, Mudrak had recently openly approved the activities of the guerrillas and said that he was tired of "being in a state of uncertainty and waiting for who knows what and in general everything has become hateful."

The war, which has begun between Armenia and Azerbaijan, is increasingly painfully striking servicemen of the former Soviet Army. According to Transcaucasus Military District Deputy Commander Lieutenant-General S. Bep-payev's report, a security detachment, located in the area of the village of Kubatly on the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan, was disarmed on January 31. The following items were stolen: 99 assault rifles, one BTR [Armored Transport Vehicle], one BRDM, 13 machineguns, 11 shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launchers, and a large quantity of ammunition. After negotiations with Azerbaijani Minister of Defense T. Mekhtiyev, a portion of the stolen weaponry was returned to the security detachment.

### Attacks on Nagorno-Karabakh Troops Continue

92UM0645A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
25 Feb 92 p 2

[Editorial: "They Are Shooting at Soldiers and Generals in Azerbaijan"]

[Text] Judging from recent reports from Baku, in Azerbaijan they are shifting to wide-scale actions against servicemen. As a PRAVDA correspondent was informed at the press center of the unified armed forces, intense shelling of the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh and the dispositions of the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment had continued over recent days.

This regiment and all other units stationed in Azerbaijan, as they have been ordered, are not intervening in the armed conflicts. Will they be able to remain neutral when they are not only being provoked, but when combat operations are being waged against them? Fifteen servicemen of the 366th Regiment have been wounded. Four are in critical condition. Private Kovalev died from wounds. There is no contact with the regiment.

On the night of 23/24 February, bandits captured a large ammunition dump near the city of Agdam. Servicing personnel at the dump, including servicemen and their families, have been taken to an unknown location. The disposition of a combat engineer battalion of the Transcaucasian Military District is also under the threat of an invasion.

There is random shooting around the units, and motor vehicles and other military equipment continue to be captured. In Gyandzh, a group of armed bandits attacked a military UAZ-469. They demanded that the assault troops give them their vehicle and weapons. The driver, Private V. Demochkin, refused and was killed by a shot pointblank. The second soldier, V. Stanislavovich, opened return fire. He destroyed three bandits and critically wounded a fourth, but a fifth managed to fatally wound the courageous soldier. Thus, two lads perished: Demochkin, a Russian from near Smolensk, and Stanislavovich, a Belorussian from Brest.

Yesterday, the vehicle of General Nikolay Popov, commander of the Fourth Army, was fired upon in Baku. The bandits captured the vehicle assigned to his first deputy. I think there is one requirement: if we are not able to end the conflicts by political means, the troops should be withdrawn from Transcaucasia. Another thing. Marshal Shaposhnikov was probably right when he said that it is time for presidents Mutalibov and Ter-Petrosyan to go to Nagorno-Karabakh and live there at least a week...

## UKRAINE

### Morozov Discusses Nuclear Weapons with French

92UM0475A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
28 Jan 92 p 1

[Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Press Service report: "Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Holds Discussion"]

[Text] On 24 January, Colonel General K. Morozov, Ukrainian minister of defense, met with a group of representatives from the French Ministry of Defense who were accompanying France's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs R. Dumas on his visit to Kiev.

A talk held by Colonel General K. Morozov and General Kesko [transliteration], who is chief of the French president's personal staff, centered on problems of control, reduction, and complete elimination of nuclear weapons located within the borders of the Ukraine.

General Kesko concluded the discussion by thanking the Ukrainian minister of defense for information he provided the French side on the progress made in implementing the defense concept and construction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces; he also spoke of the possibility of cooperating in many areas that had been discussed.

### Baykonur Cosmodrome Servicemen Seek New Status

92UM0578B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
16 Jan 92 p 1

[Telegram to NARODNAYA ARMIYA signed by the secretary of the Union of Officers and Warrant Officers of Ukrainian Extraction at Baykonur Cosmodrome: "Telegram to the Newspaper"]

[Text] The Union of Officers and Warrant Officers of Ukrainian Extraction at the Baykonur Cosmodrome support the actions of the president of the Government of Ukraine in establishing armed forces. They are indignant over the irresponsible statements of the president of the deputy corps of Russia, which are aggravating tensions in relations between Ukraine and Russia, and which constitute interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. We ask the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine to pass in the shortest time a law on the status of servicemen who are citizens of Ukraine, including servicemen performing service beyond the borders of Ukraine.

[Signed] Union Secretary Tkachuk.

### Committee for Social Protection of Servicemen Set Up in Cabinet

92UM0578A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
16 Jan 92

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Kaleidoscope of Events in Ukraine": "For the Defense of the Interests of Servicemen"]

[Text] In connection with the formation of Ukrainian Armed Forces and other military formations, and for the purpose of ensuring state guarantees regarding civil rights, freedoms, and privileges envisioned in the law, the Government of Ukraine has established a committee on questions of the social protection of servicemen under the Cabinet of Ministers.

V.A. Martirosyan was appointed chairman of the committee.

### Issues to Be Discussed by Ukrainian Officer's Union Viewed

92UM0572C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
28 Jan 92 p 2

[Interview with Capt 1st Rank Oleg Sergeyevich Bodruk, consultant to the Ukrainian minister of defense, by Maj G. Klyuchikov, NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent, under the rubric "100 Lines on the Subject": "Unite the Officer Corps"]

[Text] The All-Army Officers' Assembly held in Moscow is still being extensively discussed in the forces. The attitudes toward it vary, but it is a fact that the assembly was a step toward participation in political life by the military. And this is evoking the greatest fears. To make the military an independent political force would be to opt for the Yugoslav version for the development of further events.

In this difficult situation it was alarming to hear the report that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense was preparing to hold the All-Ukrainian Officers' Assembly. Will this move not provoke a schism in the military collectives? Will this assembly not be a political counterforce to that held in Moscow?

Our correspondent asked Capt 1st Rank Oleg Sergeyevich Bodruk, consultant to the Ukrainian minister of defense, to answer these questions:

The All-Ukrainian Officers' Assembly can in no way be regarded as some sort of counterforce to the All-Army Assembly. We are certainly not setting out to pit the opinion of officers serving in the Ukraine against that of officers of the other sovereign states.

The main purpose of the All-Ukrainian Officers' Assembly is to study the situation surrounding the formation of the armed forces of the Ukraine.

It is anticipated that Col Gen K.P. Morozov, minister of defense, will address the assembly and define the urgent problems and basic ways of developing the reform in the Ukraine. This will make it possible to direct the assembly into a constructive channel.

Some of the same officers who attended the All-Army assembly will probably come to the All-Ukrainian Officers' Assembly. Even if they advocate the idea of a unified armed force within the framework of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] with which we are familiar, however, we shall not clap and stamp our feet as was done in Moscow. It is our job to listen attentively to the officers' opinion, even if it does not coincide with our own. Criticism is intolerable only to those who strive to impose upon the society views alien to it.

It should be the main task of the assembly carefully to hear out every representative of a military collective, to reveal sore spots which actually exist and jointly to outline ways and methods of eliminating negative factors. How successful we are in this will depend upon the degree to which the officer corps is united round the idea of building a truly independent, sovereign state and establishing our own armed forces capable of providing security for the Ukrainian people.

Delegates to the All-Ukrainian Officers' Assembly will be working out a new Statute on the Officers' Assembly. A year ago a group of progressive-minded servicemen offered an alternative draft of the statute. It was assessed very negatively by the military district's command element, however.

The reality has now shown that the officers' assembly of which the commander is always the chairman is a stillborn infant. The fifth wheel on the cart, it is incapable of providing social protection for the officer. We must therefore work out a new statute, which takes into account the realities of today and makes it possible to implement to the maximum possible degree everything valuable inherent in this public institution.

### Servicemen in Ukraine To Receive Coupons

92UM0604A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
31 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Department of Socio-Legal Problems under the rubric "We Clarify": "Coupons for Soldiers"]

[Text] The editorial office of NARODNAYA ARMIYA receives letters from compulsory service servicemen and cadets at military schools in which they request an explanation of procedures for the issuance of reusable coupons. The reason for such requests is the inaccurate treatment by the mass media of documents, particularly the one concerning these categories of servicemen.

We have learned from competent officials that the instructions of 29 December 1991, signed by Vice Prime Minister O. Slepichev, chairman of the governmental commission on the use of reusable coupons, state that compulsory service servicemen, and also cadets of military schools, are paid coupons in the sum of the monthly monetary support that is due, but not more than 200 coupons. Now this maximum is 300 coupons..

### Officers' Union Executive Committee Meets

92UM0606A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
1 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Major G. Klyuchikov: "Our Own Armed Forces: Not the Finish Line but the First Step. A Ukrainian Officers' Union Ispolkom Session Took Place in Kiev"]

[Text] Yes, this was already not like those quasi-legal assemblies of union members to which they had to sneak. Really they could simply be deprived of their shoulder boards just for attending a meeting, all the more so a congress. Fortunately, those unforgettable times have passed. This time the Ispolkom [executive committee] members met in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense auditorium. And the draft from the cracks in the window frames was the only threat to the activists' heated debates.

We know the majority of the individuals. In recent times, we have frequently seen some of them on television screens and in the presidiums of various forums, others—in the spacious offices of the Ministry of Defense, and still others—at numerous meetings while speaking to servicemen.

They also conduct themselves in various ways. The majority of officers good-naturedly shake the hands of their numerous acquaintances and confidently take their seats in the hall. There are also those who are more restrained while looking closely at faces: what is the situation here in Kiev, have their comrades-in-arms maintained their former fighting spirit, and have they not been sullied by office intrigues which have consigned to oblivion common ideals?

The officers who had gathered greeted People's Deputy V. Durdinets with applause. Everyone knows very well that Vasily Vasilyevich meets with servicemen more often than others and never avoids serious problems, having concentrated all of his work on their practical solution.

While talking about the process of forming the Ukrainian Armed Forces, V. Durdinets particularly stressed that our state, contrary to the assertions of the central mass propaganda media, is creating its own army in strict compliance with international agreements on a solid legal basis. Ukraine is the only state in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] which has a solid legal basis for military structural development. As a result of the tense legislative work in our country, an entire package of military laws and other normative acts has been adopted that permit us to decisively begin creating our own Armed Forces, including naval forces. And here our state is not deviating even by a single letter from the documents signed by the heads of the sovereign states at the meeting in Minsk.

A special place in the speech was assigned to the military oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. According to data as of that day when the ispolkom session took place, more than 350,000 servicemen, who serve on the territory of Ukraine, had taken the oath. The taking of the oath is more actively occurring in the Carpathian Military District—72 percent, in Kiev Military District—66 and, in Odessa Military District—65.

It is characteristic that this process of taking the oath is occurring on a strictly voluntary basis. Any attempts to somehow influence servicemen's choice is producing a directly opposite effect. V. Durdinets cited this example: two-thirds of the servicemen who have taken the oath decided on this step precisely after the broadcast of the course of the All-Army Officers' Assembly from Moscow.

The government of Ukraine is doing everything possible to not create a tense situation around the taking of the oath. All problems that arise will be eliminated by developing interstate agreements.

Vasily Vasilyevich once again stressed the need to follow the legal path during the formation of our own army. Unfortunately, serious difficulties have arisen with the draft for military service. More than 4,000 young men are evading the draft. This problem is most serious of all in Lvov, Ternopol, Zaporozhye, Kharkov, and certain other oblasts. If previously these activities were explained by an unwillingness to serve in the "imperial" army, then how do you explain the unwillingness to serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces?

These questions that were posed to V. Durdinets after his speech demonstrated how many unclear factors, doubts and alarm arise during the course of forming our own Armed Forces even among those people who risked much so that this day would arrive. However, problems were even more clearly revealed in the speeches of Union of Ukrainian Officers (UUO) city and rayon committee chairmen.

The Ispolkom members convinced us that we cannot lapse into euphoria from the successes achieved. Only the first steps have been taken on the path toward the goals proclaimed by the Union of Ukrainian Officers. Resistance of the functionaries of the collapsed system is too great both in the center and locally. Quite a few examples

were heard at the session when unit commanders have done everything possible to restrain their subordinates from taking the oath and they have knowingly spread false rumors, while sowing doubt among servicemen.

UUO Crimean Department Chairman, Candidate of philosophical sciences, Colonel Nikolay Skipa cited examples when active advocates of the notorious GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] continue to command military collectives while persecuting advocates of Ukrainian independence and union members.

The fate of Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Mogil from Berdichev, who was present in the hall, could serve as graphic confirmation of this. While decisively opposing Unit Commander Colonel V. Bukhtoyarov's wrongdoings, he was released from the ranks of the Armed Forces for incompatibility. And only thanks to the active assistance of the Union of Ukrainian Officers, Aleksandr Mogil has been restored to his post by a Ukrainian Minister of Defense order.

This problem is very serious. And all the same, as UUO Kiev Department Chairman Reserve Colonel Roman Kostyuk noted, yesterday's opponents, who have rapidly changed into other colors, are much more dangerous. It is all the same to them, no matter which oath you administer or what banner they serve. The main thing is to preserve their own power over people and their privileges. As proof, Roman Kostyuk cited several names of officers who were observed in unseemly deeds and who now occupy responsible posts.

Besides the problems raised in the speeches, some of the organization members present expressed the idea that the need for further activities of the Union of Ukrainian Officers is doubtful at the current stage of construction of a sovereign state. Perhaps Union Chairman Colonel Vilen Arutyunovich Martirosyan provided an adequately precise and clear response to these arguments in his speech.

Yes, he said, the creation of our own Armed Forces is becoming a reality. However, this does not at all signify that the union has exhausted itself. On the contrary, it is now that the opportunity has appeared to concentrate our efforts on one of the main tasks that was proclaimed in the UUO program—on the social protection of servicemen. This problem is becoming a top priority under conditions of the current economic crisis.

Now when V. Martirosyan has also been appointed Chairman of the Committee on Issues of the Social Protection of Servicemen under the Cabinet of Ministers, new opportunities have appeared to find a solution to the situation that has developed. Specifically, we need to establish strict monitoring of the construction and distribution of housing.

Vilen Arutyunovich thinks that the cessation of arbitrary squandering and resale of military equipment and vehicles is a UUO task. Each such case should be immediately reported to the Ministry of Defense.

The purity of cadres of the newly created Ukrainian Armed Forces is a serious problem. It is impossible to permit officers, who do not enjoy the collective's trust, to command military subunits.

In the conclusion of his speech, V. Martirosyan appealed to his union comrades-in-arms for aggressive activities. The time for debate has come to an end. It is time to prove our abilities to perform good deeds with action. People must believe that the Union of Ukrainian Officers is a truly leading detachment of the Ukrainian Army.

The topic of Ukrainian servicemen who are serving outside the borders of Ukraine did not receive proper development at the ispolkom session. But this problem has not become less painful. Colonel Vladimir Fedyrko, who arrived from Estonia, talked about how with alarm and hope 692 Ukrainian families had sent him to Kiev and how it has become too much for them to bear to live in the situation that has developed around them recently in Estonia.

Officers who arrived from the Far East, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus demanded the development, as soon as possible, of a mechanism to transfer to Ukraine servicemen who are Ukrainian citizens.

Alas, they did not receive a precise reply. Yes, and there obviously cannot be a precise answer in the current political situation. It is totally obvious that the enormous number of priority problems can only be solved by moving along the path of interstate agreements and while avoiding unilateral activities and hastiness which would inevitably result in the increase of political instability.

While briefly summing up the results of the UVO ispolkom session that took place, one could say that it, first of all, permitted the elimination of certain unclear issues to which competent government representatives provided answers. Second, primary directions of activity were defined toward which all UVO members now need to concentrate their efforts.

And there is no doubt that the Union of Ukrainian Officers will henceforth have a noticeable impact on the formation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

#### Roundup of Units Taking Military Oath

92UM0572B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
28 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "They Have Taken the Oath to the People of Ukraine"]

[Text]

#### Signalmen of Chernigov

Soldiers in the unit commanded by Lt Col V. Velichko will remember this day for the rest of their lives. They took the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. Local officials of Chernigov, public organizations and city enterprises came to congratulate them. Many parents of soldiers also came from various parts of Ukraine.

#### Officers of the OSOU [Society of Defense Cooperation of Ukraine]

All the officers in the Society of Defense Cooperation of Ukraine have been administered the oath to the sovereign Ukraine. There are only three exceptions, two of whom have requested transfers to continue their service outside Ukraine and one is being discharged into the reserve.

We have learned from the Central Committee of the OSOU that the following were among the first to swear loyalty to their people: Lt Col M. Nikolus in Zhitomir, Col N. Volodin in Belaya Tserkov, Lt Col V. Kotsura in Kherson, Col A. Novgorodskiy in Ternopol, Col I. Makarov in Donetsk and Lt Col V. Tkach in Lvov.

#### The Donetsk Higher Military Pedagogical School

The taking of the military oath at the Donetsk Higher Military Pedagogical School was scheduled several days in advance. Today everyone who has decided definitely to serve our sovereign state has formally taken the oath.

Ninety-three percent of the officers and 100% of the warrant officers, extended-duty and female military personnel have taken the oath. Two thirds of the cadets have taken it. The others, those who intend to serve in other former Union republics upon completing their schooling, have signed an agreement committing themselves to work conscientiously at the Donetsk Higher Military Educational Institution, which has become their very own.

#### They Made a Choice

Recently the editors have received calls more than once about the taking of the oath at the Kiev Higher Naval School. "Why are the sailors refusing to take the oath? Does it have to do with the conflict which has arisen between Ukraine and Russia over the Black Sea Fleet"? All the questions were of approximately this nature.

Our correspondent contacted Rear Adm A. Korovin, chief of the school. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich said that the taking of the oath is scheduled for 16 February and that no "undercurrents" can interfere with the impending formal ceremony.

#### Kiev Internal Troops Take Military Oath

92UM0541B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
17 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Major A. Kharlamov: "The Militia Takes the Oath"]

[Text] Personnel of the Kiev Garrison internal security forces entities and subunits have been administered the oath of allegiance to their independent state, the people of Ukraine, and their chosen profession. Chief of the City Internal Affairs Administration Major-General of Militia V. I. Rozenko took the oath first, followed by his subordinates, to fight crime, sparing neither energy nor lives, to protect the tranquility of citizens, and to defend the state system and public order. The word has been given. Now to work!

### Defense Ministry Official: Sailors Ready To Take Ukrainian Oath

92UM0619B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
6 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* Correspondent Major V. Knysh: "Blockade: Its Organizers Are the Black Sea Fleet Leadership. But They Cannot Stop the Seamen's Patriotic Impulse"]

[Text] Yesterday, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Officers Colonel V. Lazorkin and Captain 3rd Rank I. Tenyukh returned from their latest (how many have there been) temporary duty assignment to Sevastopol. This is what they described.

The majority of officers, warrant officers, and seamen have determined in which Armed Forces they want to serve. And they are ready to take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. They are in a progressive mood. The statements of the Black Sea Fleet command authority, which (including, through actions) violate human rights, are sounding their disharmony. Fleet Commander Admiral I. Kasatonov has categorically forbidden them to take the oath and is persecuting those officers who manifest any personal initiative in this issue which, of course, is causing a negative reaction in them. Admiral I. Kasatonov is trying to make them take the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] oath as soon as possible. The attempt to portray this oath...as also being the same as the Ukrainian oath... is graphically obvious. In the sense that, they say, they are swearing their loyalty to the people of Ukraine and the CIS. In fact, this is not so. Work is being conducted, the goal of which is well known—to prevent the fleet from becoming Ukrainian. Ukrainian Presidential Decrees are being violated. Sale of fleet equipment is being permitted. For example, they are preparing a submarine for sale. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense did not know about this. There is a commercial company which is transferring all of the money and hard currency earned beyond the borders of Ukraine. We think that it is the Black Sea Fleet command authority that is the main destabilizing factor of the situation. But you cannot even begin to talk about the commander's improper behavior with regard to the president, the minister of defense, or the people's deputies. Admiral I. Kasatonov does not consider it necessary to even mask his deeds. He is speculating on the president's tact and restraint.

As before, all information is being blocked from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. We feel that they are skillfully managing the admiral's actions. Although fleet officers did not experience any delight at all from the meeting in Novorossiysk where, as we all know, three ships from the Black Sea Fleet visited. Few people knew the goals of this voyage. Although the souvenir—a model of a ship for a gift was, of course, prepared earlier and attests to the fact that the meeting had been prepared beforehand. Obviously, they planned on having some state official visit the ship...

It would be superfluous to repeat that 90 percent of the officers of fleet headquarters and ship combat squadrons

are ready to take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. The commander is using his power to prevent his subordinates from making that choice. But people are nevertheless taking the oath. Despite someone else's will, the seamen have finally determined their choice.

As for the mass media, the attitude is different toward its representatives. Ships' gangways have been ordered as previously for Ukrainian journalists although they have not cultivated a "revolt". And incidentally, it is the same for parliamentarians. But representatives of Russian Television visited Sevastopol several days ago. The eternally busy admiral paid attention to them. He treated a female journalist favorably and he acted like a gentleman and simply authorized her to visit a ship, talked with her, and helped her. In other words, graciousness itself. If only he could treat everyone that way. But, as it is obvious, everything for some people and nothing for the others. Depending, of course, on whose opinion someone reflects.

The report that the issue of removing Admiral I. Kasatonov from the post of Black Sea Fleet commander had been raised at the Ukrainian parliament was greeted with applause at the general meeting of naval infantry division officers and warrant officers.

### Black Sea Naval Infantry Decides To Take Oath

92UM0619A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
6 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* Correspondent M. Sevastyanov: "Mutiny at Kazachya Bay? Not at All. Black Sea Fleet Naval Infantrymen Have Simply Decided in an Organized Manner to Take the Oath to Sovereign Ukraine. Who Is Opposed?"]

[Text] First of all Black Sea Fleet Commander I. Kasatonov is opposed. He thinks that they will definitely make a National Guard division out of the naval infantry brigade.

Where this information came from remains a riddle. In any case, there was a group of people's deputies and members of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium with whom our correspondent visited in the area of Kazachya Bay, but no one made any such announcements where the naval infantrymen are deployed. All the more so for Admiral Kasatonov, who simply did not desire to receive the deputies and republic Ministry of Defense representatives.

The representatives of state power were met differently at the naval infantry brigade. With unconcealed joy because the naval infantrymen are tired of listening to the disinformation of Coastal Troops Commander General Romanenko and his Assistant Colonel Avdonkin on the serious consequences of taking the Ukrainian oath (at the same time, an enciphered telegram arrives under the signature of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces commander-in-chief with the order to take the oath to the Russian Federation).

Yes, it is bad to divide the fleet. But, as they say, the process has begun. And if you consider that the fleet

consists of, besides everything else, people, then it would be stupid to think that it would not enter these peoples' heads to think about their own futures.

It is entirely understandable that many ships' officers and warrant officers are worried that Ukraine, having reduced their fleet, will not need their services. In that event, without having adequate information on the intentions of the republic's leadership on this issue, and while having disinformation from the fleet commander, the seamen are uneasy.

The naval infantry is an entirely different matter. The Ukrainian Navy cannot get by without it. Because, since time immemorial, 80 percent (of division officers and warrant officers) are ready to stand under the yellow-blue banner of the state.

After Brigade Officers' Assembly Chairman Major Razhmanov's trip to Kiev and the explanation to the personnel on the prospect for future service, the percentage significantly increased and the taking of the CIS oath did not occur in the brigade. The meeting with the deputies dotted all of the "i's". Now one can boldly say that Ukraine de facto has naval infantry.

But it is still premature to yell "Hurrah!" three times in this regard. No one wants to simply part with the elite division just like that. And obviously the information about the secret order with regard to the airlift of practically the entire brigade (with the exception of one battalion) to the area of Novorossiysk that aroused the inhabitants of Kazachya Bay did not arise out of thin air.

One can only be envious of the restraint of Brigade Commander Colonel Anatoliy Nikolayevich Kocheshkov and his Assistant Commander for Personnel Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Vladimirovich Cherevko, who are doing everything possible in order to prevent their hot-tempered lads from "throwing themselves under a tank."

There have already been precedents in the fleet when, at the order of Admiral Kasatonov, officers who have taken the oath to the people of Ukraine have been quietly removed from their posts. (I want to clarify that this is a question of educated officers and not about those who think that in this troubled time professionalism has been completely replaced by ethnic pride and a career now will depend on the "fifth column".)

But then again, it would be funny if all naval infantry brigade personnel were dismissed from carrying out their official duties.

Thus, if someone tells you that seamen are rebelling in Sevastopol, do not believe it. Everything is calm for the time being at Kazachya Bay. The naval infantrymen want to amicably swear to the sovereign state on legal grounds. Indeed, it is not worthwhile to make a Nagorno-Karabakh out of it. It would be better to come to an agreement peacefully. Really, history moves in spirals.

Maybe, the fleet will once again be united sometime. But right now, what can you do, the time has come to scatter

the stones. To ignore this specifically historical condition—this is approximately the same as beating your head against a brick wall. But then again, it seems that some people in the Black Sea Fleet and many beyond its borders enjoy this pastime.

### Odessa MD Commander Meets Troops

92UM0668C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
13 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Col V. Ovsyanikov: "Odessa MD: The Commander Meets the Troops"]

[Text] First of all, the new Commander of the Odessa MD, Lieutenant-General V.G. Radetskiy, had to settle the questions of the 14th Army stationed in Moldova. Now the army has been transferred to the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces. But many other questions of an operational and supply nature have remained. Yes, and also human ones... Thus, one of the units from that formation [the 14th Army] was stationed on Ukrainian territory in the town of Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy in Odessa Oblast.

The decision was taken that it would be removed as part of the 14th Army. Incidentally, the officers from the units made their choice immediately and finally and they all took the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people.

Lieutenant-General V.G. Radetskiy arrived at the Raukhovskiy Garrison. Its name had appeared in the mass information media at the beginning of January when Ukraine announced the establishing of its own Armed Forces. Moscow Television broadcast a brief interview with two officers who had arrived in Moscow from the garrison in order to express their disagreement with the decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Council and President. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA published an article stating that the Raukhovskiy Garrison in the Odessa MD had refused to take the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people.

Actually, the situation was as follows. The officers had not seen any documents on the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They were bothered by the untraceable rumors that supposedly lists were to be drawn up immediately for those who had not taken the oath and these officers would be subjected to repression.

In a word, the officers did not have any knowledge about the long-passed Ukrainian laws "On Social and Legal Defense of Servicemen and the Members of Their Families" and "On the Defense of Ukraine." They had not heard of the draft law "On the Pension Security for the Ukrainian Servicemen and Internal Affairs Employees."

As was stated by the Deputy Chief of the Raukhovskiy Garrison for Personnel Work, Lieutenant-Colonel Vasilii Starovoytov, the taking of the oath was carried out in an organized manner.

Later the Commander of the Odessa MD visited the Crimea.



## BELARUS

### Shushkevich Heads Commission to Create National Army

92UM0665A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
27 Feb 92 p 2

[Interview with Mechislav Ivanovich Grib, chairman of Belarus Supreme Soviet Permanent Commission on National Security, Defense and Crime-Fighting, occasion, date and place not specified, by Colonel P. Chernenko: "Belarus Will Establish Its Army in Stages, States Mechislav Grib"]

[Text] Mechislav Ivanovich Grib, chairman of the Belarus Supreme Soviet Permanent Commission on National Security, Defense and Crime-Fighting; born in Vitebsk Oblast to a peasant family in 1938; completed the Lvov MVD School; served in MVD entities in various positions, the last being chief of an administration of the Republic of Belarus Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Married, two children.

[Chernenko] Mechislav Ivanovich, Belarus announced the establishment of its own Armed Forces. Your commission unquestionably already has been studying this question. Well, what kind of Army does Belarus need?

[Grib] Small but highly combat effective, ensuring the security of the Republic and people... We proceed from the assumption that, as in other civilized states, 0.5-0.9 percent of the adult population in our Republic must serve in the Army. We will adhere to this.

A special commission headed up by Republic Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich was established to form the Armed Forces. In addition, a working group headed by Belarussian Military District Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Pavel Kozlovskiy was set up to prepare draft laws on military problems. According to preliminary estimates, the Armed Forces will number around 90,000 servicemen. As you see, there is to be a large reduction of troops now stationed on Republic territory, but this will occur gradually; haste is inappropriate here.

Speaking of the future Armed Forces structure, in principle it will not differ very much from that of the present Belarussian Military District.

[Chernenko] The last Republic Parliament session allocated R8.2 billion from its budget for military expenditures, but specialists assert that this is enough only to pay the salary of servicemen and support retirees of the former Ministry of Defense. But how about combat training?

[Grib] I would not agree with the statement that not a ruble has been allocated for combat training of Belarussian Military District personnel. The sum of R8.2 billion also is calculated to support combat training, but true, not to the extent that was previously the case. Economic difficulties in the Republic also affect the Army. Evidently it will be necessary to give up wide-scale maneuvers and refrain from upgrading and replacing combat equipment in the transition period. But I cannot say specifically how much

money has been allocated for combat training. No, this is not a state secret. It is simply that military expenditures were not neatly categorized, as they say, in the Supreme Soviet. This still has to be done and be approved by the Belarus Ministry of Defense. In general, we are fighting to ensure that unified logistic support of the Armed Forces is preserved in the transition period, and this must be backed up by an appropriate treaty so that not one republic has any kind of advantage over another and cannot dictate its terms. I emphasize that this is for the transition period. Subsequently—and there is no doubt of this—Belarus itself must supply its Army with everything necessary.

[Chernenko] Mechislav Ivanovich, nine of thirteen prepared military questions were examined at the meeting of heads of state in Minsk on 14 February. I would like to learn the extent to which the adopted agreements and understandings meet your views.

[Grib] I would be playing the hypocrite if I were to say that the adopted documents fully satisfy me, which is probably understandable. When you begin to analyze work already done, it always seems it could have been done better. The fact is, I took a direct part in developing a number of documents on military problems. I specifically have complaints about the Agreement on General Purpose Forces and the Agreement on Social and Legal Guarantees of Servicemen, Persons Discharged from Military Service and Their Families. The first did not spell out specifically just what is included in general purpose forces. The second omitted certain points of servicemen's legal protection. But generally speaking, the documents adopted are an appreciable step forward, especially in solving the problem of strategic forces. Now they are under a unified command and on unified financial and logistic support.

[Chernenko] In my view, the position of Belarus in resolving military problems has undergone substantial changes lately, particularly in the matter of establishing its own Army. And now it is closer to the positions of Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan. What would you say on this matter?

[Grib] Our position is constant and has not changed. In this problem we adhere to the concept developed by the Republic Supreme Soviet, which is as follows: Belarus will establish its own Armed Forces. Our Parliament announced this back last year, and we are adhering to this line. But I will say the following about our position coming closer to that of Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan. Belarus will establish its own Army not today and not tomorrow, but in stages, in a transition period set for two years. We believe that under conditions where a large force grouping which subsequently will have to be considerably reduced is located on the territory of Belarus, that path is, one can say, the most painless. It must be taken into account that establishing a national Army and reducing Belarussian Military District forces involve the destinies of many thousands of servicemen and their families.

[Chernenko] It is common knowledge that Belarus did not sign the Agreement on General Purpose Forces among the Commonwealth of Independent States member countries. What occasioned this?

[Grib] There are several reasons. We believe the document is still raw and requires substantial modification. Above all it is necessary to determine precisely what is included in general purpose forces. This is very important for Belarus, which is establishing its own Army, or else what do we have? There are strategic forces and there are general purpose forces. You are told that national armed forces will include all the rest that is left. But what is left? Civil defense, military commissariats, military chairs... How am I to understand this? In short, this agreement must be modified, and we must return to it at the meeting of heads of state in Kiev on 20 March. That is what we declared.

#### **Unit Seeks to Halt Flow of Military Equipment to Russia**

92UM0667A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Colonel P. Chernenko: "From Minsk—Road Inspections: The Belorussian MD Together With the State Automobile Inspectorate Monitors Shipping Out of Military Equipment"]

[Text] Operating in the Republic is a work group monitoring the safekeeping and shipping out of equipment from the troop units and subunits. As is known, the Belarus Parliament has entrusted the Commander of the Belorussian MD, Colonel-General Anatoliy Kostenko, with the responsibility for the safekeeping of the equipment of the military units. So, as KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was informed in the Rear Services of the Belorussian MD, it was no accident that the monitoring group was set up. Recently a great deal of equipment has been sent from the units and subunits stationed on Belarus territory into the other regions of the former Union.

The group includes representatives of virtually all the directorates and departments of the Belorussian MD Staff. As has been learned, there are already concrete results. Thus, they have prevented the shipping out of equipment and supplies to Russia from the aviation maintenance base under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Fedor Gerasimov and in addition food from the central food depot in Orsha. On all roads they have set out GAI [State

Automobile Inspectorate] posts and these have the right to inspect the military columns traveling to outside the Republic.

Basically they are moving out construction materials and various technical supplies and equipment from the units under central subordination. However, there is no point in accusing the commanders, they receive orders for freight delivery from their superiors.

### **BALTIC STATES**

#### **Latvian Deputy Defense Ministers Appointed**

92UM0603A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
18 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by unnamed KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Soviet Colonel and American Captain—Deputies to the Republic Minister of Defense"]

[Text] High positions in the Latvian Ministry of Defense, which have been vacant since the day the ministry was organized, have been filled. First of all, appointment was made to the post of deputy minister. As has already been reported, Daimis Turlais, a former colonel in the former Soviet Army, has become one of the deputy ministers. It has now been announced officially that Valdis Pavlovskis, a captain in the U.S. Army—and not a colonel as was said previously—is the second deputy to be appointed. Other biographical data about the new officials also has become known.

Valdis-Vilnis Pavlovskis was born in 1934 in Riga. In 1957 he graduated from Portland University, in 1958 from the School for Amphibious Warfare Officers and Communications Officers, and in 1972 from California Polytechnical University. Before coming to Latvia, he worked as an architect in the State of California, and he simultaneously held leading posts in the Association of Latvian Americans.

Along with Pavlovskis, Arvaldis Lilentals, who previously served in the Armed Forces of the former USSR, received an appointment to the Ministry of Defense. He was appointed chief of staff of the defense forces. A resolution was also passed on the establishment of a special military VUZ [higher educational institution] of Latvia.

**DEFENSE INDUSTRY****Commission To Study Shipyard Fate**

92UM0582A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Feb 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Following the Disintegration of the Union, the Largest Shipyard in Ukraine Is Left to Its Own Devices"]

[Text] Nikolayev—The largest shipyard in Ukraine, the Black Sea Shipbuilding Plant Association, has faced a difficult situation following the disintegration of the Union. Its collective was left to deal with an unfinished aircraft carrier cruiser, the Varyag, and other defense orders on its own. The fact that a berth on which commercial vessels could be built is occupied complicates the issue of conversion.

Ivan Vinnik, deputy general director of the association, told a UKRINFORM correspondent: "The filling of defense orders will be suspended indefinitely because of the absence of financing from the Governments of Russia and Ukraine. The vessels should be mothballed, to which end substantial funds are required, which so far not a single sovereign state intends to provide. A commission has been created at the level of the Ukrainian Government to consider the situation of the association. First of all, the association needs to resolve the issue of material and technical supplies. Large enterprises the size of ours belong to the state in foreign countries as well. They should be supplied with resources in a centralized manner."

For its part, the management is striving to retain its cadres and utilize its production capacity. A contract has been signed with a foreign company to build three food-carrying tankers. The construction of large refrigerated trawler-fish processing plants is continuing as before. Specialists believe the next two to three months will be the most difficult for shipbuilders in Nikolayev.

**Factory to Halt Production of Strategic Missiles**

92UM0668A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 Feb 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Dnepropetrovsk Intends to End Production of Strategic Missiles"]

[Text] In the near future there will be fundamental changes in the entire former defense complex at the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau and the Yuzhnyy Mashinostroitelnyy Zavod [Yuzhnyy Machine Building Plant] Association in Dnepropetrovsk. Under a decision of the State Commission of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers which has been at work at the design bureau and at the enterprise, here from the beginning of March they intend to halt the production of strategic missiles.

**MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN  
MILITARY AFFAIRS****U.S. Cruise Missile Effectiveness**

92UM0559A Moscow VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZ-DUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian No 12, Jan 91 pp 32-34

[Article by Lt Col A. Manachinskiy, Lt Col V. Chumak and Capt 1st Rank O. Sukhonyatkin based on foreign press materials: "From the Sea and From the Air: American Cruise Missiles Struck Targets Effectively"]

[Text] During preparations for the war with Iraq, the U.S. Navy concentrated 600 Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's) of two modifications—the TLAM-C and TLAM-D—at sea. They were supplied to the battleships "Missouri" and "Wisconsin" as well as to another 11 ships of different classes operating both in the Persian Gulf and in the Red Sea.

The first launchings of cruise missiles were noted in the night of 17 January, when 52 Tomahawks were fired on Iraq. The defense ministry building, the presidential palace and communications center were destroyed by them. A total of 125 cruise missiles were ejected from the battleships during the first day of combat operations, and by the end of the second day of the war as many as 196 were launched, 90 percent of which struck their designated targets, according to Western estimates. In this period only one cruise missile was knocked down by Iraqi antiaircraft artillery fire.

Such low effectiveness of Iraq's air defense system is explained, in the opinion of foreign military experts, chiefly by extensive electronic suppression of its target detection radar. As a consequence either the missiles were missed, or it took too long for the information to get to the fire control systems. Thus, Flat Face (880-950 MHz band), Long Track and Spoon Rest (147-161 MHz) and Tall King (150-180 MHz) low-flying target detection radar was practically completely suppressed. Electronic equipment of the SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 surface-to-air missile complexes, the characteristics of which had been studied well by American specialists during the war in Vietnam and in a number of Near-Eastern armed conflicts, was also suppressed effectively.

Cruise missiles were typically launched for combat use in groups of six units, which flew together to the designated area. Strike results were evaluated by a satellite observation system, which dramatically increased the dependability of information on enemy losses, and made it possible to plan subsequent operations by cruise missiles with regard for the quality of their fulfillment of preceding missions.

As a rule, the tactics of operation of a cruise missile were as follows. After it was launched, the cruise missile flew at a velocity of around 900 km/hr at an altitude of 30-100 m, and upon reaching the target area, it climbed to an altitude of 150-200 m and then dove at the object of the attack.

The Americans also tried out an air-launched cruise missile, the AGM-84E SLAM, during Operation Desert Storm. These cruise missiles were used only in aimed selective strikes against stationary or slow-moving priority targets that were well protected in engineering respects.

The structure of the SLAM made use of existing components of other rockets. In particular it had the airframe from the AGM-84A Harpoon air-launched cruise missile, the television homing head from the AGM-65 Maverick guided missile, and the target and rocket television viewing apparatus from the Walleye AGM-62 guided bomb. In addition it was outfitted with a receiver picking up orientation signals from the NAVSTAR satellite radio navigation system.

Strikes by SLAM air-launched cruise missiles were preceded by meticulous preparations. The flight program was developed using computer-processed topographic maps and flight routes, and the prepared information was translated into codes read by the missile's onboard computer. Then these data were fed into a portable loader that could store up to 64 different programs. After the cruise missiles were suspended from the airplane, the data loader was successively connected to each of them, at which time the data were recorded in the onboard computer's memory. As a rule three program packages controlled flight in previously reconnoitered areas, and one was foreseen for a strike against a newly detected target. The final choice between one of the four possible ways of using the SLAM was given to the aircraft crew, which had to make the final choice before the missile's separation from the airplane.

Judging from available information it took a total of 30 minutes to 2 hours to plan the use of a SLAM cruise missile. It took around 30 minutes to load the data into the computer and to process and prepare the prelaunch data, it took 5 minutes to feed these data into the portable loader, and it took another 5 minutes to input the program package into the memory of each missile.

Air-launched cruise missiles were employed in the following manner. After the missile aircraft took off and reached the point at which the initial flight conditions had to be programmed, the missile's location was corrected by orientation signals received from the NAVSTAR system. Then the crew selected the cruise missile flight program and launched the missile. The SLAM is guided to its target in three phases.

During sustained flight, up until the cruise missile attained its designated area, its flight was supported by an inertial system that received adjustments from the global satellite navigation system. Upon reaching the target area, 1 minute prior to its projected encounter with its objective, the video sighting channel switched on. A video image of the designated area of ground was transmitted through this channel from the missile to the airplane, and the operator used a control stick to adjust the aiming point in response to a command radio unit. The third and final guidance stage began after the cruise missile attained a line-of-sight trajectory to the target. The infrared homing head was turned on by a command from the airplane, in response to

which it locked onto the target in automatic tracking mode and controlled the missile's flight until its explosion.

The first AGM-84E's were used on 18 January in a strike on a hydroelectric power plant. The strike group consisted of two A-6E missile aircraft, each of which carried one missile on a wing pylon, and two A-7E guidance aircraft. All airplanes of the group operated from the aircraft carrier "J. Kennedy."

To complete the assignment, two cruise missiles were launched at a 2-minute interval. The first, launched from a range of 100 km, punched a hole through the generator building, while the second entered precisely through the hole to destroy the equipment in the generator hall. It was no accident that the Americans chose air-launched cruise missiles for this mission: The important objective was destroyed with no aircrew losses, with minimum losses of noncombatants, and with practically no damage to adjacent structures and the dam.

As follows from foreign press reports, seven SLAM air-launched cruise missiles were launched in the course of the operation, four of which hit their target successfully.

The results of using cruise missiles during Operation Desert Storm were encouraging. Their target kill ratio was from 85 to 95 percent. During the combat operations, 264 TLAM-C sea-launched cruise missiles and 27 TLAM-D missiles were launched.

The command of the U.S. Navy is attentively analyzing the experience of using the new weapons, turning attention to the shortcomings.

First of all there is the vulnerability of the cruise missiles to antiaircraft fire, which brought down two Tomahawks costing around \$1 million each.

Priority objectives to be met in the immediate future are: to reduce the time required to plan use of the missiles, and to achieve independent operation by furnishing them with guidance systems operating in the final flight phase, and with target selection equipment. The possibility of furnishing cruise missiles with lidar, with infrared television guidance equipment and with millimeter-band radar is being examined.

Planning strikes at sea, right during transfer of ships (submarines) to their intended area of operations or even when they are already within the zone of combat operations, is a way to raise the effectiveness of the combat use of sea-launched cruise missiles. According to plans, the possibility for this is to be achieved by 1995.

A program for creating new ASLCM sea-launched cruise missiles, to be supplied to surface ships, is being examined. Cruise missiles capable of long range (a figure of 3,220 km has been indicated) have been proposed for the U.S. Air Force. Their range makes them strategic weapons. Their adoption is anticipated after the year 2000.

America's General Dynamics and McDonnell-Douglas are developing a new modification of the Tomahawk cruise missile—the BGM-109C Block-3, which will possess

improved flight support software making it possible to raise the precision with which the missile reaches the target.

Thus we can assert that American naval forces are being intensively armed with new high-precision weapons. In 1990 62 submarines and 32 surface ships were equipped with sea-launched cruise missiles, and by the year 2000 they are to be supplied to 198 missile carriers, including 107 atomic submarines. The number of these missiles may reach 4,000 units by the end of the century.

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### Japanese Military Attaches Interviewed

92UM0491 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 1 Feb 92  
in Russian First Edition p 6

[Interview by A. Golts with Japanese Military Attaches to Moscow: "In the Very Middle of the Middle Class Is How the Japanese Officers Feel Themselves"]

[Text] I have repeatedly been called upon to interview the foreign military including Americans, Chinese, English and servicemen from other states. But there have not been any Japanese officers among them. Moreover, I did not happen to read conversations by our correspondents with servicemen of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Clearly one felt the years-long mutual caution between our states. There was also the traditional desire of the Japanese military to keep their distance from journalists.

However, here seemingly, glasnost has worked its beneficial effect. Recently three senior officers, three military attaches working in Moscow, straight away agreed to answer my questions. They were the air attache, Colonel Yuzo Hoshino, the military attache, Colonel Masami Goto, and the naval attache, Captain 1st Rank Kodo Iwata. Here they stipulated that they would talk primarily about what for me and the readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is virtually unknown, that is, about how the Japanese military lives. They resolved to leave the questions of military policy "for later."

[Golts] Why do the Japanese youths decide to enter the Self-Defense Forces military academy, the only institution of learning which trains officers?

[Attache] "First of all," replied my interviewees smartly and firmly, in a word, "as proper," "the job of the military is the honest and worthy defense of the motherland. This is the reason that we have chosen it."

[Golts] But from what I have heard, in Japanese society there is a rather negative attitude toward the past of the armed forces and the Imperial Army. Has this been carried over to the present Self-Defense Forces? Did you also experience negative feelings when you entered the armed forces?

[Attache] Even during those years when each of us resolved to become officers, a large portion of the nation's population saw the enormous difference between the old army and the one which had been created in our democratic

society. We also saw this. And for this reason, we did not at all consider ourselves part of the past. In spite of the criticism which has been directed at the Self-Defense Forces, including their present state, their existence is approved by about 80 percent of the nation's population. At present, many consider an officer career as worthy and honorable.

In truth, only a little later did we realize that not only the romance of military service had determined the choice of our life's career.

"When I was studying in secondary school," said Colonel Goto, "my father, a school teacher, died. I would need a good deal of money to continue my education. At the same time, the Self-Defense Forces Academy did not require school expenses. On the contrary, all the officer candidates received quite decent scholarships. And here we studied the same technical disciplines, for example, electronics and electrical engineering, as on the corresponding faculties of the Japanese universities."

[Golts] The other two Colleagues of Colonel Goto also evidenced a material concern. The parents of Colonel Hoshino and Capt 1st Rank Iwata were peasants. For this reason they looked favorably upon the fact that their children intended to acquire an education without damage to the family budget. Hence an officer career in Japan is a straight path to a good education. Some have even abused this. There have been instances when the graduates of the Self-Defense Forces Academy have refused to continue service and have been dismissed from the Army. In such a case do they bear any responsibility for this?

[Attache] None at all. The only ones who are obliged to served for a certain time are those who have studied on the Medical Faculty. The point is that a medical education in Japan is extremely costly and within the reach of only the super well-off. So those who obtain this education gratis should work several years as an army medic.

[Golts] Public opinion plays an enormous role in Japan. Does a young man lose something in the eyes of his contemporaries if he, having studied in the Academy, decided to refuse military service? Would he be able to find a good job with one of the well-known Japanese firms?

[Attache] Public opinion is not very critical of such decisions. So if the Academy graduate has the requisite knowledge, he can do well.

[Golts] Can a serviceman break off his service after he has completed the academy and obtained his officer rank?

[Attache] Certainly he can. For health reasons, for family circumstances or, finally, because he has found more attractive work. Only if he has not served the required time, then he will not receive a pension, or it will be a partial one.

[Golts] How long does it take for a discharge from the armed forces?

[Attache] If, let us assume, he has submitted a request for a discharge at his own request, it would take several months to draw up the papers. In truth, if this person

possesses high skills and a rare specialty, for example, he is a military pilot, then the discharge process will take a bit longer. You realize that this is according to peacetime rules and in wartime they would not apply.

[Golts] How are promotions carried out in the Japanese Armed Forces?

[Attache] It is essential to be on good terms with your superior, said my interviewees laughingly. Then they said in all seriousness that each year the commanders draw up officer certifications. In accord with these certifications and the number of years served, the servicemen are recommended for promotion.

[Golts] Should you also improve your education in so doing?

[Attache] No, as a rule, this is not required. But the Self-Defense Forces do have training facilities and the successful completion of a course, of course, provides the opportunity to receive the next rank. In truth, at times a situation arises which the Armed Forces require personnel who have special knowledge. Then the officers are sent to civilian institutions of learning.

[Golts] In what social group do the Japanese military consider themselves?

[Attache] You know, in our Japan about 90 percent of the population considers itself to be middle class. So, in our view, the Japanese military are in the very middle of the middle class.

[Golts] What are the components of the salary of a Japanese military man?

[Attache] The main thing is the number of years served. Rank and position are much less important in this sense. When I was given my present rank, smiled Colonel Goto, my salary was increased by just ¥ 2,000. This was less than 1 percent of my salary. For a colonel who has just been given this rank, the salary is ¥ 400,000 which equals approximately \$3,000. After paying taxes and other deductions, about 300,000 remain clear.

Here let us not forget, said Colonel Hoshino entering the conversation, that in the Armed Forces there are many different service bonuses. For example, a fighter pilot receives a 75 percent bonus over his basic salary. There are also special payments for serving in regions with a cold climate and in areas remote from large cities.

[Golts] A specific feature of military service is the fact that one's place of residence must be changed often. Is compensation paid for these troubles?

[Attache] We do not receive anything except the defrayal of moving costs. It is a fact that a majority of the Japanese officials is constantly changing jobs.

The housing problem, commented Colonel Hoshino, is complicated in Japan. Some servicemen are able to rent state-owned housing and this costs less.

At present I do not have my own home. Hence, when I return to Japan, I will have to build one or rent an

apartment. My finances would allow me to acquire housing with a 2-hour drive from the center of Tokyo. The Servicemen's Association certainly will help but I shall also need to take out a bank loan.

[Golts] What happens to an officer when he retires?

[Attache] A majority continues to work. A number of enterprises willingly hire former military in highly regarding their organizational abilities. In the Armed Forces there are special courses for those intending to retire.

[Golts] Are there instances when the retirees feel resentful?

[Attache] We have not encountered this. On the contrary, the retired officers recall their service with satisfaction.

[Golts] What do your wives think about your service? Presently many women in Japan receive a higher education. Do they not regret that they have abandoned their careers for your sake?

[Attache] It has never entered our heads to ask them about this. And if the women don't say anything it means that they are content with their lot. In contrast to the United States, women in Japan for now are not very concerned with having a professional career. They prefer the career of a wife.

[Golts] As we had agreed, in the conclusion of the conversation the question arose of military-political problems.

How, in your view, will the military policy of your country change under conditions when the Soviet Union and the United States intend to curtail their presence in the Asian-Pacific Region?

[Attache] Japan, replied Colonel Hoshino, welcomes the reduction in the armed forces of the United States and your country in Asia and the Pacific. In this instance, it is very important to consider the stability factor in the Asian-Pacific Region. As for the fundamentals of Japanese defense policy, these remain unaltered. These include the maintaining of the minimum possible level of defense capability and meeting the conditions of the Security Treaty with the United States.

[Golts] American troops are being reduced in Japan. Does this not mean that your country will have to build up its armed forces?

[Attache] It must be considered, commented Capt 1st Rank Iwata, that there is a colossal difference between the defense might of America or your country and the military efforts of Japan per se. Our efforts are actually minimal. And the policy is to see to it that no dangerous vacuum of force forms around Japan which might provoke a potential aggressor. We do not possess strategic and offensive weapons such as ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, aircraft carriers, nuclear and chemical weapons.

[Golts] Recently in Japan there has been the most serious discussion of the question involving the possibility of sending troops overseas for operating as part of the UN Peacekeeping Forces. What do you, as professional military, think about this?

[Attache] You will agree that this is a hypothetical question. Of course, a soldier has the full right to defend himself. But, as is known, the UN is doing everything possible to avoid involving peacekeeping forces in military operations. Moreover, our Parliament has not been able to resolve this question. It will be discussed in the future.

[Golts] What do you think about the development of relations between the military departments of our countries?

[Attache] Last year the Japanese and USSR ministers of foreign affairs agreed that representatives of both countries' defense agencies would participate in consultation on the questions of foreign policy planning in the event of necessity. It is to be greatly lamented that a feeling of

alienation survives between the military of the two neighboring countries. We would like to begin an exchange of opinions and moving step by step, create an atmosphere of mutual trust.

[Golts] However for now, Japan clearly lags behind the Western countries in the area of confidence building in the military area. There has been not bad experience here in the form of the exchange of visits and acquaintance with each other's military concepts and doctrines and with the practical life of the armed forces.

[Attache] We have proposed that an agreement be concluded on preventing incidents at sea. If this agreement is signed, grounds will be created for bilateral contacts in the military area.

So, let us hope.

5285 PORT ROYAL RD  
SPRINGFIELD VA

22161

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